Flood Inquiry Report

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abbreviations 4
Glossary 5-8
Foreword 9-11
Composition &Terms of Reference 12-13
Findings of the Commission 14-21

MAIN REPORT
CHAPTER-1 THE 2010 FLOOD DISASTER:
NATURE AND CAUSES 22-25
CHAPTER-2 THE INQUIRY PROCEEDINGS
Section 1: Gist Of Public Grievances
Official Testimonies:
Section 2: Federal Organizations
Section 3: Provincial Authorities
26-74
CHAPTER-3 FLOOD DAMAGES:
QUANTIFIED AND NON-QUANTIFIED 75-79
CHAPTER-4 GEOGRAPHY OF PAKISTAN
Section 1: Terrain and Climate
Section 2: The 2010 Monsoons
Section 3: A Scenario Averted By Design 80-106
CHAPTER-5 ANALYSIS OF THE OFFICIAL EVIDENCE

Section 1: Federal Organizations
Section 2: Provincial / Territorial Administrations 107-150
CHAPTER-6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 151-160
CHAPTER-7 RECOMMENDATIONS 161-165

ANNEXES

ANNEX-I Supreme Court Order Dated 15-12-2010.
Supreme Court Order Dated 04-01-2011 (Annex-I-A)
Supreme Court Order Dated 09-03-2011 (Annex-I-B)
Supreme Court Order Dated 28-03-2011 (Annex-I-C)
Supreme Court Order Dated 14-04-2011 (Annex-I-D) 166-176
177-178
179
180-183
184-185
ANNEX II List of Witnesses Examined:
At Islamabad (Annex-II-A)
At Breached Bund Sites (Annex-II-B)

186-189
190-194
ANNEX III
Relief Assistance by NDMA In Kind (Annex III-B)
Cash Assistance Through :

Watan-Cards (1st Installment Disbursed)
(Annex-III-B-I)
Watan-Cards (2nd Installment due for Disbursement.
(Annex-III-B-II)
PM’s Relief Fund 2010( as on 30 April 2011)
(Annex-III-B-III)
Relief in Kind by PDMA’s
(Annex-III-B-IV)
195

196-197

198

199

200-206
ANNEX-IV
Foreign Assistance for :

Rescue and Relief Stage (Annex-IV-A)
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Stage (Annex-IV-B )

207
208-210

APPENDICES

Appendix-A ‘Indus Waters Treaty in Retrospect’ by
Mr. Bashir A. Malik.
Appendix-B List of Witnesses examined by the Punjab Judicial Commission
Appendix-C Copies of the Petitions and Written Statements/ Comments from the Respondent provided through the Court Registry
Appendix-D Report of the Sindh Judicial Commission

Appendix-E Sindh Bund Manual (Fourth Edition) 2008

Appendix-F HR Petition by Malik Kausar Abbas, Advocate

Appendix-G Communication dated 08-04-2011 from Hon’ble Mir. Zafar Ullah Khan Jamali, former Prime Minister of Pakistan
Appendix-H Summarized Statements of Witnesses recorded at Islamabad including TV Clips, DVDs etc.

Appendix-I SUPARCO’s Remote Sensing Maps Re: Breaches of Tori and Kot Almo Bunds and Daro Canals in District Thatta etc.
Appendix-J Power Point Presentations by senior officials and other material reviewed.
Appendix-K Proceedings of the IRC Meetings held in 2008, 2009 and 2010 Re Repair of Tori Bund etc.

Appendix-L List of Witnesses who filed Affidavits (District Wise)

ABBREVIATIONS

C.E. Chief Engineer
C.E. (D&F) Chief Engineer (Drainage & Flood)
Cfs Cublic feet per second
D/S Downstream
FFC Federal Flood Commission
FFD Flood Forecasting Division
FWC Flood Warning Center
HFL Highest Flood Level
I & P Department Irrigation and Power Department
MAF Million Acre Feet
NDMA National Disaster Management Authority
PCIW Pakistan Commission for Indus Water
PIDA Provincial Irrigation and Drainage Authority
PMD Pakistan Meteorological Department
PMF Probable Maximum Flood
PMO Project Management Office
PMP Probable Maximum Precipitation
RC Relief Commissioner
S.D.O. Sub Divisional Officer
S.E. Superintending Engineer
U/S Upstream
XEN. Executive Engineer
IRC Indus River Commission
NADRA National Database & Registration Authority
SUPARCO Pakistan Space Upper Atmosphere Research Commission
ROB Rules of Business

GLOSSARY

Abkalani Sindhi The inundation or flood season in Sind from 1st May to 15th October.
Acre foot A unit of volume used in irrigation practice. It means the volume of water required to cover an area of one ace, to depth of one foot = 43,560 cubic feet.

Barrage A structure of moderate height built across a river or a stream to control the river levels and to divert waters for irrigation, navigation, power or other purposes.
Blow-Out An underground leak also called a sand-boil occurring through a sand stratum under the base or seat of a bund breaking out through the ground surface on the rear of the bund in the form of a bubbling spring, carrying with it a volume of sand.
Breach The pit excavated for obtaining the earth required for making up the section of a bund.
Breaching Section Designated Section of an embankment that has to be operated (removed or blown away) in case the pond level touches the critical level to threaten a barrage.
Bund An earthen embankment built more or less parallel to the river banks and at a sufficient distance away, on either side of the river course, to protect the country-side from inundation by the river spill during flood.

Canal An artificial channel constructed to convey appreciable quantities of water for irrigation.

Coffer dam A barrier of wood, concrete or steel sheet pilling built in water to form an enclosure from which water is pumped to permit free access to the area within. A coffer-dam is a (usually temporary) barrier constructed to exclude water from an area that is normally submerged.It is used to allow construction on the foundation of permanent dams, bridges, and similar structure
Crest The top of a dam, dike, spillway or weir, frequently restricted to the overflow portion.
Dam A barrier, typically of concrete, constructed to hold back water and raise its level, the resulting reservoir being used in the generation of electricity or for water supply.
Discharge The rate of flow at stated site, i.e., the quantity of water passing in unit time.
Drainage The natural lines of depression in an area, through which storm water escapes to the river.
Embankment A wall or bank of earth or stone built to prevent a river flooding an area – also called a levee, dyke or bund.
Flash Flood A flood that rises rapidly, with little or no advance warning.
Flood Plain The entire area subject to overflow by the river course in flood, mostly formed by the gradual deposits of sediments on delta lands, causing it to advance further and further into the sea.
Free-board The distance between the designed full supply level and top of the sides of an open channel or masonry work left to allow for wave action, floating debris, or any other condition or emergency without over-topping banks of the channel sides of the structure. The vertical distance between the flood level and the top of the embankment, or other specified structure.
Glacis The sloping floor below and in continuation of the raised crest of a weir.
Groyne A spur constructed with more permanent materials as an obstruction of stone, timber, or brushwood from the embankment of a river, for diverting or holding the flow. A stone groyne is called a spur. When the groyne is constructed parallel to the river flow, for the purpose of protection against wavewash, it is called a “longitudinal groyne,” or “muhari”.
Guide bank The embankments forming the upstream and downstream approaches of a weir. The nose of guide bank is heavily `stone pitched to withstand river action. A protecting and training bank constructed to guide the river through the waterway provided. A river bund may in effect, be a guide bank when it is at the edge of the river course, there being little or no foreshore between the river course and the toe of the bund, e.g., the Jamshoro Bund.
Headworks The works constructed at the off-take of a main canal. It includes the weir on a river, the dam at storage site, etc.
High Flood Level The highest recorded flood level a river has ever attained in any previous year (since 1914), at a given point. The bund is, however to be designed for, or maintained to, “the Designed High Flood Level (D.H.F.L.) which is the assumed H.F.L. “or the “extrapolated H.F.L.”, whichever, is higher.
Hydrograph 1) The curve resulting from the plotting of discharges against each day of the year.
2) A graph showing the gauge (or discharge) with respect to time.
Hydrology The branch of science concerned with the properties of the earth’s water, especially its movement in relation to land.
Inundation Canal A canal dependent upon the surface level of the water in the river for its supplies. It follows that inundation canals only run when the supply in the river rises to a level which permits of feeding the canals.
Irrigation The artificial applications of water to arid land for the purpose of growing crops.
Kharif Summer crops.
Loop Bund When there are tow lines of defence, the subsequently constructed bund line on the rear or land side is generally, called the Loop Bund and the first line is called the Front Bund. If the first line of defence is eroded or abandoned the Loop Bund may become the Front Bund; vice versa, if another line of defence is constructed on the river side, the Front Bund becomes the Loop Bund.
Marginal bund An embankment constructed along the river at a short distance from the margin with the object of preventing inundation of the area behind the embankment.
Overtopping River water running over the top and washing out a portion or whole of the bund.
Piping The flow of water under or around a structure built on permeable foundations, which if not prevented or stopped will remove material from beneath the structure and cause it to fail. The erosion of sub-soil high velocities of flow of water through it, when such velocities exceed a certain limit, is also referred to as ‘piping’. .
Pitching Stone, brick, brushwood, or mattress (i.e., composite brushwood and earth), or other similar materials, placed on earth surfaces for their protection against the action of flowing water. Also known as “Riprap”.
Precipitation The total measurable supply of water received directly from clouds, as rains, snow and hail, usually expressed as depth in inches/ centimeters in a day, month or year, and designated as daily, monthly or annual precipitation.
Rabi Winter crops.
Reach A comparatively short length of a stream or channel.
Regulation The process of distribution of supplies available in a river between different canals taking off it or between channels on a canal.
Regulator A structure through which the discharge may be varied at will, also applied to structure provided with means of varying the water surface level above it.
Riparian Of, relating to, or situated on the banks of a river
Rod Kohi Hill torrents.
Silt 1) Water-borne sediment. The term is generally confined to fine earth, sand, or mud, but is sometimes broadened to include all material carried, including both suspended and bed load;

2) Deposits of water-borne material as in a reservoir, on a delta or on overflowed lands.

Sluice A water channel that is controlled at its head by a gate. Also, a conduit for carrying water at high velocity; an opening in a structure for passing debris; to cause water to flow at high velocities for wastage for purposes of excavation, ejecting debris; etc.
Spur In irrigation practice, a projection into a stream, provided with an armoured head; the head may be of various shapes.
Time lag Is the allowance that has to be made for time required for the effect of changes in indent at one site reaching another indenting site. The time elapsing between the occurrence of any alternation of discharge or level at toe point on the river and its occurrence at another point. Time lag is generally measured by timing the passage of a peak or trough between two points varies inversely with the magnitude of the discharge, for even the same order of discharge, it is different on the failing stage from its value on the rising stage on account of the difference in the slopes of the river.
Wave-wash The damage done to bunds when, on account of strong wind velocity, the flood water forms waves which mount and strike and splash on their upstream face unless counteracted by jungle or other artificial device.
Weir A fall extending across river or canal usually provided with a raised crest and glacis.
Wetting Channel A device used for soaking or preparing a bund in advance of the main rise of the river, for its task of holding back the river. It refers to both (a) a gravity channel from the river lip to the bund and (b) the channel between the trench bund and the main bund through which water is pumped to soak the main bund.

بِسۡمِ ٱللهِ ٱلرَّحۡمَـٰنِ ٱلرَّحِيم

“In the creation of the cosmos and the earth, in the succession of the night and the day, in the vessels that sail across the seas and oceans with cargoes beneficial to human beings, in the water that ALLAH sends down from the sky clouds with which HE brings to life the earth soil after it becomes dead-barren, causing all manner of living creatures to multiply on it, in changing the direction and velocity of the winds, and, the clouds that run their appointed courses between the sky and the earth. Surely, these are the great wonders of ALLAH for those men and women young and old, who possess wisdom and rational intellect”. (Surah Al-Baqra:164)
(Translation by Mr. Badr Hashemi)

FOREWORD

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan constituted a Commission to enquire into the pleadings of various petitioners regarding the 2010 Flood which engulfed the whole country and caused unprecedented damage to life and property.

2. The finalization of the Report took longer than the period assigned to the Commission originally due to the large volume of work involved and the complexities prevalent in most of the important sectors which necessitated more indepth interactions with concerned institutions in light of the Terms of Reference contained in the thirteen formulations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in its Order dated 15th December, 2010 passed in the relevant Constitution Petitions.

3. We would like to acknowledge the assistance and support by all the Ministries and Institutions of the Federal Government as well as the Provincial Governments, in the completion of the task assigned to us. The Hon’ble Prime Minister had graciously spared his official helicopter for four days that facilitated our field visits to three provinces.

4. We are also grateful to the civil society organizations, the media representatives and the public at large for their unqualified support.

5. We would like to place on record our appreciation of the support and assistance provided to us by the Cabinet Division, Government of Pakistan, particularly by Brig Zulfiqar Ali Gorsi, Director General (Military Wing) and his staff in the Cabinet Division, Islamabad.

6. The invaluable assistance provided to us by Mr. Sajid Mehmood Qazi, Facilitator / Additional Registrar, Supreme Court and his staff is highly appreciated.

7. The Commission expresses its gratitude to the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan for reposing confidence, trust and unqualified support to it without which it would not have accomplished its task. While doing so, it was mindful that: “Law shall not stop with the punishment of petty crimes by little people. It must also reach men who posses themselves of great power”. (Robert Jackson, Chief Prosecutor, Nuremburg Trials)

(Fateh Khan Khajjak) (A. W. Kazi) (Kh. Zaheer Ahmed)
Member Member Member

(Muhammad Azam Khan)
Member/Chairman

COMPOSITION AND TERMS OF REFERNECE

A. Composition

1. Muhammad Azam Khan, former Chief Secretary, Khyber- Pakhtunkhwa
2. Fateh Khan Khajjak, former Chief Secretary, Balochistan.
3. A. W. Kazi, former Cabinet Secretary, Government of Pakistan.
4. Kh. Zaheer Ahmed, former Federal Secretary, Government of Pakistan.

B. Terms of Reference (TOR)

8. These TORs were laid down in the form of formulations / questions by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its aforesaid order as under:-

1) “Whether embankment breaches during the period of high floods in Indus River are subject to any procedure to be followed by the authorities at the relevant time, if so, what is the manner of exercising of such powers and by whom and under what circumstances?
2) Whether in the floods in River Indus in the months of July and August, 2010, procedure for embankment breaches was followed judiciously?
3) Whether before ordering embankment breaches at different places, particularly at Ali Wahn and Tori Bund, no procedure was followed, if so, who is responsible for the same?
4) Whether before embankment breaches at different places, precautionary measures were adopted, particularly in view of warnings issued from time to time by the metrological department of Pakistan?
5) Whether the beneficiaries, if any, responsible for embankment breaches to save their properties / crops etc, are also responsible for the losses sustained by the affectees?
6) What is the approximate volume of losses sustained by the affectees and Government during the floods?
7) Whether relief was extended to the flood affectees on war footings or not?
8) Jacobabad Airport was available for flood relief operations, if so then why the relief goods were not sent to affectees on urgent basis?
9) What is the pace of rehabilitation in the flood devastated areas?
10) Whether flood affectees are entitled for damages and compensation from the Government of Pakistan or from the persons who were benefited from the embankment breaches?
11) Whether administrations of the Provincial Governments in private and official capacity are responsible for failing to manage affairs of flood affectees justly or properly, if so, what action is suggested against them?
12) Whether embankment of River Indus was being maintained annually, if not so, who is responsible for the same?
13) Who was responsible for breaches that took place at Thori Bund and Ali Wahn Bund?”

THE FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION

9. On the basis of oral and documentary evidence, related information in public domain, its interaction with the affectees during field visits to four provinces, as analyzed in the main Report, the Commission’s findings on the specific formulations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court are given below seriatum:-

1. Whether embankment breaches during the period of high floods in Indus River are subject to any procedure to be followed by the authorities at the relevant time, if so, what is the manner of exercising of such powers and by whom and under what circumstances?

Findings

a. From Diamir-Bhasha downwards upto D.I. Khan, Indus River flows through KP and the Punjab; KP is not threatened by the Indus, nor any SOP for flood embankments was currently in vogue in the Province.
b. Jinnah and Taunsa Barrages on the Indus are being maintained by the Punjab and Chashma Barrage is maintained by the WAPDA.
c. Pre-designated breaching sections have been earmarked for the Right Guide Bund (RGB), upstream Jinnah Barrage for activation before the water levels threaten the barrage safety; for the purpose, an inter-agency civil-military committee has been notified by the Provincial Government to determine on-spot justification and its precise timing for activation by Army’s Engineers.
d. The current SOPs do not authorise breaches in Left Guide Bund (LGB) or Left Marginal Bund (LMB) of Jinnah Barrage in the Punjab or for any other bunds in the Punjab or Sindh, as such. On the contrary, all bunds are required to be maintained for safety of the people, farms and property, as per specified guidelines.

2. Whether in the floods in River Indus in the months of July and August, 2010, procedure for embankment breaches was followed judiciously?

Findings

a. In the Punjab, pre-designated breaches in RGB upstream Jinnah Barrage were operationalized to save the Barrage by use of explosives through the Army Engineers, on 31st July 2010 after due process and diligence by the notified inter-agency committee.
b. Other major breaches, including those in the LGB/LMB of Jinnah Barrage, LMB of Taunsa Barrage and its secondary Sunawan Bund in Muzaffargarh, Jampur Bund and Fakhhar Bund in Kot Mithan, of Rajanpur district were not caused by direct human interventions, nor permissible as such under any SOPs. A host of factors & reasons contributed to these breaches: Pre-flood poor maintenance, existence of private bunds in the river belt, non-observance of barrage gate regulations at critical hours, use of incompatible quality of material for rehabilitation of LMB on Taunsa and conceptual and design issues and motivated considerations of the duty staff, inconsistent with officially approved plans, besides complacency were noted.
c. In Sindh also, no breach to any bunds was authorized but these occurred in case of Tori and its loop bunds due to pre-flood negligence,poor maintenance and attempts to remove earth from the crest. In case of MS and PB Bunds in Thatta Sujawal, observed indifference, before and during the flood season and illegal practices in and around the bunds contributed to the breaches.

3. Whether before ordering embankment breaches at different places, particularly at Aliwahan and Tori Bund, no procedure was followed, if so, who is responsible for the same?

Findings

a. The Tori Bund suffered years of neglected maintenance; its height had eroded substantially, and ‘dangerously’, long before the flood season; last minute, misdirected departmental attempt to remove earth from its crest to fill the ‘Garrahs’ [deep pits] on the riverside of the Bund in wee hours of 6/7th August further reduced its height in gross violation of specified guidelines; the public viewed that as a deliberate attempt to breach. At the relevant time, the Chief Engineer, Guddu, camped at Tori Rest House, and his team, especially the XEN in-charge, failed to take timely remedial measures; they were directly responsible for consequential losses in Sindh and Balochistan.
b. The case of Aliwahan Bund was, however, somewhat different; it was not breached during 2010 floods. High level consultations amongst political and civil-military officials including Federal, and Provincial political personages assembled at Sukkar for two days decided against this breach; in fact, the petitioner’s case was that Aliwahan bund should have been breached.

4. Whether before embankment breaches at different places, precautionary measures were adopted, particularly in view of warnings issued from time to time by the meteorological department of Pakistan?

Findings

a. The bunds are spread over thousands of km and had suffered extensive erosions before and during the 2010 Flood; most vulnerable amongst these had been placed under special focus for precautionary measures against any contingency, too. The pre-flood surveys by civil-military teams to check the status of these structures, as also required by respective District Disaster Plans were treated as a routine. However, specific evidence was not produced to confirm or deny whether these inspections fulfilled the official instructions had been complied in letter, much less the spirit of statutory obligations of the Ordinance LIII of 2007, since converted into an Act of Parliament in December 2010. In many cases, field inspections were claimed, but not even recorded.
b. The PMD’s revised forecast was late, but sufficient time was still available, particularly for authorities in southern Punjab and Sindh to take corrective and preventive measures. However, these were not effective, particularly as extremely wide margins were noted in the PMD’s flood predictions and actual flows due to unguaged torrents, streams and rivers.

5. Whether the beneficiaries, if any, responsible for embankment breaches to save their properties/crops etc, are also responsible for the losses sustained by the affectees?

Findings In principle, causing wrongful loss to any one is a penal offence, irrespective of whether the perpetrator gains from that act or not? However, in the case under inquiry, though unprecedented losses were inflicted by acts and omissions of concerned officials in the irrigation hierarchies, no specific evidence was produced to establish wrongful gain by any specific individual, except general and at times vague allegations and opinions on management of irrigation works and ways & means to protect the infrastructures: e.g.

a. In the Punjab, the CE & SE at Jinnah Barrage did not ensure pre-flood preparations, including mandatory stocking of loose stones to plug the potential breaches or to check non-compliance and report deficiencies in accordance with approved Flood Protection Plan for the 2010 season.
b. The CE at Jinnah Barrage and PMO Taunsa Barrage, both failed to ensure observance of barrage regulations, demonstrate effective control or supervision over their subordinates, especially after 21st July PMD warning for acting in accordance with approved Flood Protection Plan for the 2010 season.
c. In case of Tori, MS and PB Bunds in two irrigation regions of Sindh, the then Secretary, Irrigation and two Chief Engineers of Guddu and Kotri Barrages, failed to take timely corrective measures to save affectees from the losses to which they were exposed, both in Sindh and Balochistan.
d. The then Secretary Irrigation Sindh and CE Guddu not only misrepresented facts before the Commission, at Islamabad and the SE Kotri on site at Thatta, knowing these to be false and deliberately suppressed evidence of their respective culpability.

6. What is the approximate volume of losses sustained by the affectees and Government during the floods?

Findings

a. Mundane Nationwide Losses of Infrastructure:

(i) Rs 855 billion, of which over 65% was by private peoples, excluding complete loss of one additional Rabi crop, in Jaffarabad District of Naseerabad Division in Balochistan.
(ii) The gross loss is almost 5.8% of the GDP and at par with debt servicing allocations for fiscal 2010-11.
(iii) Public expenses by civil and defence establishments from their own allocations are not reflected in the above losses.

b. Indirect Losses:

(i) Loss of human lives: 1,600, compensated or to be compensated @ Rs. 500,000/ per death.
(ii) Loss of one-half of academic sessions of some 7.0 million school going children.
(iii) Loss of jobs: 4.5 million, mostly farm labour.
(iv) Exposure to diseases and malnutrition of 20 million people.

7. Whether relief was extended to the flood affectees on war footings or not?

Finding Despite glaring cases of inadequate attention in many areas, the magnitude and scale of the disaster and the speed with which it unfolded in first phase during July 27-12th August, the overall rescue and relief operations launched and logistics mobilized at all levels including public responses constituted an impressive chapter of managerial history, particularly, if regard was paid to prevailing organizational erosion since 1969. Both civil and military establishments mobilized whatever they could; the NGOs extended full cooperation to the affectees. The administration in KP and the Punjab remained most visibly active.

8. Jacobabad Airport was available for flood relief operations, if so then why the relief goods were not sent to affectees on urgent basis?

Finding Presence of sizeable number of foreign personnel at the Jacobabad Airbase for sometime was confirmed; that may have created a perception of its inaccessibility for relief goods. The foreign nationals were reportedly employed to train and assist PAF staff for upgrading facilities, before arrival of the new batch of F-16 planes, due by December 2010, at that time. However, the number of relief flights, flown in and out of Jacobabad airport, during August and September do not substantiate that it remained inaccessible, except on technical grounds of capacity constraints. The PAF confirmed that the base provided a virtual air-bridge for relief operations, in an area, otherwise cut off from rest of the province for many weeks; that contradicted the assertion of closure of the facility for relief assistance.

9. What is the pace of rehabilitation in the flood devastated areas?

Findings The Planning Commission has developed a hard core portfolio of priority works for restoration of damaged infrastructure at a cost of Rs. 277 billion, in next 3 years. The program has been designed in consultation with federating units and International Development Partners. It was, however, conditional to part funding by the DFIs. It contains sectoral / regional schemes for immediate to short-term execution. The main component of Rehabilitation programmes include:

a. Rehabilitation of Affectees:

(i) Most affectees have returned to their native places, except in Sindh and Jaffarabad district of Naseerabad Division of Balochistan where some relief camps are still operating, as pre-conditions conducive to revival of life and living have not been restored.
(ii) Compensation of first tranche of Rs.20,000 per household to rebuild/ repair houses, contributed by Federal and Provincial Governments on 50:50 basis has almost been completed, except cases being re-verified for various reasons of imperfect documentation or cases of observed anomalies.
(iii) Remaining payment of Rs.80,000/ per household is expected to commence after disbursement of loans from WB/ ADB etc. The Provinces have used this delay for recertification of the contested claims.
(iv) Some friendly countries and NGOs have donated / offered construction of model villages following Build Back Better [BBB] policy with necessary civic amenities; the work is steadily progressing on ground.

b. Restoration of Irrigation Infrastructure:

(i) The Farm sector activity has been revived in the provinces, except directly affected districts of Jaffarabad and Jhal Magsi in Balochistan; for the latter two areas, the Hon’able Court has issued orders for time bound restoration of irrigation supplies in the light of interim recommendations of the Commission.
(ii) KP and the Punjab reacted promptly to restore losses to irrigation network from their own resources.
(iii) The Sindh Government did not move as promptly as expected; however, it finally prioritized execution of 39 development schemes worth Rs.5,000 million, for rehabilitation of bunds / canals commenced after receipt of 50% federal subvention, in early March 2011.
(iv) Balochistan too did not initiate rehabilitation of farm sector in Naseerabad Division, with requisite urgency pending restoration of damaged infrastructure in Sindh due to paucity of funds.

10. Whether flood affectees are entitled for damages and compensation from the Government of Pakistan or from the persons who were benefited from the embankment breaches?

Findings

a. The Calamities Act 1958 did not obligate compensation for losses on account of any natural disaster, much less 1947 type claims. However, as a natural social compassion, ex-gratia ad-hoc compensation is invariably provided to affectees in distress or victims exposed to natural or man-made disasters beyond their bearing capacity. The governments also remit abyana and land revenue in calamity affected areas. With the promulgation of the NDMA Ordinance/Act, however, fixation of an objective scale for compensation has become a statutory duty. For the 2010 Flood, a scale of compensation was approved by the ECC. The ECC approval did not, however, take into account where affectees lost their land to rivers or landslides in mountains. The NDMC or other provincial bodies under the Ordinance LIII of 2007 did not adopt the ECC’s political guidelines, formally. A limited insurance cover by ZTBL window is available to farmers but it was/is not availed by most.
b. As noted in the Commissions’ findings under formulation No 5 supra, no proof of wrongful gains was produced, though extensive losses were suffered, as stated above.

11. Whether administrations of the Provincial Governments in private and official capacity are responsible for failing to manage affairs of flood affectees justly or properly, if so, what action is suggested against them?

Finding: Primary source of disaster was attributable to the collapse of irrigation structures, new and old, that caused unprecedented damages to rest of the public and private infrastructure and property. However, the magnitude of losses is so large, that no individual or government was in a position to compensate for the losses on stand alone basis, at least immediately. The more so, as for over three decades, Pakistan’s scarce resources have been diverted to unwelcome wars imposed during extra-constitutional regimes, without peoples’ sanction since widened to a three-dimensional security threat, from within and without, under extraordinary conditions. Following measures may be considered:

a. The action against officials of the Punjab government held responsible for acts of omission and commission as identified by the Punjab Judicial Commission be proceeded against in due process.
b. The Governments may sensitize the WB about the direct and indirect losses caused by breach in Taunsa’s LMB that had cascading effect on other bunds with request to absorb expenditure on (a) above, plus other compensation for the affectee-farmers in Muzaffargarh District.
c. In Sindh also, the then Secretary Irrigation and Chief Engineer Guddu be thoroughly investigated under direct supervision of Sindh High Court, to account for their failure to take timely preventive measures, reasonably predicted in February 2010 and before, with respect to Tori Bund and the acts and omissions leading to its eventual collapse after the onset of heavy rains on 27th July 2010 in KP and G-B and consequent floods.
d. Likewise, the CE and SE Kotri be subjected to explain their failures to rectify and repair MS and PB Bunds, despite four-week advance warning.
e. Special audit of all the provincial irrigation works executed during last 10 years at least, be conducted.
f. Strengthening of Federal Flood Commission and oversight of the NDMA as per law.
g. In the immediate to short term Farmers’ association may be encouraged to persuade their members to avail insurance cover through ‘Zarai Taraqiati Bank’ (ZTBL) window.
h. Long-term bonds may be issued to farmers having subsistence holdings, through ZTBL, as a token of recognition of their damages suffered due to consistent official neglect.

12. Whether embankment of River Indus was being maintained annually, if not so, who is responsible for the same?

Finding: Most embankments were not maintained, as required and specified in SOPs; this also reflected mis-match in resource allocations, except in case of LMB on Taunsa, rehabilitated in 2008-2009 at a considerable cost under a WB funded project. Most breaches also indicated serious organizational and managerial issues impinging upon professionals’ apathy besides being an indicator of widespread corrupt practices in the hierarchy. That is also due to disproportionate commitment to canal water distribution under political influences; local committees and user-charges for recovery of maintenance funds may be considered, as offered by KP farmers to improve communication for timely actions.

13. Who was responsible for breaches that took place at Thori Bund and Ali Wahn Bund?

Finding: As noted under TOR no. 3 above, the Tori breach was attributable primarily to negligence of CE Guddu and his team; his immediate supervisor, the then Secretary Irrigation and author of the revised Bund Manual, was equally, if not more, culpable with them, on two counts:

Firstly,failure to ensure upgradation of the bund before 2010 Flood as mandated by the IRC on 4th February 2010; and

Secondly, for suppressing evidence, with an attempt to mislead the Commission, knowing full well about pre-flood state of Tori Bund; they both committed perjury, knowing it to be such. The last minute shifting of Irrigation’s Minister’s portfolio needs to be explored too, by the political leadership in that context to rule out manipulation or divert the focus of failed bunds from departmental acts and omissions to political leadership, notwithstanding the confusion compounded by his irresponsible statement.

MAIN REPORT

CHAPTER-1

THE 2010 FLOOD DISASTER: NATURE, CAUSES

The Mandate:

1. On 15th December 2010, while hearing various HR Petitions [Re: 62/2010, 17/2010 and others], a three-member full bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, headed by Hon’ble Chief Justice of Pakistan vide its Order ANNEX I (herein below cited as the 15th December Order), as amended on 4 January 2011 vide Annex I-A, constituted a 4-Member Commission composed of Barrister Azam Khan, Mr. Fateh Khan Khajjak, Mr. A.W. Kazi and Kh. Zaheer Ahmed, former Provincial Chief Secretaries and Federal Secretaries for factual determination of below listed thirteen formulations consented to by the parties. These formulations have been adopted by the Commission as its Terms of Reference (TORs) which are:-

1) “Whether embankment breaches during the period of high floods in Indus River are subject to any procedure to be followed by the authorities at the relevant time, if so, what is the manner of exercising of such powers and by whom and under what circumstances?
2) Whether in the floods in River Indus in the months of July and August, 2010, procedure for embankment breaches was followed judiciously?
3) Whether before ordering embankment breaches at different places, particularly at Aliwan and Tori Bund, no procedure was followed, if so, who is responsible for the same?
4) Whether before embankment breaches at different places, precautionary measures were adopted, particularly in view of warnings issued from time to time by the metrological department of Pakistan?
5) Whether the beneficiaries, if any, responsible for embankment breaches to save their properties/crops etc, are also responsible for the losses sustained by the affectees?
6) What is the approximate volume of losses sustained by the affectees and Government during the floods?
7) Whether relief was extended to the flood affectees on war footings or not?
8) Jacobabad Airport was available for flood relief operations, if so then why the relief goods were not sent to affectees on urgent basis?
9) What is the pace of rehabilitation in the flood devastated areas?
10) Whether flood affectees are entitled for damages and compensation from the Government of Pakistan or from the persons who were benefited from the embankment breaches?
11) Whether administrations of the Provincial Governments in private and official capacity are responsible for failing to manage affairs of flood affectees justly or properly, if so, what action is suggested against them?
12) Whether embankment of River Indus was being maintained annually, if not so, who is responsible for the same?
13) Who was responsible for breaches that took place at Thori Bund and Aliwan Bund?”

2. The Commission was required to submit its findings within two months. On 15th January 2011, it commenced its work; On 9th March and 14th April, 2011, vide Orders Annex I-B and I-C, respectively, further extensions were granted by the Hon’ble Court up to 30th April 2011 as requested by the Commission. The Commission was authorised to co-opt and engage any prominent ‘Experts’, if so required by it. The Hon’ble Court had directed the Federal and Provincial Governments to extend requisite assistance and logistic support to the Commission, at Islamabad and during field visits, as may be needed. The Court also advised consideration of the book ‘Indus Waters Treaty in Retrospect’ authored by Mr. Bashir A. Malik [Appendix-A], a retired Superintending Engineer who remained associated with WAPDA during conception of the Treaty and thereafter. The Commission benefited from the data / information from Mr. Malik’s above cited book. The Commission, however, noted from the copy book of depositions recorded by the Judicial Commission constituted by the Punjab Government that he had been examined by that Commission [Appendix-B] where questions had arisen at various levels about Taunsa Barrage LMB’s design as well as use of incompatible materials. His association with this Commission was, therefore, not deemed appropriate.

3. Copies of the petitions and written statements / comments from the respondents provided to the Commission through the Court Registry are listed in [Appendix-C]. These include a copy of the Report [Appendix-D] of the learned 2-member Judicial Commission [herein below described as SJC], constituted by the Sindh Government to inquire into the breaches during the 2010 Flood submitted on 9th December 2010 by the Respondent Sindh Government in the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Out of the 225 page Report, its 128 pages [Pages 20-26, 47-58, 69-164, and 179-191] are relevant extracts from the Sindh Bund Manual [Appendix-E]. An additional Civil Miscellaneous Petition [Appendix-F] filed after the 15th December Order assigned to the Commission was not pursued by the learned ‘Intervener’ who met the Commission at Kot Addu on 17th March and confirmed that he had since been examined by the Punjab Judicial Commission.

4. Mr. Sajid Mehmood Qazi, the learned Additional Registrar of the Court was assigned to act as ‘The Facilitator’ for the Commission; his invaluable and painstaking assistance and promptitude facilitated the Commission’s task at every stage, and in all matters from convening of its first sitting at Islamabad, recording of the proceedings, coordination with the petitioners, relevant government offices and officers, collection of information and securing of documents and background material, so was indeed the case with his hardworking staff, as and when needed. Federal and Provincial Government functionaries extended assistance, as and when required.

5. In pursuance of its task, a preliminary meeting was convened on 15th January, 2011, in the Supreme Court building wherein Barrister Azam Khan, the learned member from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, was requested to act as Chairperson to steer the Commission’s proceedings. Mr. Abdur Rauf Chaudhary, the then Cabinet Secretary, alongwith senior officials and the representatives of Provincial Chief Secretaries attended that sitting by special invitation, to assure government’s assistance and support, at par with what was made admissible to the Hon’ble members of the NODMC, constituted by the Federal Government to oversee the 2010 Flood Relief and Rehabilitation operations; that commitment was later reaffirmed by Ms Nargis Sethi, the incumbent Cabinet Secretary who designated Mr. Shahid ullah Beg, Additional Secretary Cabinet Division and Brig, Zulfiqar Ali Gorsi, Director General Military Wing and NODMC with service experience in the flood affected areas, remained available in all sittings for logistic support. On the Commission’s request, the Cabinet Secretary deputed Brig Gorsi, to accompany the Commission in its 6-days field visits to the four provinces.

6. Regular hearings of the Commission commenced at Islamabad w.e.f. 22nd January, 2011, and continued on 27th January, 8th, 15th and 23rd February and 9th and 18th April 2011. Thereafter the Commission met from 26 to 30th April, 2011 to consider and finalize its Report. Field visits to Balochistan, Sindh and the Punjab were undertaken from 14 to 17th March and to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) from 31st March to 1st April, 2011, respectively. Aerial view of the Rabi crops in the flood affected areas enabled the Commission to see the restoration of farm activities in the Punjab and Sindh, as was indeed noted in the two days road travel to KP’s doubly affected farm areas in the command of canals/minors of Rivers Swat and Kabul. The case of Balochistan was somewhat different and interim recommendations were submitted to the Hon’ble Court that was pleased to pass orders on 28th March 2011 [Annex I-D] for time-bound completion of priority irrigation works to restore infrastructure for plantings of the 2011 Kharif crops in Jaffarabad.

CHAPTER-2

THE INQUIRY PROCEEDINGS

7. With a view, therefore, to relate the pleadings, the Commission resolved at the outset to seek a comprehensive overview of the organizational networks established at Federal, Provincial and Local levels to plan, coordinate and execute assigned functions for effective responses, at various stages of disaster management, including the 2010 Flood, followed by examination of the nature and causes of grievances of the petitioners and media, and other relevant material placed on record, initially in the context of formulations no 1, 2 and 12 cited supra, followed by comprehensive responses on other issues. The lists of witnesses examined at Islamabad and during field visits, and those who filed affidavits is given at Annex-II-A, B & C . These included petitioners/ public witnesses, in-service and retired officers/ respondents and a large number of affectees.

8. Amongst the public, those who deposed before the Commission, or appeared to support other affectees included a lady MNA resident of Thatta, and the Deputy Chairman, Senate of Pakistan, a Federal Minister both from Jaffarabad, leading media anchors/representatives who covered the floods by spot visits, members of concerned civil society and individuals who sought to appear before the Commission. Hon’ble Mir Zafar Ullah Khan Jamali, former Primer Minister of Pakistan had also evinced his interest to depose before the Commission. However, despite two opportunities, allowed on his own requests, he was unable to attend and substantiate serious allegations made by him before the media and later in his written communication of 8th April, 2011 [Appendix-G]. Federal Minister Syed Khurshid Ahmed Shah, former Federal Minister Mir Aijaz Hussain Jakhrani, MNA, Sirdar Mohammed Saif-ud-Din Khan Khosa, MNA, Jam Saifullah Dharejo, Provincial Minister Irrigation, Sindh and Malik Ahmed Yar Hunjara, MPA (Punjab) deposed before the Commission on 18th April, 2011.

9. Heads/representatives of various Federal and Provincial Ministries/Departments including the NDMA under Prime Minister’s Secretariat, Pakistan Army, PAF, SUPARCO and Pakistan Meteorology Department under Ministry of Defence, the Federal Flood Commission and WAPDA under Ministry of Water and Power, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, NADRA under Ministry of Interior, territorial administrations of FATA, Gilgit Baltistan and AJK, all under direct Federal responsibility, Provincial Irrigation and Power Departments and Disaster Management Authorities whose senior functionaries, past and present , were invited to assist the Commission.

10. A number of other officials and persons also briefed the Commission during its six days field visits to the Provinces to reiterate officially stated presentations. : General perceptions in the affected areas were also noted by the Commission in its sessions held at Tori and Thatta-Sujawal in Sindh, Jaffarabad in Balochistan, Taunsa and Kot Addu in the Punjab, Munda, Nowshehra, Charsadda and Peshawar in the KP. The visits provided an opportunity to have an overview of the damages to breached infrastructures and works-in-progress for restoration of the Rabi crops in affected areas of four provinces; that blending of the evidence on record with ground realities facilitated findings on the specific formulations.

11. Gist of written presentations, supplemented by oral depositions, were summarized in the record of proceedings as ‘Minutes’ [Appendix-H], The power-point presentations and other material including TV Clips, DVDs and remote sensing images tendered in support of oral depositions were viewed by the Commission and have been placed on record, Media reports from following web sites were also taken note of.

a. [http://tribune.com.pk/story/50070/flood-inquiry-tribunal-asks-for-more- detailed-reports/;
b. http://pakobserver.net/2010/10/30/;
c. http://www.nation.com.pk./pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english- online/Regional/Lahore/11Nov-2010/]

12. The Commission also benefited from the depositions of 82 witnesses/officials examined by the Sindh Judicial Commission that included a local MNA and an MPA from the affected areas, Advocates (2), Media personnel (4), Office-bearers from local Zakat Committees (2), Abadgars Social Welfare Boards (2), Zamindars (15), Farmers/villagers (28), concerned public officials (22), Irrigation officials /experts (10) and revenue staff (2). The 150 witnesses examined by the Punjab Judicial Commission included locals/ affectees (50), mostly from Muzaffargarh District and a few from Mianwali, High Court Advocates (9), Provincial officials (48), including Departmental Secretaries/senior officials (25) and Irrigation officials (23), Senior Federal officials (17), Subject Specialists/Experts (13), District Administrations (7), Media (2) and three from NGOs. Provinces/ administrations of Balochistan and KP or FATA did not hold or report any significant probe or inquiry.

SECTION-1

GIST OF PUBLIC GRIEVANCES

13. During various sittings of the Commission, all the petitioners reiterated substantive contents of their respective petitions to reaffirm grievances stated therein with respect to inadequacy of pre-flood preparations, to allege neglected state of maintenance of protective bunds, lack of direction or timely cautions to enable people to vacate to safety. Attention was drawn to conflicting statements of senior public functionaries: Whether breaches were pre-planned and induced by authorized officials, these were motivated by malicious interventions or these were accidental? Adequacy or otherwise of preparations for evacuation of the affectees were questioned. Some breaches were allegedly at the behest of politicians for diversion of flood waters to inflict unprecedented damages, with or without departmental connivance. It was also asserted that too little was done too late in various phases, both due to incompetence and widespread corrupt practices that continue to be seen in the disbursements of ex-gratia assistance or rehabilitation. A former Prime Minister also joined the affectee-protestors.

14. As regards the specific grievances of the petitioners, the media representatives and members of civil society who deposed before the Commission at Islamabad and the affectees who met with the Commission during field visits, their submissions are summarized below:-

a. Ms. Marvi Memon, MNA (the Petitioner in Constitution Petition No.62 of 2010) from Thatta, in Sindh levelled serious allegations based on a detailed account of her meticulously documented field visits along the flood-route of River Indus that began from Gilgit-Baltistan. Her contentions were supplemented by multi-media presentations, video-clips and summary of day-to-day media coverage of reported events to flag various aspects of mismanagement and neglect in handling of the disaster, in all its phases. According to the petitioner, relevant departments had failed to faithfully undertake or execute pre-flood plans, upkeep the maintenance works due to negligence, incompetence, corrupt practices or combination thereof. It was asserted that specific warnings by the Flood Commission and Meteorological Department about high floods at Guddu and Sukkur barrages were ignored. During rescue, Shikarpur flood affectees were denied access to Benazirabad (formerly Nawabshah) and many others from upper Sindh were not allowed relocation in Karachi. Breaching of Tori and PB Bunds and B.S. Feeder and many more cuts/breaches violated past practices and departmental procedures enforced in 1976 when Ali-Wahn Bund was breached to save people and crops but that was not allowed in the 2010 Flood. Drawing attention to her frequent field-visits to affected areas, particularly in K.N. Shah and Thatta in Sindh, she noted that most people alleged that their personal properties were exposed to water havoc but Ali-Wahn Bund was not breached at the behest of two Federal Ministers/ MNAs Syed Khurshid Ahmed Shah and Mr. Aijaz Jakhrani. She flagged the TV clip in which Sindh Irrigation Minister, Mr. Saifullah Dharejo, in presence of acting Chief Secretary Sindh, informed the Press about his department’s pre-planned breaches in the old Ghauspur Loop Bund, a claim that was later further confirmed publically by other Parliamentarians too. In the rehabilitation phase also, many irregularities/malpractices were alleged in issuance of Watan Cards due to political considerations; that seeds and fertilizers had not been equitably distributed among the deserving farmers, well in time; and that these were due to lack of effective supervision and poor control compounded by alleged corruption, observed even in rescue, relief and rehabilitation phases. She also alleged that despite a year long forewarning by the World Bank, our Governments did not initiate appropriate timely actions to prepare people for the disaster. It was stated that no visible maintenance work had been carried out on the protective bunds for years. The Petitioner also stated that she had reasons to disassociate from the proceedings of the Sindh Judicial Commission, as also summarized in her power-point summary placed on record.
b. Mr. Jan Muhammad Jamali, Deputy Chairman Senate of Pakistan, who had filed a petition for Suo Moto action through Mr. Fakhruddin G. Ibrahim SASC, also deposed on the above lines to state that the Irrigation authorities neglected the maintenance of barrages in general, and Sukkur in particular where many gates were/are still not functional. As direct consequence thereof, its discharge capacity had been considerably reduced; flood waters were diverted to expose Balochistan to unprecedented losses and damages and pushed tens of thousands of IDP’s to Balochistan; that Balochistan was never prepared for the floods and diversion of devastating waters that virtually destroyed Nasirabad Division, whole of Jaffarabad District and part of Jhal Magsi without any warning by Federal or Sindh Government. He alleged malafide and urged consultations with neutral professionals from Balochistan and Sindh. Mr. Jamali also affirmed that no one from Balochistan was associated or consulted by Sindh Judicial Commission, nor did the Petitioner trust its proceedings and findings.
c. Ms. Zahida Thebo, Advocate, who had sought compensation for individual losses deposed that to save the town of Mehar (North of Dadu), the Chief Minister Sindh directed diversion of water towards her cropped area that resulted in the inundation of about 180 villages; that 90-meters of unauthorized cut was induced in the Sultan Bund and adjoining road that dislocated the population of Khairpur Nathan Shah town; that not only the livestock of the poor perished, the sub-surface waters and fertile soils were rendered unfit for irrigated cultivation. She placed on record relevant copies of her telephonic conversation with local manager of a politician and police officer in support of her claims.
d. Mr. Hamid Mir, a leading Journalist and ‘GEO TV’ anchor gave graphic details of the most direct, on-spot live coverage of water flows at worst affected select locations where breaches did take place. It was deposed that in KP’s Nowshera and Charsadda Districts, unprecedented flash floods had surprised everyone. These had destroyed private property, and swept away many Government offices and infrastructure. Unlike KP, authorities in Southern Punjab and Sindh had adequate time to prepare and minimize damages of the impending disaster. At a few places, security personnel were seen actively engaged in causing random breaches, to protect security installations and personnel, without visible presence of civilian counterparts. During these visits frequent allegations of inaccessibility and non-availability of Jacobabad Air-Force Base were voiced by the locals. Sindh Minister, Ms. Sassi Palejo blamed the Irrigation Department of negligence and corruption and massive losses due to human interventions from breaches of B.S. Link. It was also noted that during his visit to Rahim Yar Khan, Mr. Jehangir Tareen, MNA / former Federal Minister had informed him that vast areas on the Punjab-Sindh boundary were inundated by partially washed away Bhong Bund, and that the bund was left incomplete due to court injunctions, though most was completed in time. Mr. Mir also deposed that in Jaffarabad, the local officials were seen pre-occupied in evacuation of their own families/ relatives whereas non-local Civil-Military officials on duty were seen effectively engaged in relief and rescue operations. It was further stated that during the rescue phase, despite clear media warnings, the Sindh administration failed to provide security or check the dacoits who looted many destitute/ affectees besides kidnapping their women and children.
e. Mr. Aamir Ilyas Rana, Bureau Chief, ‘The Express News’ deposed that he accompanied the Hon’ble Prime Minister to Suhbatpur in Jacobabad District where the locals and Mr. Zafarullah Khan Jamali, former Prime Minister informed the Prime Minister about deliberate diversions of water towards Balochistan at the behest of Federal Ministers Syed Khurshid Shah and Mr. Ijaz Jakhrani to settle old political scores and to save Jacobabad Airbase, not accessible to locals. He referred to the statement by the Sindh Chief Minister, Syed Qaim Ali Shah, who had dismissed the gravity of the disaster, in a lighter vein, if not outright insensitivity, to counsel the people to go on 15-days vacations and save themselves from impending floods. He also pointed out that the security agencies present in the area carried out unauthorized breaches and they needed to clarify their role and position.
f. Mr. Javed Ahmed Soomro, Reporter ‘Sindh TV’ deposed that his cameramen were the first to capture the illegal breach of Tori Bund, much before arrival of the high floods and these self-evident DVDs were provided to the Registrar Supreme Court, for viewing the ground situation.
g. Mr. Ali Sher, Chief Reporter ‘Waqt News’, deposed that video footage provided by the media established clear discrepancies between the statements of Irrigation authorities including Provincial Minister regarding breaches and vehemently dispelled the claims of over-topping, as the prime cause of flooding of human settlements/ crops exposed to excessive waters released as a result of these breaches.
h. Mr. M.B. Soomro, Reporter ‘The Daily Kaawish’ deposed that Sindh Irrigation Department did not/could not correctly forecast the magnitude of approaching waters that inflicted extensive damages; that at pre-flood stage timely draining out of water from Kenjhar and Mancher lakes could have decreased damages due to pressure from excessive flows. He also averred to gauges and dysfunctional gates at Sukkur Barrage to allege corrupt practices and/or non-maintenance. It was pointed out that thousands of acres of ‘Kacha’ land was illegally encroached upon by local influentials and construction of houses and other built-up properties had aggravated flood hazards. To Mr. Soomro, permitting breach on the left bank on river Indus below Kotri revealed malafide motives.
i. Sh. Nisar Hussain, Bureau Chief of ‘Apna’ TV Channel, deposed that Sindh administration was negligent as it did not take appropriate measures, though the flood waters from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) took almost 3 weeks to reach Kotri; he opined that the possibility that funds sanctioned for maintenance of embankments and bunds etc. were misappropriated by the Irrigation staff, in collusion with the contractors could not be ruled out. Illegal encroachments along the river banks were also a source of observed damages.
j. Mr. Sarwar Bari, a social activist and political analyst attached to an NGO, and a columnist gave an overview of his organization’s work in flood management and disaster mitigation since 1992 and shared his observations and findings after field visits during 2010 floods, based on exhaustive review of media reports and analytical reviews on the subject. These had been reported in a detailed column published in the Daily News in February 2011. He deposed that early warnings were not issued to the affectees in the southern Punjab to prepare them to move out to safety, to reduce damage to life and property. He compared the extent of damages in some areas in Muzaffargarh District with reference to numbers to substantiate his observations by asserting that out of 608,822 Watan Cards in the Province, 242,392 (40%) were issued in Kot Addu alone which showed extent of localized damage induced by unauthorized breaches; that many genuine affectees were left out in the process for various reasons was supported by a classical case of person without both hands but denied Watan Card for not being able to put his thumb impression or signatures. Hardships of single ladies not legally separated from husbands were also pointed out and flagged by his associate activists, to urge a fair resolution of complaints against what were alleged to be graft-seeking field staff. Mr. Bari vehemently asserted that disbursement of relief and rehabilitation grants suffered neglect, inefficiency or unchecked corrupt practices amongst Federal and Provincial government’s field staff. Extended distances between residences of the affectees to the ATM machines (11-50 miles) had exposed them to extra hazards. It appeared to him that the rehabilitation plan and program had not been unfolded fully and transparently. Retention of Rs. 6 billion, allegedly lying idle in the Prime Minister’s Relief Fund was not seen as healthy. He presented his mixed bag of findings from responses obtained from flood affectees in Thatta/Badin in Sindh and Muzaffargarh in the Punjab that revealed varying perceptions and reactions regarding degrees of effectiveness of different departments, officials and non-official agencies and existence of corruption, the sole exception was the Punjab Health Department that scored 10/10 for its work in the affected areas and the case was used to infer that affectees awareness about ground realities was not superfluous. He strongly pleaded for early restoration of elected local governments as its absence had contributed towards compounding of people’s miseries. Analysis of 112 articles published in various national dailies on the issue of flood losses that attributed most of the responsibility to Government’s failure to forecast and take timely precautions that further aggravated poorer ‘Human Development Index’ (HDI) in poorest districts of southern Punjab. The research conducted by M/s Jamal Khan Toor and Malik of PIDE in its Pakistan Development Review, Issue No.42/2 Summer 2003: ‘Mapping the Special Deprivation in Pakistan’ established deprivation among poorer southern Punjab districts like Muzaffargarh, Layyha and D.G.Khan were at the top, was cited as these were the worst hit districts. He sounded a caution: Unless remedial steps were taken without delay, hunger strike or long-march to Islamabad may be planned by the affectees, as a last resort.
k. Khanzada Ameer Masood, an affectee/property owner from D.I. Khan deposed to highlight his predicament of failing to receive compensation as a case of observed anomaly: He is a permanent resident of South Waziristan, who remained employed with a state-owned utility in Karachi, till his recent retirement, but maintains a house in the vicinity of Gomal University DI Khan in KP. He was denied compensation despite running from pillar to post as his CNIC did not show his third address, in view of NADRA’s verification process. His complaint was sent to PDMA, KP for verification.
l. During the Commission’s visit to Tori Bund on 14th March, 2011 a large number of affectees had gathered; out of these,14 persons namely M/S Pir Bux s/o Nabi Bux , Mohammad Tariq s/o Abdul Qadir, Arz Mohammad s/o Mohammad Naeem, Jalal ud Din s/o Mohammad Murid, Sair Ali s/o Momin, Baqa Mohammad s/o Allah Bux, Qabil s/o Mohammad Ramazan, Mohammad Amin s/o Mohammad Khan, Mohammad Salah s/o Allah Nau, Janib s/o Haider, Khair Mohammad s/o Khoso, Khadim Hussain s/o Khawja Dinno, Ghulam Yasin s/o Dhau Khan, and Liaqat Ali s/o Naeem Khan, all residents of Kandh Kot Tehsil opted to depose individually, as others present endorsed by acclamation. These witnesses, except M/S Arz Mohammad s/o Mohammad Naeem, Qabil s/o Mohammad Ramazen and Janib S/o Haider Bux, affirmed that I and P officials did not attend their frequent urgings to strengthen the Tori Bund before arrival of the peak floods; revealed that 24/7 vigil enabled them to foil the departmental attempts to breach the bund in the dead of the night of 6/7th August; asserted that their legitimate apprehensions regarding the breach were dispelled by lower level I and P staff as the Chief Engineer Guddu Barrage came to the site on the fateful day of 7th August when the said bund had breached; he was too late and went back without getting out of the jeep. They also stated to have been ignored from relief ration or rehabilitation grant. Three other witnesses opined that Tori breach was caused by over-topping and departmental officials worked as best as they could. The Commission was informed that only a few days ago, the Hon’ble Chief Minister had laid the foundation stone for reconstruction of the protective bund with modified design that will help remove weaknesses in the old design. The people sought assurances that the restoration of breached bunds will be completed in good time before the arrival of next monsoon. The Commission travelled on the old/ breached bunds including main Tori Bund, Ghauspur Bund and Gaurghat Bund that reinforced each other in a triangular loop but had been extremely eroded; the Commission noted the HFL watermark that confirmed that the bund with its normal height could not have been overtopped.
m. During the Commission’s visit to Jaffarabad on 15 March, the most directly affected district from Tori breach, the locals affirmed the state of despair due to inattention to restoration of irrigation supplies that caused loss of two successive crops, one by the floods and the other for non-restoration of conditions conducive for farming, as stagnant water and disruption of irrigation supplies from Kirther canal since after the floods. They were dismayed over the acts and omissions of the Sindh officials who let the flood waters divert to about 700, 000 unsuspecting residents of Naseerabad Division who were being approached by another 300,000 from neighbouring Sindh to seek shelter in safer havens, without knowing what was chasing them with vengeance. Serious allegations were made to vent their grievances with the assertion that in case the Kharif sowing was not made possible, a large population will be forced to vacate the inhospitable lands to block Sukkur Barrage supplies. As the Commission had witnessed the state of farms during its low over-flight from Sukkur that day, it did not deem it necessary to seek further depositions to substantiate what was stated by the local elders in the presence of Deputy Chairman Senate of Pakistan and a Federal Minister from the area, with relative dignity and poise; the representatives of the Provincial Governments did not contradict them either.
n. During the Commission’s visit to Thatta’s two breach sites, M.S. and P.B. Bunds, a large number of people gathered at the breach site, including their local MNA reiterated their grievances in general as well as in specific terms. 28 witnesses got their statements recorded. They alleged that relief was not provided to them and many others, despite verified losses. It was stated that the bunds had breached due to poor or non-maintenance as well as illegal pumps, pipes/cuts allowed in connivance with Irrigation officials to irrigate farms behind the bunds. The officials frequently used the area for evenings/nights recreational parties. It was also asserted that against 3-4 days normal travel time from Kotri, the 2010 Flood took weeks to arrive at Thatta; while it had given ample time to I and P Department to take safety measures to reinforce the weaker sections of the bunds, it did not demonstrate its sense of responsibility; the people also had not been warned despite more than adequate time-lag of almost 4-weeks since heavy downpours generated super flood in KP Province towards the end of July. Discriminatory exclusion from Watan Card dispensation was also alleged. Satisfaction was expressed that work on restoration of breached bunds had started/ nay coincided with the Commission’s visit, with the hope that it would be completed without delay. The Commission noted the HFL watermark on the portions of bunds that had not breached; that confirmed that with its normal height, these bunds could not have been overtopped.

SECTION-2

OFFICIAL TESTIMONIES

FEDERAL MINISTRIES/ DIVISIONS/ ORGANIZATIONS

15. 64 officials representing the respondents arraigned in the petitions, or those engaged directly or indirectly in the flood-management (excluding Federal Finance Ministry) were invited to depose and assist with due regard to thirteen formulations listed in Para 1 supra. Additionally, presentations were also made by officials at the sites of breached bunds during 6 days field visits to four provinces. A gist of their formal positions submitted to the Commission in its sittings at Islamabad, as further reinforced by general submissions and documents sought by it is summarized below, not necessarily in the sequence of presentations /appearances:-

a. Mr. Asjad Imtiaz, the then Acting Chairman FFC apprised about the FFC’s role as coordinator that undertakes liaison with various agencies for technical assistance and securing federal funds while execution of schemes was left to the Provinces. According to him, the FFC primarily acted as an inter-Provincial clearing-house for processing approvals, examining technical soundness of flood related schemes as one-window lobby for federal funding whereas schemes are executed by the Provinces / Territorial administrations. It was given out that 6,803 Km of bunds /embankments and 1,410 spurs were being maintained by the provinces of which 332 Km are in the Punjab, 2,422 Km in Sindh, 352 Km in KP and 697 Km in Balochistan. It was claimed that FFC’s role was limited to concept clearance and technical appraisal of flood protection works in the national context and as facilitator of federal allocations by the Planning Commission. While the FFC saw its functions as advisory in nature, it assisted and steered formulation of three 10-year programs executed with an overall investment of Rs.26,138 million since 1978 to June 2010 for various flood protection and drainage programmes in the Provinces. Out of this Rs.891.2 million were expended during ADP 2008-09 and 2009-10; Rs.62.98 million was used during ADP 2010-11 against Rs.703.76 allocated for the purpose. The lowest releases were noted during 2009-10 when against annual average expenditure of Rs.880 million during 2008-10, only Rs.77.328 million were spent. The current year’s PSDP allocation was Rs.740 million against which Rs.67 million were utilized in Provinces, till December 2010. The Fourth Medium-term program was still on the drawing board but it will need careful review, in the light of the 2010 Flood experience. On 11th February, 2011, the Planning Commission confirmed an estimated outlay of Rs.4,614 millions through the PSDP including Rs.3.669 million earmarked for FFC as its Monitoring, Evaluation and Supervision charges, a duty that the FFC did not clarify though its former Chairman admitted before the Punjab Judicial Commission about its capacity limitation.
b. Lt. General (R) Nadeem Ahmed, the Chairman, NDMA since 2007, briefed the Commission in the context of formulations 1, 2 and 12 in Para 1 supra about the organization’s preparatory work for management of potential disasters. His submissions, further supplemented by written material tendered on 18th and 27th January 2011, being copies of official communications, presented the holistic view of the enormity of 2010 flood operations and how these were coordinated, with a host of local and international organizations and bilateral donors. It was given out that with graduation of ‘Relief and Early Recovery Phase’ by end January 2011, work on rehabilitation was being pursued. A copy of draft National Flood Reconstruction Plan 2010, datelined December 2010, Planning Commission of Pakistan, that contains ‘Damages and Needs Assessment’ (DNA) Report formulated for the ADB and World Bank after consultations with concerned Federal Ministries, Organizations and Provinces/Territorial administrations was presented. The draft Plan confirmed an agreed quantum of Rs.855 billion=US$ 10.05 billion as flood damages in public and private sectors; it gives organization/sector/areawise preview of the prioritized schemes for restoration and rehabilitation of infrastructure and livelihood in next 3 years, subject to availability of funds. The NDMA is to be a body corporate under Act XXIV of 2010 gazetted on 11th December 2010. It was initially established under a Presidential Ordinance in 2006 ‘….to regulate the national disaster management system to overcome unforeseen situations’. Referring to the pre-flood events in 2010, it was given out that on 28th June 2010, at an inter-government / inter-agency preparatory session, the Chairman reviewed the pre-flood state of preparedness to respond to any eventuality keeping in view the weather forecast by the Meteorology Department: All Provincial Governments, except the Punjab, armed forces and international community attended that consultative review. With the change in the weather forecasts towards end of 3rd week of July, the NDMA continued to alert all concerned for rescue and relief operations, to mobilize potential resources of men and material and managed to save many precious lives, beginning with operations in KP. For the purpose, the NDMA tapped all resources for relief/ rescue operations, with swiftest possible deliveries, local and foreign. It handled 227 Foreign Flights, unloaded at various stations and dispatched relief items promptly, keeping in view operational capacity of the receiving Airports. Location-wise destinations/ arrivals of flights were: Chaklala (144), Karachi (32), Lahore (03) Multan (23), Peshawar (19), and Quetta (6); Shahbaz Airport, Jacobabad handled some 200 flights to provide an air-bridge for the area isolated for almost 40-60 days. Recounting further, the NDMA led operations, specific details were provided: 42 de-Watering Pumps, 488,243 Tents, 931,293 Tarpaulin Sheets, 126,731 Plastic Mats, 1, 899,175 Blankets, 290,262 Mosquito-nets, 9,696 Shelter-Kits, 412,384 Kitchen-sets and 9,868 Kerosene-Stoves, 10. 750 million Ready-Meals, 330,000 Tons in Miscellaneous food items, 413 tons of medicines, 160,470 Hygiene-Kits, 4,864 Water-plants, and 10, 841 water-Purification Kits and 250 million Tablets and 11.7 million Medical consultations, all in kind, at an estimated cost of Rs 841 million. On termination of Relief and rescue phase by 31 January 2011, except a few pockets in Sindh, rehabilitation phase had been geared up, and by 13 February 2011, almost Rs. 28 billion were disbursed to 1,480,000 family-heads identified with reference to eligibility criteria, determined by respective provinces as the first tranche @Rs. 20, 000/, with 50% share from the Provincial Governments. Disbursements were being made through Watan cards, prepared and distributed by 127 special centres set up by NADRA in the Punjab (28), Sindh (41), Balochistan (11), KP (27), AJK (13) and GB (07). While many affectees may be waiting for their cards, a significant number of affectees did not receive or en-cash their cards /payments. Inter-Provincial dispersal of NADRA Centres confirmed the following coverage: The Punjab: 84%, Sindh 95%, KP 90%, Balochistan 86%, AJK 90%, and GB 93%. It was also stated that in response to the call by the Prime Minister, Rs.7,160 million cash was received in the PM’s Relief Fund, though not adequate to cover the next phase of committed ex-gratia relief @ Rs.80, 000/ family out of a total of Rs.100, 000/ family; It was disclosed that to eliminate complaints of abuse, the second tranche would be subjected to additional safeguards. An updated position with respect to provision of relief goods, cash assistance through Watan Cards and donations received in Prime Minister’s Relief Fund 2010, as on April 25th is attached as [Annex-III: A-D].
c. Mr. M. Yaqoob Chaudhary, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Defence made a formal appearance alongwith senior officers of the Pakistan Army, Air-Force, Meteorology Department and SUPARCO, who dealt with or were familiar with 2010 flood operations to give their respective overviews:-

(i) Mr. Arif Mahmood, Acting D.G. Meteorology Department who submitted a written report as well, deposed that normal flood season starts from 15th June and ends on 15th October every year. During this period the National Weather Forecasting Division based at Islamabad issues daily flood reports. With the present capacity of his office 3-4 days early predictions are possible but can be increased to 10 days, at the maximum. Availability of trained manpower, resources and state of the art equipment at seven Radar Stations established at different locations in the country, include two Doppler Radars with capacity to measure exact precipitation. However, no Radar coverage was available in upper reaches beyond Tarbela or upstream Khairabad or Hill torrents elsewhere; that in June, 2010, the department had predicted “normal or slightly more than normal rainfall” for the 2010 Monsoon season. However, in the case of KP, sudden changes in the system developed and flash floods took the people by surprise, the actual rainfall was many times higher than predicted especially in north-western areas and record rainfall was received in Saidu Sharif and Mianwali in Punjab as well. That with effect from 24th July onwards, the pattern changed significantly after a long dry spell, the department commenced regular weather advisories from its Islamabad head-office to some 350 listed addressees; that on 28 July 2010, its Flood Forecasting Division at Lahore predicted heavy rains in the catchments of rivers Kabul and Swat; that Wapda’s gauges at river Kabul and Swat were washed away after flash floods in 2010 and exact flows could not be calculated. The flood maintained its peak flows for over 7 to 8 days, which caused major destruction; that on 31.7.2010, the Director (Operations), PDMA, Sindh, acknowledged timely advisory from the Meteorology department with reassurance that District Disaster Management Authorities were well positioned to take appropriate preventive actions; that natural flow of water is being blocked due to massive encroachments in most water ways, private zamindara bunds and unplanned habitation by rising populations etc. On being advised by the Commission, the Acting DG confirmed additional departmental requirements to improve its capacity to predict up to 10 days in advance to minimize or ward off catastrophes of such a magnitude and that such a proposal was receiving consideration in the Ministry of Defence.
(ii) While deposing, Mr. Jawed Ali Qureshi Director SUPARCO made a presentation about the remote sensing satellite images in general and flood affected areas in particular. These were taken in daylight and provided a comparative view of the ground condition of the bunds in 2009 and later after 2010 high flood season; no images were possible during cloud cover; in post-breach phase. At least, 26 breaches were recorded in and around Tori Bund area alone, the biggest being the main Tori breach measuring 2,370 meters; the breaches at Kot-Almo and Daro Canals in District Thatta were also displayed. The copies of the Remote Sensing maps for Sindh and Punjab were submitted for record [Appendix-I]. These enabled the governments to eliminate claims of losses not suffered.
(iii) Brig. Ajmal Iqbal, Director (Engineering Branch), Pakistan Army deposed that the Army had the capacity to execute the breaches as per joint deliberations and the decision of the notified civilian authorities, under the overall umbrella of the NDMA; that in the Punjab, a 4-5 member Civil-Military Committee notified in 2004, headed by respective District Coordination Officer with XEN Irrigation, Representative of Pakistan Army and Highway Department etc determined in the light of SOPs whether a breach was necessitated; that during 2010 Floods, controlled breaches were made on 30th July 2010 with Army assistance to protect the Jinnah Barrage, but the Army was not called to assist for breaches to LMB in Taunsa area. Likewise in Sindh, neither any breach was effected nor carried out downstream Guddu Barrage. He confirmed existence of security related limited number of bunds/ embankments in the border regions but these did not have any impact on the flood protection operations, nor did Irrigation authorities responsible for their maintenance flag any concern about those locations, except a few in Sutlej River area close to International border. It was, however, affirmed that in newer designs, the defence needs were being harmonized with irrigation related concerns. He advised that additional escape channels may be developed to ease out the pressure at Guddu and Sukkur Barrages.
(iv) Air Commodore Ashfaque Arain, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Plans) of the PAF who stated to be the officer-in-charge flood operations at the relevant time, deposed that the PAF Airbase Shahbaz, Jacobabad, was in exclusive management, control and use of the PAF. It was stated that a large workforce had been deployed that included expatriate Technicians/Consultants engaged for upgradation of physical and electronic infrastructure, required before arrival of hi-tech F-16 planes, due by December 2010. It was stated that Jacobabad area remained cut-off for almost two months during which an air-bridge was provided to ensure essential supplies in coordination with the NDMA, Provincial Authorities, Donors and by the Governments and NGOs desirous of using the base. In April 2011, it was confirmed that in all, 1,296 rescue and relief flights were handled by the PAF out of which 767 flights were operated from the Shahbaz Airbase, in Jacobabad, alone; out of these, in August alone, 266 flights were handled by the Base. Recounting the PAF role in the flood operations, it was stated that the PAF had arranged 252 rescue boats for Army and Navy to assist evacuation of 22,742 flood affectees besides air-lifting 2,923 people to various destinations in Sindh, including Karachi; over 8, 888 metric tons of food supplies and medicines were airdropped besides establishment of many medical camps and shelter for 13,436 persons at PAF facilities maintained till November 2010. It was also stated that additionally, the base secured/supplied some 5.0 million litres of aviation fuel for foreign relief planes. It was denied that any request from any NGO or civilian authority for use of the Air-base was declined, except on account of structural and capacity constraints at the Base, not designed to receive and handle larger aeroplanes or heavy cargoes; such planes were diverted to Karachi or Chaklala from where C-130 aircraft used to lift relief goods to Shahbaz Base for further distribution by civilian authorities. It was denied that the PAF Shahbaz or any of its other outfits engaged, advised or requested for breaching of any specific bund; the moreso, as the Base was considerably higher in elevation than the rest of nearby Jacobabad town at a distance of 122 KM from Tori Bund. It was stated that on and after 12th August 2010, much later after inundation of area affected by the Tori breach, some sensitive equipments/assets were removed to other locations, in anticipation of any disaster. As a further goodwill gesture, the PAF launched, from its own resources, construction of 650 houses for the affectees.

d) Mr. Ali Arshad Hakeem, Chairman NADRA, a statutory outfit of the Interior Ministry provided background of the assignment regarding rehabilitation of persons who lost their homes and hearths. A decision was taken for disbursement of ex-gratia rehabilitation grant @ Rs.100,000/ family, to be shared equally by Federal Government and Provincial Governments. On 6th September, 2010, the NADRA was engaged for the purpose, in pursuance of a decision by the Council of Common Interests (CCI) for coordination through the NDMA. It responded most promptly to the call to design a workable system for CNIC-based verification that facilitated disbursement of the first tranche of ex-gratia grants @ Rs.20,000/- per head of family through Watan-Card instruments in coordination with Banks designated by Federal Government to render cost-free Services (Accounts/ATMS) within the shortest time-span. For the purpose, 127 centres had been set up in flood affected areas; as per the design, the Watan Cards are activated after a lapse of 48 hours of issue, for electronic re-verification of the recipients to ward off the possibility of impersonation/duplications. Complaints where noted were addressed with requisite attention and promptitude. Commencing 21st September 2010, by 13th February 2011, almost Rs.28 billion had been disbursed to 1,480,000 family heads identified with reference to criteria notified by the Provincial Governments concerned. For the first tranche @ Rs. 20,000/- per family head a significant number of affectees have not encashed their cards. As on 25th April the number of Watan Cards recipients had increased to 1,514,202 with Rs.29.266 billion disbursed. The second tranche of Rs.80,000/ family will be subjected to additional safeguards by the respective Provinces/Territorial administration. He termed the Watan Card assignment to be an ‘uphill task’ for his organization mandated to design the programme and prepare cost-free, transparent, national data-based disbursement for most expeditious delivery. He documented his submissions to depose that NADRA database covered 91% population that enabled it to swiftly counter-check bio-metric particulars of the affectees and their family members, leaving no room for human error or manipulation, in line with principles of institutional accountability and individual traceability. With respect to its own staff, it was asserted that the NADRA pursued zero-tolerance against corrupt practices and delinquent officials face strict penalties. The Provinces had devised variable criteria for grants that impinged on the complaints regarding coverage or otherwise of Watan Card dispensation: While the Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan notified calamity affected areas under the Calamities Acts 1958, KP pursued survey based approach. The NADRA also issued 237,615 free CNICs through special arrangements for the affectees. Specific data was provided with instances where persons made repeated attempts to secure Watan cards (27 in one case) but could not succeed due to inbuilt safety features. The Commission was assured that the hardship cases and anomalies flagged before it during the hearing did not suggest any design deficiency and that those will be processed for remedial steps and relief due, and outcome will be reported, without delay. Further and specific details about the complaints from flood affectees etc received against departmental officials on various counts and the actions taken against them were sought.
e) Mr. Shakil Durrani, Chairman Wapda provided a global overview of the water sector with special focus on the weather-related changes in the region and deposed that historically, the factors which triggered record floods of 1924 and 1929 were primarily caused by exceptionally high rainfall in various locations including the catchments of Kabul, Swat and Indus River systems, in relatively shorter durations. The 2010 Flood was triggered by unprecedented rainfall in catchments compounded by a significant regional shift in climatic behaviour, prompted by confluence and clash of two weather systems of South-west monsoon from the East and Westerly system from the Gulf that stayed over north-western belt of Pakistan, some 80-100 km westwards from its traditional loci. That Wapda was responsible for upkeep of two major Dams at Tarbela and Mangla besides storage in Chashma Barrage on the Indus. Technically sound SOPs were in position to regulate daily/ hourly water storages and releases from these reservoirs. Unless the WAPDA maintained structures were critically endangered, its water releases required IRSA indents. During 2010 flood at a critical juncture, on certain days, Tarbela retained higher than normally permissible levels that partially reduced rising water levels downstream Khairabad, to prevent major disaster for the controlled irrigation infrastructures, public and private life and property, all through. The 2010 Flood did not cause any significant damage to WAPDA maintained structures except the losses caused by flash floods in Swat. Additional capacity created by raising the height of Mangla Dam required gradual filling of 2.28 MAF water over the next few years, beginning 2011 summer. However, the process was delayed due to presence of affectees in the expanded pond area in the AJK, partly due to delayed payment of full compensation and resettlement. It was stated that WAPDA was invited by Sindh Government to advise about the infrastructure in Sukkur and other barrages. During such visits on 1st August, the Chairman had the opportunity to fly over Tori Bund alongwith senior officers of Pakistan Army and noted deep and wide fissures that indicated poor maintenance and lack of upkeep. That decision not to breach Aliwahan Bund was taken by Sindh Government after consultations with its Consultant, a retired irrigation Secretary, who believed that bunds were not designed or erected to be breached; safety of nearby railway track and national highways behind Aliwahan Bund was pressed in, as additional justification against any suggested breach. He pointed out the benefits of developing escape channels to ease the flood pressures as was noted in case of the ‘Raini Canal’ model designed for the safety of the communication infrastructure. The case of Munda Dam construction in Swat was cited to state that on completion, it would prevent flooding of Nowshera as was noted from the incomplete Gomalzam Dam that saved D.I. Khan from complete devastation in 2010. It was further informed that initial feasibility survey of Akhori Dam will enable authorities to reinforce its flood protection plans. The Chairman also opined that per capita water availability had been reduced from 5,000 cmt/day in 1950 to less than 1,000 cmt /day in 2010 that classifies Pakistan as a water-starved country; however if existing12.95 MAF storage capacity was expanded in line with yearly availability and past escapes to the sea [91.83 million MAF peak in 1995] Pakistan’s existing resources were adequate for food security of 500 million population.
f) Sahibzada Mahmood Faizi, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MINFA) appeared in the absence of the Secretary reportedly out of the country, and his team was provisionally permitted to brief about sectoral losses and expected production in the context of food security. Mr. Faizi, deposed that within the agriculture sector, standing 2010 Kharif crops registered most losses, estimated at Rs.280 billion. He confirmed adequate carryover foodstocks and good Rabi harvest to ensure food security, though 1/3 decline in paddy production squeezed its exportable surplus. Post-flood cropped area under various Rabi-crops including wheat in the Punjab and Sindh declined by some 800,000 acres or 3.5 % of the cropped area, whereas area under oil-seed crops of canola and sunflower remained stable and rising, compared to last year, though substantial crop-specific inter-provincial variations were reported; expansion in areas under sugarcane was partially off-set. First crop estimates from provinces were due in early April, but adequate irrigation supplies, and timely winter rains will, Insha Allah, ensure good yield and overall production to generate a moderate exportable surplus. It was also stated that Federal funds for ex-gratia relief for seed and fertilizer @ Rs.2,400/ acre in kind was being given to small and affected farmers, with holdings upto 12.5 acres; 50 % was to be picked up by Federal subventions as per the scale approved by the ECC. On 2nd March, 2011, the Commission was advised that the scale compared favourably with farm-gate cost of grain production estimated by Agricultural Prices Commission that varied from Rs.467 for Sindh IRRI to Rs.584 in the Punjab against Rs.949 for basmati; for wheat, the cost ranges from Rs.747 in the Punjab to Rs.761 in Sindh whereas for cotton seed its range was Rs.1,261 in Sindh and highest Rs.1,424/acre in the Punjab; sugarcane cost varied from Rs.69 in the KP to Rs.74/ acre in the Punjab. It was further verified that MINFA did not receive routine Fortnightly Alerts or Special alerts on rain/food prospects from the ‘Global Information and Early Warning System’ (GIEWS), UNFAO during south-west monsoon as such data was accessible at FAO’s website.
g) Mr. Muhammad Junaid, Acting Chairman, National Highway Authority (NHA), Islamabad responded to sectoral losses and other questions to depose that on its inception, the NHA inherited a large network of roads that now extends to 12,000 km besides other related infrastructure. It was stated that highways/ motorways built in the flood plains are elevated from their natural level and admittedly constitute obstructions in the natural water flows but due care was taken at the design stage to ensure smooth flow of water. The designs respond to the unforeseen contingencies with appropriate provision for breaches of the roads, with minimal damages, a claim not fully borne out by blockage of flood water and consequential overtopping of Peshawar-Islamabad Motorway (M-1), north of Peshawar and Dera Allah Yar Jacobabad by-pass. Extensive encroachments in the right of way and around major roads also disrupt the human settlements and natural flows of waters. He noted that damage to road infrastructure due to 2010 floods was estimated at Rs.18 billion; its reconstruction cost is projected at Rs.22 billion.

SECTION-3

THE PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES

a. The KP representatives of Irrigation Department confirmed maintenance of 541 bunds / spurs with 286.3 km length that included 44 on Indus River, in addition to 3 out of 52 Marginal Bunds along the Indus and 96 retaining walls erected for flood protection. Of these, 21 spurs had been abandoned after construction of Chashma Barrage. A portion of Guide-Bund that breached in D.I. Khan region was swiftly attended to and potential damage contained. As no breach section was deemed necessary in the existing infrastructure, the question of observance of the SOPs or otherwise was not considered relevant in KP.
b. While giving an overview of the Punjab operations, Mr. Rab Nawaz, Secretary Irrigation and Power deposed that 3,500 km (2,083 miles) of flood embankments in the province were being maintained including 845 km (507 miles) on the Indus River. Despite many institutional, managerial, budgetary and operational constraints and prioritized commitment towards maintenance of main spurs, by and large the bunds were being maintained in reasonably tolerable condition, as per its ‘Flood Fighting Plans’ devised for each region/ barrage and revised annually. The major issues confronting irrigation management, enumerated in the written presentation included: disproportionate pre-occupation with canal water distribution for irrigation requirements, frequent thefts by commercial earth lifters, unauthorised and technically unsound public works by local authorities, surge in encroachments, unlawful use of acquired lands in river-pond areas [now being sold off), staff complacency after protracted dry-spells and ineffective or inadequate inter-Provincial coordination etc. The case of breached ‘Fakhhar Bund’ near Mithan Kot, constructed by the district council in 1980s without technical safeguards and since transferred to I and P Department for maintenance, was cited in particular to assert that such projects created false sense of security. It was pointed out that the natural factors like heavy rains in Swat, Kabul and Indus Rivers catchments during last week of July and first half of August, 2010, combined with heavy rains from hill torrents in DG Khan and Rajanpur Districts had hit the areas around main barrages, irrigation infrastructures, cropped lands and the people, in two waves: First peak flows reached Jinnah Barrage on 30 July but by then parts of 4, 999 ft LGB/LMB had already eroded (on 29 July) due to ‘pathetic handling of barrage gates’ by the XEN incharge of the regulation who apparently left it to the lower staff to decide and forge the record later after contributing to the 29th July breach of the LGB/LMB to flood Mianwali and Bhakkar districts. The flood that peaked at Taunsa on 2nd August had also breached the 7,410 ft long LMB and many more secondary bunds and canals damaged by massive flows that escaped therefrom, due to multiple factors including inattention to the complaint of jamming of electronically operated gates since 17July. It was pointed out that spur 5 was saved but the LMB’s breach at RD 32-33 led to extensive damages in Muzaffargarh district where TP link and Thal canal overflowed to inundate Kot Addu for weeks. Heavy discharges from torrential rain in Suleiman range raised the flood waters downstream DG Khan, Rajanpur and RY Khan to 1.2 million cusecs, breaching Jampur and Mithan Kot Bunds that inundated many towns; the flood was described as 1/1000 years. The incomplete Bhong Bund that breached upstream Guddu on the Punjab-Sindh boundary inundated vast areas in the Punjab as well. It was disclosed that breaching sections are specified for Jinnah barrage (RMB: RD 6700-8700 and LMB: RD 5000) and Dholewala Groyne inside the river which were activated after due consultations by the civil-military officials, on spot, as soon as the gauge touched the critical high of RL 700 and rising, following Khairabad downstream discharge at Tarbela of 1.1 million cusecs. The water that escaped from these pre-designated breaches re-entered downstream Jinnah Barrage, as expected. While denying any motivated, parochial expedient or considerations, it was conceded that at many places people prevented or even induced human interventions to cause breaches in defiance of official persuasions, urgings, warnings and directions; managerial weaknesses and human errors where noted were subjected to E and D proceedings, since put on hold in view of the on-going inquiry by the Punjab Judicial Commission. It was also admitted that but for timely presence of army personnel, damages at certain places could not have been contained by local civil administration, seemingly impaired, after 2001 administrative paradigm and disconnect since dissolution of LGs in end-2009. Frequent warnings to vacate the potentially exposed areas were ignored at the instance of local wizards claiming to know the Indus better but confronted by nature with what they never expected; local resistance and hostilities were unleashed for various reasons and motives, to prevent timely relief cuts at certain locations e.g. near RD 4000 Muzaffargarh was cited where departmental staff was manhandled and transport and equipment brought for relief was allegedly burnt down by the mob, leading to initiation of criminal proceedings. The silver lining here was that departmental probes were conducted and responsibilities for acts or omissions including attempts at forgery were identified with promptitude, and repairs to protective bunds were undertaken to restore where necessary with modified structures, without waiting for Federal approvals/ funds. Fundamental issues have been raised in the expert testimonies before the Punjab Commission viz a viz quality of professional inputs in the WB funded Taunsa Bund Remodelling Project executed at the cost of around Rs. 11 billion during 2004-09. These revealed serious capacity constraints of the departmental officials and their skills over the years-despite manifold expansion in the irrigation establishment, fragmented in material respects since July 1970.
c. The newly appointed Secretary Irrigation Department, Sindh, Mr. Memon touched upon the factual narrative but deposition was made through the Chief Engineer Guddu Barrage, Mr. Zafarullah Mahar, who restated what was deposed before the SJC, to dismiss the concept of pre-determined SOPs for human interventions, to assert that no cuts/ breaches were permissible in the flood protection bunds. It was, however, conceded that most bunds, including Tori Bund, had lost almost 70 inches or so of their designed heights that contemplated six feet freeboard over 1976 HF Line with additional margin of 1-2 feet. That was attributed to paucity of funds required to repair usual erosion @ 1-2 inches due to natural elements. He also affirmed that unlike 1976, this time Aliwahan Bund was not to be breached and that was a course agreed to, at high level meetings at Sukkur on 8-9th August, attended amongst others by the Chief Minister Sindh, Federal Minister Syed Khurshid Shah, the Chairman Wapda, Commander 5 Corps and Mr. Idrees Rajput, a private Consultant after deliberated options and discussions. It was contended that Aliwahan breach would not have affected the breach or otherwise, upstream Tori Bund but had the former been breached, extensive losses would have occurred all through to Hyderabad threatening communication infrastructure enroute and newer population settlements that mushroomed since 1976. Existence of extensive encroachments of acquired lands in Katcha and around river beds, farming in the danger zones and abuse of bund surfaces for various unauthorized purposes, to which staff’s insecurity from outlaws had added additional and avoidable hazards was confirmed to assert that these invariably led to lowering of guards by concerned O and M staff of the Irrigation Department. It was also contended that the limited number of breaches confirmed good quality of maintenance of hundreds of km rest of the bunds. While supplementing the main thrust of the official depositions on behalf of the provincial government, Mr. Mahar volunteered this particular aspect after the Commission’s directions to the FFC representative to undertake actual measurements of the two breaches flagged for extensive damages in Sindh and Balochistan, in particular on 7/8th August 2010, was significant. Other senior officials who came forward to supplement the aspects not covered by Mr. Mahar, included:-

(i) Mr. Muhammad Ehsanul Haq, M.D. Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority (SIDA) whose jurisdiction is limited to Ghotki Area Water Board, Sukkur-Nara Area Water Board and Kotri left-bank Canal Area Water Board. It was deposed that no breach was executed by the SIDA anywhere in the area of its responsibility, nor was any option contemplated to cut Aliwahan Bund, not even as a remote logical possibility, to reduce pressure on upstream Tori Bund. To Mr. Haq, the bund breach was / is not an option in case of floods in his province where the river runs on the ridge, higher than the surrounding area except the hilly terrain. He stated that under the current policy, the only option was to keep the embankments and bunds intact; that the 2010 flood was unique in history, as the peak water flow of over 1.13 million cusecs was sustained by Sukkur Barrage despite reduced capacity of 900, 000 cusecs, for almost a fortnight; its recent upgradation by Pakistan Army proved beneficial. Funding difficulties were flagged to point out that works upto Rs. 200 million were executed for various Bunds but payments had not been released. The officer noted the need that better coordination between SIDA and Irrigation Department would be conducive for barrage managements.
(ii) Mr. Shuja Ahmed Junejo, a senior Engineer with extensive experience in Sindh irrigation management who benefited from the Mississippi River practices that later contributed for updating the Sindh Bund Manual in 2008 under his stewardship, was at the helm during the 2010 flood season as Secretary Irrigation and Power, Government of Sindh. He deposed that in a meeting of the Sindh Cabinet, chaired by the Chief Minister Sindh, it was decided that no group or individual will decide about the potential breaches. He further submitted that until 27th July, the 2010 summer season generally remained dry in Sindh and Indus River System Authority (IRSA) was being urged to release more water for its irrigation needs after extension of releases in Taunsa-Panjnad Canal. However, the sudden build-up at Tarbela and Mangla during next 2-3 days, took every one by surprise. The 2010 flood was classified as ‘Super-floods’ as per the Sindh Bund Manual, and it came down in a relatively shorter period that halted natural dredging process. Since no such serious flood had visited Sindh/Country since 1992, it had created a sense of general complacency to limit the departmental capacity to check and maintain strength of the bunds, as mandated. As a consequence, the Tori and MC Bunds overtopped by excessive flows; there were no deliberate breaches, though non-maintenance due to limited budget had contributed to the damages. To Mr. Junejo, maintenance work ensured safety of most bunds except two that breached. The breach of Aliwahan Bund could not have stopped overtopping of the Tori Bund; instead it would have fully inundated many more districts on the left bank of Indus river right up to Hyderabad, without corresponding benefits for other public or private assets or peoples elsewhere; he had first-hand experience of witnessing the 1976 breach at Aliwahan as an SDO. He was also of the view that in 2010, the hill torrents in ‘Sulemanki’ range of DG Khan flooded and inundated the ‘Kachhi’ canal area of Balochistan to cause havoc. He admitted that many gates of Sukkur Barrage remain closed due to design issues developed by changes in the Indus River course in 1930s that reduced its capacity from designed 1.5 million cusecs to 900,000 cusecs by irrigation research undertaken in Pune in pre-independence British India and causes were probed. The Sindh Government had contemplated redesigning of this barrage, to restore and upgrade its original capacity. During normal floods, increased water flows dredge and remove heavy sedimentation from river side of the bunds that creates required space to accommodate additional waters. But medium to high floods do not permit any room to attend to minor problems in the bunds. Thousands of acres of land encroached upon by local influentials in the ‘Katcha’ area of Sindh that blocked the natural water flows create additional issues during flood seasons.
(iii) Mr. Idrees Rajput, another former Secretary, Irrigation Department, Government of Sindh and still consulted by it, contributes regularly to ‘The Daily Dawn; he stated that on 8-9th August he was especially flown from Islamabad by Governor’s plane to Sukkur where he strongly advocated against breaching of Aliwahan Bund. In essence, he deposed that in record high 1976 floods, 1.2 million cusecs of water passed Indus at Guddu Barrage without breaching Tori Bund; in 1996, only 500,000-600,000 cusecs caused it to breach, that was repeated during 2010, “Super-flood”, though lower than 1976 recorded highest. According to him, Aliwahan Bund downstream of Tori, even if breached would still not have prevented overtopping of Tori. He attributed the collapse of protective embankments to obvious weaknesses in proper maintenance of the main and loop-bunds, professional inefficiency, negligence, leakages/ corruption, all listed in the operational Bund Manual, update till 2008. These were compounded further by poor law and order situation besides questionable staff appointments by methods fair and foul that exacerbated routine departmental working, critically impaired and compromised in its quality and sensitivity. Fish ponds and agro-farms constructed in the ‘Katcha’ area, where soil and stones stored at various sites were removed from the bunds, tend to contribute to erosion in their heights and expose these to overtopping. To Mr. Rajput, Tori Bund breach was one such case, not an exception. He also opined that hill torrents flooded the ‘Kachhi’ canal that caused unprecedented devastations in Balochistan.

d. The Secretary I and P Balochistan presented its case by deposing that within the Province, almost 13 local rivers and hill torrents generate frequent floods in and around their banks during SW Monsoon in summer and NE monsoon seasons that brings winter flood, mostly in Sibi and Makran coastal areas. Protective works have been created to provide reasonable degree of protection to people and cropped lands, though communication network is affected. There is no protective bund on Indus River as it does not pass through that province. Pre-flood SOPs for coordination and operational mechanisms were in position with respect to irrigation structures of the province. Though none of the flood protection works within the province expected any major threat during 2010 floods, extensive damage was caused to the canal system due to Tori Breach in Sindh that led to overflow and further breaches in Shahi and Begari canals systems (under Guddu Barrage command) including damages to roads and bridges, commencing 9th August; Rajanpur hill torrents further added to that intensity; many lives were lost and extensive property was destroyed or sub-merged in Naseerabad Division, as Jaffarabad District was completely inundated from unsuspected flows. Floods swept away vast cropped areas leading to declaration of emergency on 14/ 15 August; by 15-16 August, Rojhan Jamali had been covered by a sheet of water that headed for Usta Mohammad affected likewise, before the water skirted away to SW direction, rendering another over 100, 000 IDPs in its reach. Another one-third of one million strong IDPs came from Sindh to seek shelter; 1,315,342 people in four districts, including those from Sindh, were directly exposed to Tori breach. In all, 97 deaths were reported. Overall damage was Rs.15.63 billion, of which 89 % were in Jaffarabad alone. The entire civil administrative infrastructure was affected. Kharif crops over 15,219 Sq Km were destroyed after being submerged for many weeks. As many as 643 spurs were being maintained besides major and minor bunds. During 2010 floods, 421 major and minor breaches took place due to inundation by Tori out of which 268 had been restored and repaired. It was suggested that additional works including expansion of storage capacity was needed to capture 8-10 MAF of water that was currently going down to the sea. Visual and other details of the damage inflicted by water that escaped from the Tori Bund breach were provided to affirm that senior Irrigation officials from Balochistan had not inspected the Tori Bund’s condition after 1996. Mr. Ibrahim Rind, former Chief Engineer Irrigation, Balochistan who recently retired from Balochistan Irrigation Department was invited on the request of Senator Jan Jamail, supplemented the above submissions to depose that ‘he had visited Tori Bund way back in 1996 when it had almost its normal height. Lack of resources, prolonged dry spells and insecure local environments in ‘Katcha’ area were amongst main reasons for non-maintenance of the Bund; uncontrolled encroachment in the traditional water ways and pond areas also obstruct natural water courses/ flows. In 2010 floods, Tori Bund was overtopped due to consistent non-maintenance. In his opinion Tori Bund was not deliberately breached though extensive havoc was caused by the breaches to the greenbelt of Jaffarabad and Jhal Magsi of Naseerabad Division, virtually destroyed without prior notice or warning. No Met radar has been installed in the Province of Balochistan, the biggest land mass of the country with over 700 km coastal belt, with a history of tsunami.’

e. With respect to Relief and rehabilitation activities in various Provincial/ Territorial jurisdictions:-
i) Mr. Tahir Munir Director General, PDMA Balochistan presented a written report on losses and damages as well as relief and rehabilitation being undertaken to depose that during the floods of 2010, four districts of Naseerabad Division were affected by outflows from Indus but Jaffarabad District was completely inundated. About 2,000 tons of food items were distributed among the flood affected people. Pakistan Army, Pakistan Air force and Frontier Constabulary extended assistance in the relief and evacuation process. With respect to award of compensation to the flood affectees, Committees at the Union Council level comprising representatives of the local notables, local Government Departments, school teachers and Patwaris were formed. Rs. 2 billion has been distributed among the affectees.
ii) Mr. Asif Ali of PDMA, KP deposed that the PDMA coordinated with Pakistan Army, Pakistan Navy, Pakistan Air Force and the District Administrations of the Province in the relief operations. The Government schools were used for evacuated flood affectees. Rs. 630 million were spent on the rehabilitation, including those in Swat, Nowshera, Charsadda and D.I. Khan Districts. About 400,000 complaints regarding the non-availability of Watan Cards and other relief measures were admitted as pending decisions. The Commission observed that KP had vast experience in handling IDPs but expressed concerns over sizeable number of unsettled cases to direct the Provincial Government/ PDMA to report back about measures taken or proposed to be taken to settle such large number of complaints in coordination with NADRA, if necessary. In the later briefing at Peshawar on 31 March 2011, the Commission was informed that the number of pending cases has been reduced to 100,000, which are also being verified. The backlog of complaints reflects heavily on public perceptions about the NADRA. During its briefing on 31 March at Peshawar, the PDMA provided further details.
iii) Mr. Khalid Sherdil, Director General PDMA/ DG Relief Punjab gave a detailed presentation about the relief and rehabilitation operations as summarized in his power-point presentation, to depose that Provincial Disaster Need Assessment (DNA) in the Flood Reconstruction Plan formulated by Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan was prepared jointly with Asian Development Bank and the World Bank. It was given out that initially, 1, 786 villages in 13 districts, later decreased and increased in two revisions to 1,795, were declared as calamity affected areas. Of these, Muzaffargarh, Rajanpur, Khushab, Mianwali, Rahim Yar Khan, Layyha, and Bhakkar were most affected, in the same order; detailed surveys were undertaken after some complaints surfaced in the media and as many as 317 villages were de-notified as others were included in the relief coverage. Responding to general concerns about Rabi crops, it was stated that by 31 January 2011, at least 206,624 out of 221,741 small and affected farmers were provided 1,026,657 bags of 50 kg seed whereas 1,053,181 bags of fertilizers were handed over to 210,483 farmers, to invigorate Rabi crops sowing over 1.1 million acres of farmlands under favourable weather conditions and another 18,7621 bags were under distribution. Details of relief goods, equipment and other essential supplies provided through civil outfits and armed forces were given: 850 Boats, 892 Out-board Engines, 105 dewatering sets and 10,656 Life Jackets, 61,321 Tents including those provided by the NDMA (12,398), ERC (13,723), UAE and Saudi Kingdom (6,000), in addition to 28, 800 arranged by the PDMA for 11 most directly affected districts. Other in-kind donations, secured from private/ party sources included 143,359 dry rations and 2,275 truck loads of essential supplies that included 479 trucks containing winter needs: 254,206 Quilts, 136,392 Blankets, 22,584 Jackets/ Sweaters and 16,949 Bed sheets besides 60,897 miscellaneous articles collected and distributed. Of these 350 truck-loads, mostly donated, had been sent out to KP, Sindh, AJK and Gilgit–Baltistan, as a good-will gesture, at times on appeals from local authorities/people of rain affected hilly-areas. In addition to in-kind official and non-official support mobilized by the Provincial Government, Rs. 434 million were provided to the DCOs concerned for disbursements to those in need of essential items. 89 Model villages were being constructed with the help of 30 donors, local NGOs, bilateral grants, international organisations as provincial resources were committed for provision of allied facilities at a cost of Rs. 242 million; PRSP was the largest NGO assigned to construct 2,191 houses in 20 villages at a cost of Rs. 1,167 million; three Japanese NGOs undertook to build 2,110 houses and over 212 acres of land was earmarked; additional land measuring 1,016 kanals was allocated for various social amenities including a few schools, medical facilities, a park, community centre and a slaughter house. As regards cash donations, including salary deductions, about Rs 1.5 billion was received in the Chief Minister’s Relief Fund and being utilized as per the approved plan. Affectees were given 608,189 Watan Cards, out of which 601,899 were activated with a total disbursement of Rs.11.984 billion through two designated banks. Confirmed deaths were 105 and prescribed compensation has been paid to the heirs in three districts of Muzaffargarh, Rajanpur and Layyha. Health Department’s role was highlighted to state that no major epidemic had broken out in the flood affected areas due to timely coordination by the PDMA with concerned government and non-governmental entities. It was confirmed that compensation to the farmers by way of free wheat-seed and fertilizers was being ensured. For the second phase, the Planning Commission had confirmed the release of 2nd tranche for housing assistance @ Rs. 80,000/ family with 50% from provincial funds. It was given out that the Punjab Government proposed to revise the list to eliminate undeserving persons. Responding to extraordinary variations in the range of Watan Card distributions for two locations within Muzaffargarh, it was contended that lower number in Layyha showed that it was exposed to lesser damage that was made possible by construction of a 2 km protective bund by voluntary contributions of local community and administration. As regards complaints of the aggrieved, it was stated that 100 Writ Petitions were pending in the Lahore High Court, about various matters relating to 2010 floods.
iv) Ms. Iffat Malik Acting D.G. PDMA Sindh deposed with respect to her organization and work to state that three agencies were responsible for relief and rehabilitation in Sindh: The Relief Commissioner, Secretary Rehabilitation and the PDMA. A brief overview of the PDMA’s work and performance during 2010 flood disaster was provided to confirm that flood water in certain areas was still waiting to be drained. These were later supplemented with a written response dated 3rd March 2011 extensively documented as –a- consolidated position of the Sindh Government on the 13 formulations, including the coordination with armed forces and international donors. From preparation of district plans, to inspection and review of the ground conditions, issuance of alerts or services rendered by various levels, beginning April/ May 2010, in focussed sessions held on 17th, 19th, 24th and 26th May and 23rd June in batches of most vulnerable districts, before participating in the NDMA Conference of 28th June 2010 have been listed in detail. These measures expected an integrated approach for surveys of vulnerable points to identify gaps to be plugged in time, district contingency plans for storage of essential requirements at key locations, constant vigilance of historically most threatened bunds at various stages of approaching monsoon build up, setting up of relief camps with essential prerequisites, plans for orderly shifting of most vulnerable settlements etc all designed for an organised service delivery. The PDMA arranged boats, equipment and materials requested by armed forces. The follow up actions were pursued to receive unqualified assurances from all concerned including the Irrigation Department responsible for safe upkeep of the 147 pre-identified vulnerable bunds, keeping in view the UNOCAST’s satellite imagery of areas earlier inundated in 2007 floods, to help focus on areas most likely to be affected in the first round. Establishment of District Coordination Rooms had been confirmed well in time. It was lastly given out that on 28 July, and 1St August, on receipt of fresh advisories on heavy rains in upper catchments:-

1) Special alerts were issued about exceptionally high floods ranging from 500,000-600,000 cusecs on or around 3-8th August at Guddu to rise to 950,000-1,050,000 cusecs by 6th August to threaten Ghotki; 500,000-600,000 cusecs at Sukkur by 4th August that could rise to 900,000-1,000,000 cusecs by 7th August to expose Sukkur, Larkana, Benazirabad (formerly Nawabshah), Hyderabad, and Noshehroferoz before reaching Kotri and downwards. At that point in time, the Irrigation department had projected 850,000 cusecs maximum at Guddu and below from 3-6 August onwards. All concerned were alerted on 30th and 31st July, for activating Contingency Plans A and B, to commission the Relief Camps. Armed Forces had reported slower response from irrigation officials in patrolling the bunds. However, as floods breached Tori Bund, 60 km downstream Guddu, concerns were conveyed on 7th August about attention to second line of loop/ protective bunds at old Ghauspur, J-Spur, KT Jatoi and Dadu–Moro Bridge, to advise pre-emptive measures; these were followed by further advisories including those on impending dangers to canals in Ghotki. On 18th and 22nd August, additional assistance was sought from HQ 5 Corps for Thatta-Sujjawal areas.
2) With respect to breaches, it was denied that any breaches were pre-designated or permitted under regulation, much less to favour or target any area or people; the moreso as many socially active local groups were engaged for vigilance and relief support. Recounting relief support, it was submitted that before arrival of flood waters, the PDMA immediately procured and dispatched 22,050 tents, 1,300 tons of cooked ration bags and 600 water cartons and, 7 boats and 4 boat engines that were supplemented by 97,334 tents, 374,365 tarpaulins, 160,080 kitchen sets, 25,559 tool kits and 686,547 blankets 100,000 tons of food items were secured from WFP and distributed to 3.3 million IDPs in 14 Districts; some 750 tons of food items were received from overseas Pakistanis. Jacobabad was cut off for 40-60 days and an air-bridge was established to drop supplies to the marooned. 225 PAF air sorties, 8 helicopters, 699 SAR, Zulu Boats and hovercrafts of Pakistan Navy participated at various stages; out of these, 228 relief sorties arrived through Jacobabad airport during September alone. As many as 5,000 doctors and 1,000 post-graduate trainees joined for health cover with the assistance of 12,000 paramedics, and a large contingent of nurses, in public and private sector/NGOs, duly equipped with life-saving drugs and supplies. In all, 1,477,851 patients were treated: 78,000 patients at medical camps, 351,235 diarrhoea cases including 41,925 bloody diarrhoea, 1,009,541 suspected of malaria and 679,367 skin diseases, as another 1,151,432 were suspected of ARI; UNICIEF set up water filtration plants and repaired protective works. At least, 392,823 animals were treated against 2.86 million vaccinated, in addition to 495,570 cattle provided other medications besides 77,574 maunds of wheat straw. For revival of agriculture, 70,000 metric tons of urea @ Rs. 780/ bag and 35,757 tons of other fertilizers, 49,567 metric tons of wheat-seed were arranged; bulk has been distributed amongst small farmers. For rehabilitating the damaged housing stock, besides cash grants through Watan Cards, 10,700 houses were identified for re-building by UN Habitat, 10,000 by Iran and another 2,000 by Turkey. In addition to in-kind relief, Rs. 2,318 million was expended on relief goods through respective DDMAs and Rs. 2,100 million were assigned to irrigation department for rehabilitation of damaged works. Compensation for the affectees, residents of areas declared as calamity hit u/s 3 of the 1958 Calamity Act were entitled to differentiated rates of compensation for loss of life and/ or assets as per ECC approved scale given in the table below:-

Table: Rates of Compensations in Pak-Rupee

1 Loss of Bread winner 100,000
2 Other family member 50,000
3 Injury/ Disability 20,000
4 House Reconstruction Pucca 20,000
5 Partially damaged Pucca 10,000
6 House Reconstruction Kacha 10,000
7 Partially damaged Kacha 5,000
8 Shop Pucca 10,000
9 Shop Pucca Partially Damaged 5,000
10 Loss of Milched Cattle; and Sheep/ Goat 10,000: and 3,000
11 Poultry Birds 30/Bird
12 Seeds/ Fertilizer per acre 2, 400

Out of that, a lumpsum grant of Rs. 20,000/family, equally shared by Federal and Provincial Governments was approved in the first phase, and Rs.10.132 billion had been disbursed to 566,468 Watan Card holders for payments by designated banks, after its electronic verification from national data-base record. The 2nd tranche of Rs. 80,000 was proposed to be paid on availability of loan funds. Small farmers were allowed Rs. 3.360 billion @ Rs. 2,400/acre as one bag of urea and 50kg wheat seed, to bring 1.4 million acres under Rabi crops, also with 50:50 Federal-Provincial contributions, on the scale approved by ECC. Reverting to key issue of maintenance of bunds, it was asserted that during the last decade, Rs. 944 million had been spent for maintenance of 1,300 miles of bunds with an average of Rs.72,600/ mile/ year; out of that only Rs. 2,810,491 were utilized for 5-miles long Tori Bund @ Rs 56,200/ mile/year that was obviously inadequate to ensure compliance with specified standards laid down in the Bund Manual. The officer had verified that recent changes in the top management positions that persuaded the Commission to summon officers concerned with PDMA and relief work at the time of the disaster, to clarify context of the briefing in a comprehensive manner. Three below listed officers appeared accordingly and assisted the Commission as follows:-
3) Mr. Sualeh Ahmed Faruqui, the DG PDMA during the 2010 Flood had played an active role at various stages of the disaster. In addition to above cited written submissions of 3rd March 2011, he deposed that prior to promulgation of NDMA Ordinance 2006, three different authorities were assigned to deal with rescue, rehabilitation and relief work in the Province, under overall supervision of Provincial Relief Commissioner. However, with the establishment of the PDMA in 2006-07 in pursuance of a Federal law, these functions were consolidated in the PDMA, later activated in 2010. He confirmed that in pre-flood 2010 phase, beginning April 2010, the PDMA, in consultation with 23 district governments, Irrigation Department and Armed Forces carried out a detailed preparatory exercise. By June 2010, Armed Forces had completed reconnaissance of 148 vulnerable flood protection embankments. These efforts were intensified after Meteorology Department’s preliminary assessment of 28th June of ‘slightly above-average monsoon’ in late July. It was pointed out that pre-flood season witnessed shorter irrigation supplies and additional supplies from IRSA and competing claims between Sindh and the Punjab Governments pre-occupied public attention. The weather warnings were later converted to frequent alerts in response to expected floods as per revised forecasts. He confirmed the substance of the submissions filed on 3rd March to the effect that the PDMA had made district-specific advance preparations and reasonable provisions had been made for launching possible recovery and relief operations. Pakistan Navy was associated by providing boats and other essential supplies, well in time. However, actual floods were beyond the imagination of all concerned and preparations became inadequate. It was affirmed that four bund breaches at Bhong, Tori, Thatta and Sujawal had caused extensive damage beyond expectations, but these were not attributable to deliberate human interventions. Pakistan Army units were present at/near Tori; the moreso as the possibility of any breaches to Aliwahan Bund was conditional to potential threat to Sukkur Barrage but that situation did not arise.
4) Mr. Shahabuddin Channa, Secretary Rehabilitation, Government of Sindh associated himself with the depositions of Mr. Faruqui to say that floods affected 7.28 million population as 800,000 houses were damaged leaving over 1.8 million IDPs. Watan Cards were issued to more than 500,000 family heads. No complaint was received for recovery of encroached land in ‘Katcha’ area in the Province.
5) Mr. Mohsan Chandna, Secretary P and D, Government of Sindh also reaffirmed the substance of the depositions made by two other officers of the Sindh Government to state that plans were being taken in hand to repair and restore the flood embankments well in time. Federal funds were expected for the purpose.
6) Mr. Arshad Khan, D.G. Disaster Management Authority, FATA deposed that during the 2010 floods, the FATA Administration was already engaged in providing relief assistance to 200,000 Internally Displaced families; out of those, 41,000 IDP/families have since returned to their native homes. Most damages in FATA were caused by heavy rains, flash floods and landslides and it was not possible to issue any early warning in such situations. So far, 91 persons lost their lives due to flash-floods, and appropriate compensation to the heirs of the deceased and injured have already been paid; however FATA Administration awaited federal reimbursements. The overall damage to the properties had been assessed at Rs. 7,555 million and compensation would be paid to the affectees as and when funds become available.

v) On behalf of Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit Baltistan Administration:-

1) Mr. M. Akram Sohail, Secretary/DG State Disaster Management Authority, AJK, Muzaffarabad, deposed that more than 11,000 people were affected by flash floods and rains, and they were provided relief assistance. For rehabilitation, over 10,000 Watan Cards have since been issued; 100% re-verification was being carried out before the next instalment. Difficulties due to delayed repair of Kohala-Muzaffarabad and Muzaffarabad-Chakothi highways were pointed out.
2) Mr. Abdul Qayyum, Director General Disaster Management, Gilgit-Baltistan functioning since September, 2010, deposed that all the seven districts of Gilgit-Baltistan were affected by 2010 floods. Relief assistance was provided where necessary. In rehabilitation stage, so far, more than 3,000 Watan Cards have been issued while 1,750 Watan Cards were being processed. No significant complaint has come to light from any circle.

CHAPTER-3

FLOOD DAMAGES: QUANTIFIED AND NON-QUANTIFIED

16. That the floods caused unprecedented losses is universally acknowledged. An irreparable loss of over 1,600 deaths, thousands suffered minor and major injuries including permanent disabilities; 20 million became IDPs, largest ever in history anywhere, it will take time to heal the wounds. Almost 4.5 million lost their jobs, mostly in the farm sector; 7 million school going children were prevented from resuming academic activity for half the year. Despite initial public reports of US$ 43 billion losses that included war burden, there was a consensus amongst Federating units and International Development Partners that Pakistan suffered a loss of Rs. 855 billions [US$ 10.056 billion] equivalent of 5.8% GDP in 2010-11, though direct losses to Irrigation infrastructures were limited to 2.8 % of the total. Of these losses some 50 % was borne by Rural/ Agriculture/ Farm sector (Rs. 429 billion), followed by damage to private housing stock (Rs 135 billion), Transport and Communication (Rs. 113 billion), Financial Sector (Rs 57 billion), Education (Rs. 27 billion), Energy (Rs. 26 billion) and Water and Sanitation (Rs. 9 billion) in addition to losses to Governance infrastructure and other miscellaneous losses, potential loan write offs not to speak of tax revenues, both lost or foregone for years.

17. In terms of the loci of the damages, Sindh reported most losses, followed by KP, the Punjab and Balochistan, though the latter’s relative losses became more pronounced as unlike other areas, the 2010-11 Rabi crop could not be planted by farmers most directly impacted by loss of two successive crops. The FATA, Gilgit-Baltistan and AJK also had their share of sufferings, primarily due to rain-induced damages. Following table summarizes sectoral and spatial dimensions of the assessed damages:

Estimated Damages to Public and Private Infrastructures (Rs. billions)
Sector Total Bal KP Pb Sindh FATA GB AJK
Agriculture 429 (22.0) 36.3 33.6 156.2 195.7 3.1 1.9 2.1
Transport and Communications 112.9 (200.0) 3.2 28.7 15.2 51.4 2.0 1.3 2.9
Education 26.5 (37.5) 0.8 2.9 7.9 13.3 0.4 0.3 0.8
Irrigation 23.6 (37.0) 2.5 5.8 2.8 11.6 0.2 0.1 0,4
Water/ Sanitation 9.3 (6.0) 0.5 1.7 1.8 4.90 0.6 0.1 0.3
Governance 6.0 (5.0) 0.11 1.7 096 3.05 0.03 0.1 0.1
Health 1.5 (4,0) 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1
Housing 135.0 (126.0) 8.2 19.2 27.4 78.7 5.4 3.2 6.8
Financial Inst. 57.3 (39.0) na Na na na na na na
Environment na (18.0) na Na na na na na na
Other Pvt Loss 23.93 (na) 0.88 4.69 6.53 11.75 0.02 - 0.1
Total *855 (578;0)1 53.0 100.0 219.0 372.0 6.0 4.0 7.0
* Includes Rs. 53 billion damages to Federal Infrastructures and other non-listed sectors. Figures in parenthesis indicate estimated cost of repair/ restoration works.
Source: Cabinet Division: NODMC Secretariat, Planning Commission’s Report dated 15th December 2010.

18. A three-year recovery and rehabilitation program was chalked out with consensus of Federating units and leading DFIs for economic recovery by way of revival of livelihood, public services, and community and gender empowerment schemes with indicative gross sectoral investments of Rs 613 billion contemplated for the purpose. The hardcore prioritized component for Physical Infrastructure was estimated to cost Rs. 277 billion, with 89% claimed by Transport and Communication (Rs. 171 billion), Education (Rs. 38 billion), Irrigation (Rs. 37 billion), and Transfers and Subsidies (Rs.177 billion incl. Rs. 161 billion for rehabilitation of private shelters.) Private Sector/ Public Sector Enterprises (PSEs) were expected to invest Rs.113 billion taking into account the losses tabulated supra.

19. In terms of affected population and severely impacted households, the following table gives a bird’s eye view of the geographical dispersion of the disaster in terms of loss of livelihood in the context of determination of programmes developed or executed for ex-gratia grants in rehabilitation phase in various federating units:

Estimated Affected Poor People/ Households (Millions)

Total Total Bal KP PB Sindh FATA GB AJK
Population 19.08 0.90 2.88 7.33 6.75 0.24 0.17 0.81
Households(HHs) 2.90 0.13 0.36 1.11 1.12 0.03 0.17 0.12
Severely Affected HHs (%) 1.93 (67) 0.10 (77) 0.2 (79) 0.6 (55) 0.87 (78) 0.01 (47) 0.01 (41) 0.04 (35)

Source: Cabinet Division: NODMC Secretariat Report dated 18 January 2011,

The above shows the proportionate ranking of severely affected areas i.e. KP, Sindh and Balochistan; in terms of population and housing units impacted, the Punjab and Sindh were almost at par. However, if regard was paid to the relative size of total population, Sindh topped the list of affectees.

20. As regards losses to irrigation infrastructures, an official report confirmed that ‘Pakistan experienced extensive monsoon rains in July-August 2010, which generated unprecedented flood flows in primary, secondary and other rivers including hill torrents and local nullahs. The river Swat, Panjkora and Kabul experienced historic flood flows, which crossed the historic flood peaks. The floods caused huge damages to private and public infrastructure, human settlements, cropped lands, buildings, highways, bridges, irrigation networks, flood protection works and under construction hydropower projects. The flood damages to the irrigation and drainage infrastructure are estimated at Rs 23,600 million:-
Irrigation Sector Damages

PROVINCE DAMAGES ESTIMATED
RS MIL US$ MIL
AJK 14 0.6
Balochistan 2,516 29.6
FATA 255 3.0
Gilgit-Baltistan 138 1.6
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 5,810 68.4
Punjab 2,813 33.1
Sindh 11,638 136.9
Wapda 416 4.9
Sector Total 23,600 277.6

Province-wise damages in the [above] table…………and details are summarized below:-
a. In KP, the floods washed away Munda Head works on Swat River and damaged all other major irrigation structures partially, including Warsak, Amandara and Chashma barrages.
b. In Punjab, the breaches at Jinnah and Taunsa Barrages caused the main damage. The highest damage occurred to the Taunsa-Panjnad Link Canal and Muzaffargarh Canal.
c. In Sindh, four breaches in flood protection embankments, Left Marginal Bund of Guddu Barrage and Tori, MS and PB Bunds, caused main damages. The Tori Bund breach had inundated entire North West Canal command area and damaged much of the infrastructure on its way back to the Indus River.
d. In Balochistan, the flood from the Tori breach and flash floods from hill torrents damaged irrigation and drainage infrastructure in eighteen districts.
e. The flash floods in AJK, GB and FATA damaged or washed away small- scale hydro power plants, irrigation and river training works.
f. Flood damage to WAPDA infrastructure was mainly incurred in Chashma Barrage, Chashma-Jhelum Link Canal, Chashma Right Bank Canal (CRBC), Raini and Kachhi canals, and Right Bank Outfall Drain.
g. The irrigation infrastructure in Sindh incurred the greatest damage, 43% of total, followed by KP 27%, Punjab 14% and Balochistan 12%…….. Overall, 44 percent of the damage was incurred by Canal systems, 36 percent by flood embankments, 10 percent by barrages and head works, 7 percent by drainage systems and 3 percent by other infrastructure.
The DNA has revealed several weaknesses in the irrigation sectors (i) deferred maintenance of flood embankments; (ii) insufficient reservoir/storage capacity to absorb flood peaks; (iii) lack of response mechanisms to early warnings; (iv) need for expanding flood early warning system (FEWS); and (v) encroachment of the flood plains and riverine areas. The aging infrastructure and deferred maintenance needs immediate attention. The breaches in flood protection embankments along the Indus River caused the main damage, and none occurred due to overtopping. The climate change will cause more frequent extreme floods in future, which needs to be taken into account while reviewing structural designs, and maintenance requirements. In addition, a comprehensive inspection protocol is needed for critically important major river training works and embankments.

h. A natural response is to review the country’s overall flood management strategy and implement a comprehensive long-term multifaceted flood management program. The following elements could be considered for this review: enhancing the absorptive capacity of catchments to prolong run-off concentration time; building additional reservoirs to absorb flood peaks; enhancing discharge capacity of the existing barrages and river training works; adopting a “living with the floods” approach for the riverine areas in Punjab and Sindh; improving and expanding flood forecasting and early warning systems; and enhancing evacuation and flood relief capacities.’ [Source: Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan: December Report 2010]
CHAPTER-4

GEOGRAPHY OF PAKISTAN

21. Pakistan is located in the Indus river basin and its delta, with rivers of Kabul, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi and Sutlej as its main tributaries. Based on the Indus river system supplies, we boast of the largest irrigation network in the world though water availability for food and cash crops during critical seasons becomes acute, particularly in dry weather cycles. However, following independence in 1947, problems regarding riparian rights with India emerged as an immediate issue resolved by ad-hoc responses. In 1960, the World Bank brokered Indus Water Treaty was signed, following imposition of extra-constitutional rule that granted an air-base to the USA in Peshawar. Under the Treaty, Pakistan conceded India’s rights over three eastern rivers: Ravi, Sutlej and Beeas whereas our primacy over Indus, Jhelum and Chenab was recognized; to make up for the ensuing water shortages from the rivers conceded to India, a system of Link Canals and construction of major water reservoirs was designed for gravitational transportation of water through economically viable softer soils in the Punjab plains. Earth-filled Mangla Dam on River Jhelum [boundary of the Punjab-Azad Jammu Kashmir] was the first to be constructed in 1960s, with appropriate power generation capacity; recently, its storage capacity has been increased by another 3.3 MAF by raising its height to originally contemplated level. Construction of rock filled Tarbela Dam [in the KP Province] followed in mid 1970s, as the largest storage with power generation units since upgraded after ADB financed Ghazi-Brotha project in the last decade. More were to follow, preferably at 5-years interval: Kalabagh [Punjab-KP], and Diamer-Bhasha, Bunji and Dasu [Gilgit-Baltistan] being two other major projects but the priorities became controversial for various reasons, amongst the Provincial riparians. Rather than moving on for construction of other agreed options, almost 25 years were lost in the ‘to construct or not to construct’ paradigm. Stopgap short term options including increased reliance on thermal and gas fired power stations were made besides resort to importing electricity from Iran and engaging in controversial rental power stations that multiplied per-unit cost of energy to compound rising poverty; it also compelled huge investments in gas and diesel fired generators and UPS equipments.

22. Our fast rising population does not have universal access to safe drinking water; per capita availability is constantly slipping downhill, also owing to excessive pumping of underground waters necessitated for controlling water-logging and salinity. Per capita surface water availability has reduced significantly; from 5,260 m³ in 1951, with 34 million population, to 1,038 m³ in 2010, when the estimated population is 172 million (WAPDA, 2009). Irrigated agriculture is the backbone of Pakistan’s economy and will continue to dictate need for creation of additional water-storage to control flood losses, save river run off during monsoons, and use the stored water during lean seasons for timely maturity of winter-spring staple food crops besides boosting electricity generation from a potential 58,000 Megawatt from our river system. According to WAPDA, the designated national organization for executing mega projects in the water sector, the country has a large cultivable base of 72.70 million acres (MA) of which 52.31 MA is under irrigation. Creation of additional storage facilities could bring more under plough from the remaining 20.39 MA of culturable waste land, to expand food production for ever growing domestic demand and by generating exportable surplus through value additions.

23. Be that it as it may, on the premise of GDP growth as per medium term plan targets for 2020, projected national demand of electricity is expected to reach 22,000 MW, against currently estimated supply at 8,000-13,000 MW, amongst others, due to limited installed capacity, rising fuel prices and massive circular debt. The country is in dire need to tap as much as is feasible from the known; stop gap temporary generation of electricity through rental power thermal-plants is not only expensive but politically unpalatable for other considerations, as well. As regards, the current water storage capacity is nearly 10% of the total average annual flows of 136 MAF, fast reducing due to excessive sediments from the river waters; the existing storages (Tarbela, Mangla and Chashma) have lost almost 5 MAF of storage capacity due to siltation. By the time Diamir Bhasha Dam is completed, it will just restore the existing capacity.

SECTION-1

TERRAIN AND CLIMIATE

24. Pakistan is the 36th largest country with unique geographic location, situated on 30°00′N & 70°00′E, ‘and a profound blend of landscapes called ‘a junction point of history and pivot of geography’, varying from plains to deserts, forests, hills, and plateaus ranging from the coastal areas of the Arabian Sea in the south, to the confluence of the Karakoram, Himalayas and the Hindu Kush mountain Ranges in the north. More than one-half of the summits are over 4,500 meters, and more than fifty peaks reach above 6,500 meters; highest are Nanga Parbat and K2 (8,613.3 meters). Our geology overlaps both with the Indian and the Eurasian tectonic plates that cover most Pakistan. It spreads over 880,940 km2 (340,132.8 sq miles); 97.13% is land and 2.87 % is under water. Its northern mountains are in proximity of Mackinder’s Heartland, whereas southern coastline is washing Spemann’s Rim land. The Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir lie mainly “along the edge of the Indian plate prone to violent earthquakes as the two tectonic plates often collide. It is prone to natural disasters’, is also well established: The October 2005 earthquake, and July-August 2010 floods wrought unprecedented havoc and loss on the fledgling economy, particularly its most vulnerable groups in the least developed areas.
25. “Pakistan has 6,975 km of international and some disputed borders: Afghanistan (2,643 km) to the north-west that include the Khyber Pass and Bolan Pass, the traditional migration routes between Central Eurasia and South Asia, Iran (912 km) is in the west, the People’s Republic of China (510 km) is on our north and India (2,910 km) to the east bordering most controversial boundaries. The climate varies from tropical to temperate. Arid conditions exist in the coastal south, characterized by a monsoon season and a dry season with lesser rainfall, while abundant rainfall is received in the Punjab, with wide variations between extremes of temperature. Rainfall varies from as little as 10 to 150 inches/year, also, with extreme location based variations; coastal belt along the Arabian Sea is usually warm, whereas the frozen snow-covered ridges of the mountain ranges far north remain closed round the year, accessible for a few weeks in May/June. The source of glacial melt is in northern highlands with rugged and high mountains and all the rigours of the climate” and historice source of tourists attractions.
26. “The country has four seasons: a cool, dry winter marked by mild temperatures from December through February; a hot, dry spring from March through May; the summer rainy season, or southwest monsoon period, from June through September; and the retreating monsoon period of October and November. The onset and duration of these seasons vary somewhat according to location. Pakistan lies in the temperate zone, immediately above the Tropic of Cancer”.
27. “Less than one-fifth of Pakistan’s land area has the potential for intensive agricultural use. Nearly all of the arable land is actively cultivated, but outputs are low by world standards. Cultivation is sparse in the northern mountains, the southern deserts, and the western plateaus, but the Indus River basin in Punjab and northern Sindh has fertile soil” that enables Pakistan to feed its 170 million population besides exporting some surplus under normal climatic conditions; agriculture contributes about 1/4th of the GDP besides being the major source of earning foreign exchange.
28. “South of the northern highlands and west of the Indus River plain are ‘the Safed Koh Range’ along Afghanistan border and ‘the Suleiman Range’ and the ‘Kirthar Range’; these define the western extent of Sindh Province and reach almost to the southern coast. The lower reaches are far more arid than those in the north, and branch into ranges that run generally to the southwest across Balochistan”.
29. “The Indus, one of the great rivers of the world, rises in south-western Tibet; about 160 km west of the Sutlej River source that joins it later in the Punjab. The catchments of the Indus are estimated at almost 1 million square km, and all of its major tributaries in Pakistan i.e. Kabul, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi and Sutlej Rivers eventually flow into it. The Indus basin is a large, fertile alluvial plain formed by their silt. This area has been inhabited by agricultural civilizations” for the last over 5,000 years B.C.
30. “The upper Indus basin includes Kashmir, Gilgit-Baltistan the KP and the northern Punjab; the lower Indus basin begins at Panjnad also in the Punjab (the confluence of the eastern tributaries of the Indus) and extends south to the coast, in Sindh Province. Out of the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi and Sutlej rivers that pass through the Punjab, the Sutlej is mostly on the Indian side but a potential source of surplus flood flows, if any. In the southern Punjab, the British harnessed the irrigation potential over 100 years ago by establishing what came to be known as the Canal Colonies, to facilitate emergence of intensive cultivation amidst semi-arid conditions to usher in a new social and economic order”.
31. “Balochistan is located at the eastern edge of the Iranian plateau and in the border region between Southwest, Central, and South Asia. It is the largest of the four Provinces (347,190 km² or 134,051 square miles). The population density is low but per caput water availability has gradually touched the stress level. Much of the Province, south of provincial capital Quetta is sparse, desert terrain with pockets of inhabitable towns, mostly near rivers and streams”. The Kharan Desert is the largest, and is situated in most of Kharan and Chaghi districts. Recent development of Gwadar port has opened the prospects to revitalize its economy.
32. There are two major dams and 19 barrages and several head works. The Tarbela Dam on the Indus in KP and the Mangla Dam on the Jhelum, on the boundary of the Punjab and AJK, both built as part of the Indus Basin Project. The Warsak Dam on the Kabul River near Peshawar is much smaller. These dams, together with a series of headworks and barrages built during the British Raj, and those built since independence, are of vital importance for food and cash crops, the two main stays of the national economy with quick yielding, least input-output ratios, and largest single source of informal employment. Twelve link canals and 45 canals commands also help calm the raging flood waters from cyclical devastation of large areas. [For more details, Google may be explored].
SECTION-2
THE 2010 MONSOONS
33. The south-west monsoons contribute some 65% of the annual rainfall in Pakistan; the rest is generated by other systems including north-westerly winds, in winter. The 2010 monsoon season was, however, unusual in some respects. In end June, 2010, the PMD’s seasonal forecast predicted ‘slightly above normal’ monsoon (+10%) and weather remained dry till 17th July. Provinces competed for extra irrigation releases for the Kharif crops till end of 3rd week of July; between 18-26th July, moderate to high but localized rains visited the Indus basin’s catchments, though southern Pakistan received a few traces of rains, here and there. By that time, PMD had reviewed its earlier forecast in favour of heavy rainfall and alerted all concerned. Revised weather ‘Advisories’ were issued by its FFC Division, to all concerned to prepare for the eventuality. It was stated before the Punjab Judicial Commission that international forecast s of extremely high rains was not shared with the stakeholders. Beginning 27th July, an unusual convergence of easterly NW system was noted over north western Pakistan (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa + NW Punjab), with westerly Arabian sub-tropical winds forming a static jet for almost 48 hours. That triggered an unprecedented precipitation in upper and lower Swat, especially Saidu Sharif in Malakand and upper and lower Dir, Besham and Peshawar. By 30th July, the rains had generated fierce dimensions in the form of raging floods. (Source: Daily Observer of 14-09-2010 Article by Dr. Mohammad Haneef of PMD, cited in Wapda’s power-point presentation of 15 February 2011). The precipitation was so extraordinary that some claimed its frequency of return-period at Peshawar and Saidu Sharif as 2,800 and 8,000 years, respectively. The actual rainfalls during July-August may be seen in the following table:-
RAINFALL DURING JULY (15TH TO AUGUST 15TH ) 2010
STATIONS 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Total
MURREE 0 0 0 0 22 8 3 55 18 0 0 5 97 40 231 0 4 0 17 7 0 8 29 1 13 1 38 0 4 11 18 630
MUZAFFARABAD 0 0 0 1 53 62 55 13 14 0 3 35 91 59 103 1 1 1 31 1 0 15 31 2 2 0 33 0 4 4 1 616
GARHI DOPATTA 0 0 0 0 2 14 55 38 48 0 0 15 116 26 189 0 0 13 35 15 0 13 22 16 4 8 0 0 3 4 0 636
MIANWALI 0 0 0 0 0 80 12 179 TR 0 0 0 0 190 31 0 0 0 0 40 8 0 TR 9 1 0 0 0 0 0 TR 550
RAWALAKOT 0 0 0 20 0 24 0 73 52 0 0 2 105 19 171 0 0 2 5 6 2 TR 21 0 5 12 1 0 7 23 10 560
ISB. SD. PUR 0 0 0 0 TR 17 4 26 3 0 0 3 62 72 257 0 0 0 0 1 8 16 52 2 0 0 30 0 22 0 3 578
KAMRA 0 0 0 0 0 27 13 120 TR 0 0 4 0 68 240 0 0 0 0 1 8 16 52 2 0 0 30 0 22 0 3 606
SAIDU SHARIF 0 0 S 0 0 7 8 24 0 0 0 4 44 187 103 0 0 0 0 39 0 27 48 18 15 0 10 0 19 12 1 566
RISALPUR 0 0 0 0 2 0 13 3 0 0 0 9 5 280 121 TR 0 0 TR 27 0 0 132 36 13 0 45 0 TR 38 32 756
KOTLI 0 0 0 40 19 41 TR 41 TR 0 55 0 103 6 47 12 37 0 3 1 1 4 8 0 10 5 0 16 0 6 3 458
PESHAWAR A/P 0 0 0 0 0 0 47 20 0 0 0 TR TR 274 59 0 0 0 0 29 0 0 8 68 15 0 3 0 1 2 5 531
KAKUL 0 0 0 0 5 42 41 24 0 0 0 1 31 35 124 0 1 0 2 2 8 32 25 5 8 1 5 0 2 13 3 410
CHERAT 0 0 0 0 0 7 2 7 0 0 0 1 33 257 81 0 0 0 1 48 0 0 28 34 42 0 10 0 27 0 8 586
ISLAMABAD A/P 0 0 0 0 39 91 TR 10 5 0 0 TR 68 31 120 0 0 0 0 5 TR TR 57 22 TR TR 0 TR 4 16 1 469
SIALKOT CANTT 0 0 0 29 31 60 6 127 2 0 0 15 55 11 7 0 124 0 0 TR 0 11 43 0 3 0 TR TR 29 18 0 571
LHR. City 0 0 0 5 0 0 191 97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 310
ISLAMABAD ZP 0 0 0 0 27 32 TR 29 3 0 0 3 19 30 156 0 0 0 0 1 1 9 39 4 0 0 1 TR 2 2 9 367
BALAKOT 0 0 0 2 1 8 6 12 7 0 0 71 45 45 90 5 0 5 0 13 0 36 23 1 7 TR 1 3 21 3 9 414
ISB.SH.ABAD 0 0 0 0 42 54 0 17 3 0 0 7 26 54 105 0 0 0 0 2 5 6 52 8 0 0 0 3 1 0 9 394
DIR 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 24 5 0 0 25 57 149 * 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 35 48 12 9 11 0 3 64 20 484

GUJRANWALA 0 0 0 TR 17 86 57 62 TR 0 0 47 0 TR 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 0 4 0 5 0 70 0 TR 387
LAHORE A/P 0 0 0 4 TR TR 98 138 2 0 0 0 TR TR 0 1 4 0 0 2 TR TR 2 0 0 9 15 TR TR 30 1 306
BANNU 0 0 0 0 0 TR 101 51 6 0 0 0 7 84 1 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 35 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 326
STATIONS 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Total
SIALKOT A/P 0 0 0 7 61 67 0 38 4 0 0 64 21 9 0 0 TR 0 0 0 0 104 42 0 5 0 1 0 51 TR 0 474
LOWER DIR 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 17 0 0 0 6 0 192 71 0 0 5 0 19 0 0 14 36 3 0 1 0 8 0 0 379
MANGLA 0 0 0 1 5 140 1 35 1 0 1 0 0 18 34 0 0 0 0 24 0 7 5 0 1 0 32 0 3 0 81 389
JHELUM 0 0 0 6 13 92 1 38 1 0 30 0 1 7 7 0 36 0 4 15 TR 4 10 0 3 0 TR 0 TR TR 1 269
MANDI-BAHU-DIN 0 0 0 20 14 41 9 36 0 0 5 0 11 1 47 0 1 0 TR TR 0 0 86 0 3 0 17 0 0 0 2 293
MIRPUR KHAS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 143 0 0 0 0 16 19 0 4 1 0 48 0 0 0 0 0 0 241
PARACHINAR 0 0 0 0 0 1 26 16 5 0 2 2 20 21 20 0 0 0 24 0 65 3 12 0 33 20 5 0 0 2 0 277
FAISALABAD 0 0 0 0 0 6 60 52 0 0 0 0 1 12 3 0 0 0 0 TR 0 0 7 46 4 0 37 21 53 3 0 305
LHR. SHAHDARA 0 0 0 0 0 0 117 64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 94 0 275
SARGODHA 0 0 0 0 0 17 37 95 0 0 0 0 1 14 25 0 0 0 0 10 7 TR 8 TR 0 0 TR TR 15 0 4 233
T.T. SINGH 0 0 0 0 0 0 TR 95 0 0 0 0 18 42 TR 0 0 0 1 50 50 0 9 85 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 351
BHAKKAR 0 0 0 0 0 15 50 31 1 0 0 0 1 59 TR 0 0 3 6 58 12 TR 36 TR TR 0 0 0 0 0 0 272
THATTA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 0 13 15 45 50 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 5 1 107 0 0 0 0 0 0 277
JHANG 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 45 0 0 0 0 0 15 4 0 0 0 2 45 2 0 0 5 6 4 0 0 1 0 43 195
D.I.KHAN 0 0 0 0 0 TR 80 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 17 150 39 TR 13 1 TR 0 0 0 0 0 0 310
SAHIWAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 17 0 0 0 1 26 3 0 0 0 1 3 TR TR TR 0 0 0 0 1 51 0 TR 136
DADU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 TR 0 0 0 13 117 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 156
JACOBABAD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 36 0 0 0 57 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 7 TR TR TR 0 0 TR TR 0 1 137
KARACHI A/PORT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 TR 0 9 0 28 38 7 0 4 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 62 61 TR 0 0 0 0 0 212
ZHOB 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 14 5 0 0 0 0 73 0 0 8 0 0 0 7 7 0 36 4 35 0 0 0 0 0 192
BARKHAN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 56 0 0 0 0 16 19 0 0 0 0 0 14 29 2 0 1 53 0 0 0 0 0 0 190
KALAM 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 4 0 0 0 14 84 * 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 1 0 120
DROSH 0 0 0 0 0 0 TR TR 0 0 0 0 23 61 15 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 13 9 5 2 2 0 1 0 139
OKARA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 0 0 2 6 0 5 38
PADIDAN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 TR 42 28 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 7 3 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 86
D.G.KHAN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 46 7 0 0 0 6 6 0 0 0 1 43 29 65 TR 0 TR 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 211
STATIONS 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Total
ASTORE 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 12 13 0 0 0 2 14 21 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 9 3 0 0 0 0 89
CHHOR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 22 3 4 0 2 0 0 3 10 18 39 3 0 0 19 55 1 0 0 0 0 0 195
BADIN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 4 0 3 7 0 0 0 14 10 21 6 TR 0 0 7 102 0 2 0 0 0 0 192
GUPIS 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 3 0 0 0 2 32 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 8 0 0 0 0 11 0 94
HUNZA 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 9 9 0 0 0 3 19 14 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 10 0 0 0 2 TR 84
NAWABSHAH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 0 19 0 0 0 3 TR TR 0 0 12 1 46 0 0 0 0 0 0 98
BAHAWALNAGAR 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 5 18 0 0 6 11 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 18 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 82
CHITRAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 41 13 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 3 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 75
MITHI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 13 3 32 1 0 0 0 29 23 26 24 2 0 0 82 59 0 0 0 0 0 3 306
SIBBI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 6 7 0 0 0 0 0 TR 11 TR 2 26 TR 0 0 0 0 0 0 60
MULTAN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 0 3 12 TR 0 0 6 5 16 4 TR TR 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 197
GILGIT 0 0 0 0 0 0 TR 5 9 0 0 0 5 11 14 6 TR 0 0 0 0 TR 5 13 20 1 11 0 0 TR TR 100
CHILAS 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 7 0 0 0 2 8 26 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 8 2 9 0 0 2 TR 81
MOIN-JO-DARO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 TR 0 0 0 TR 0 0 10 0 2 3 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 48
HYDERABAD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 7 9 1 0 0 7 3 0 0 0 1 5 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 64
BAHAWALPUR CITY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 TR TR 0 0 0 27 5 0 0 4 0 2 28 32 TR TR 1 TR 8 0 0 0 TR 49 156
KHUZDAR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 TR 0 3 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57 TR 19 2 0 0 0 0 99
SKARDU 0 0 0 0 0 0 TR 3 18 TR 0 0 0 1 1 TR TR 0 0 TR 8 3 4 1 4 2 TR 0 0 9 0 54
BAHAWALPUR A/P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 TR TR 0 0 0 4 14 2 0 0 0 8 65 16 0 0 12 0 2 0 0 0 0 TR 123
RAHIM YAR KHAN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 TR TR 23 0 0 0 TR TR 46 57 25 TR 22 TR 5 0 0 0 0 2 180
LARKANA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 TR 0 0 0 1 TR 1 131 3 TR 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 140
ROHRI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 TR 4 TR 0 TR 0 0 0 0 TR 5 13 20 1 11 0 0 TR TR 54
KALAT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
QUETTA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 TR 0 0 0 0 0 TR 1 TR TR 0 TR 0 0 0 0 0 1
SUKKUR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 TR 0 TR TR 8 11 9 0 2 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 37
SAMUNGLI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 TR 0 0 0 0 0 TR TR TR TR 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Source: PMD, Ministry of Defence
34. In KP Province, flash floods washed away the head-works, bridges and roads besides silting of major and minor canals and farms around the rivers, including civil canals and inundation of vast human settlements; no allegations were levelled against the officials or politicians who indeed reacted promptly to restore irrigation network for 2010-11 Rabi crop that limited the losses to Kharif crops, destroyed by rivers. In Sindh, as many as 2,155 breaches were reported with canals and minors leading the list of its five irrigation regions including SIDA. Of these, 134 breaches were to the major and secondary bunds with Tori breach as the source that topped the damages. In the Punjab, except one induced breach to RGB, upstream Jinnah Barrage, rest were differently attributed by concerned officials to unprecedented high volumes and extremely lengthy durations of the super floods, though serious observations were raised by professionals about the lack of effective command at site and staff negligence. The evidence produced before the Punjab Judicial Commission flagged non-opening of barrage gates in good time, forging of official entries of gate opening at Jinnah Barrage, use of non-conforming sandy clay beneath the stone pitched LMB, natural erosion, non-maintenance, dysfunctional electronic gates awaiting repair since mid July, design issues regarding the bund slope on canal side, construction of additional weirs during 2004-07 at Taunsa Barrage under the World Bank project, all combined to create the observed havoc. The fact that the Taunsa’s LMB had been subjected to extensive repairs in 2008-2009 with design modification raised more basic questions, inter-alia, in view of the false sense of security amongst the unsuspecting residents in the vicinity. Be that as it may, the following sequence contains the nature and effect of concentrated downpour that generated super-foods travelling from the northern hills to southern plains before its eventual fall into the sea, with colossal damages on the way with some unusual features:-
a) Most rains in the north were unprecedented, some 60-100 km westwards towards Khyber Pakhtunkhwa from its seasonal monsoon loci in upper Punjab and Kashmir.
b) The first of the two rounds during 27-30th July was after a long dry spell, but the second round of 3-9th August was in highly wet-soil conditions.
c) The extraordinary quantum of daily localized downpour in the upper catchments of Rivers Swat, Kabul and Indus; e.g. on 29th July, Cherat 257 mm, 187 mm at Saidu Sharif, 274 mm at Peshawar and 280 mm at Risalpur. Whereas historical annual highest at Peshawar was 400 mm in the year 1996; other parts of the country also received extensive downpours, at times with intervals.
d) Such rains in KP province generated flash floods of extremely high magnitude. Peak discharges (60-200 per centum more than historic maximum) in Swat river at Amandara and Munda, Kabul River at Nowshehra. Extensive precipitation in the catchments of river Swat in KP swelled flows from the Kabul River that coincided with heavy rains in catchments of the Indus River.
e) For a while, it rendered planned response irrelevant and redundant, as the irrigation infrastructure and public offices in the flood plain were swept away by the high tide.
f) As waters began their downward journey, structures at Munda Headworks on Swat River and rain-gauges on Kabul River near Nowshehra were swept away.
g) In terms of the quantitative flows that peaked to 270, 000 cusecs at Amandara Headworks on Swat River, these swelled to 365,000 cusecs with additional flows from Panjkora River which had washed away Munda Headworks, on 29th July.
h) Downstream Munda, on 30th July, another 150,000 cusecs from Kabul River passed through Warsak dam, to touch another historical high at 481,000 cusecs on that very day against previously recorded 218,000 cusecs in 1965.
i) During its visit to Munda Headworks on 31st March 2011, the Commission noted the complete destruction of the Headworks where all but one iron gates on either side of the river had been pulled out and swept away like a straw, many km downstream.
j) Kabul River that passes through Nowshehra spilled over from both its banks to submerge several settlements under 8-10 feet of water besides inundating irrigated crops in that fertile belt, before the roaring waters rushed to fall in the Indus at Khairabad.
k) The field visit on April 1, 2011 to Nowshehra confirmed that sweep of the rain-storms induced floods beyond comprehension, too high to stay within the banks of Kabul River.
l) Upstream Tarbela, on 29th July, the extraordinary rains, hill torrents and glacier melts on Indus River had generated 835,000 cusecs intake in the reservoir, 61% higher than previous highest 520,000 cusecs in 1992.
m) By that time, Pakistan’s largest reservoir at Tarbela had already surpassed its initial E-1 1500 ft threshold that permits limited daily retentions; the Dam management had been put on high alert since June 2010, amidst fears of accidental burst of Attabad lake in Hunza.
n) Substantial retention of extra intake at Tarbela was made possible as 603,000 cusecs were released, to attenuate minimum additions at Khairabad and downstream that day.
o) On arrival in downstream Khairabad, as these releases from Tarbela joined the super-flood flows from Kabul River, it had averted another big back-wash towards Nowshehra.
p) Timely steps at Tarbela, minimized threat to the aging Jinnah Barrage, commissioned in 1947, which is awaiting rehabilitation.
q) As the first wave of season’s highest flows reached Jinnah Barrage six hours earlier than expected on 30th July evening, the LMB and LGB had already breached on 29th July to inundate vast tracts of lands and settlements in Mianwali and Bhakkar; the 3,500 feet long breach in LMB was later plugged by 2nd August 2010 before arrival of 2nd peak after 9th August 2010 that did not affect any additional areas.
r) On the following day of 30th July, highest flows of 936,000 cusecs arrived but before these approached the red-line for Jinnah Barrage, three pre-determined breaching sections in Right Guide Bund (RGB) were got activated with the help of the Army Engineers to release about 100,000 cusecs; no risk could be taken at that stage.
s) The measure saved the vulnerable barrage though damages were inflicted to a few of its installations including under-repair apron, Power-House, 11 KV Transmission line and some peripheral structures.
t) As water advanced towards Chashma Barrage in Mianwali, on 1st August, it attained a peak of 1,038,876 cusecs, with addition from Kurram River. Here, extensive consultations ensued since receipt of 30th July warnings and breaches at Jinnah Barrage, and an orderly routing of 957, 310 cusecs was affected by adjusting the gates as per WAPDA’s O and M safety Manual. The management had diverted 150,000-200,000 cusecs to its power-house and Chashma-Jhelum Link canal and some through its CRBC besides impounding 0.31 MAF against barrage’s gross capacity of 0.32 MAF.
u) The next major controlled structure downstream was Taunsa Barrage with an upgraded design discharge capacity of 1.1 million cusecs; on 2nd August that barrage passed a seasonal peak discharge of 959,891 cusecs, but a 2.4 km length of the LMB, next to Tibba Tie minor, refurbished during 2008-09, collapsed before the water reached its crest.
v) That breach in turn triggered almost 10 breaches on nearby Sunawan Bund and 13 breaches on other secondary bunds (5,000 ft) on the banks of T.P. Link Canal and Muzaffargarh Canal during 2-4th August.
w) The above breaches had diverted 125, 000 cusecs to inundate vast areas in Muzaffargarh’s Kot Addu sub-division that remained exposed to an unprecedented havoc for 17 days. The breach was closed by constructing a new bund within 20 days by 24/7 deployment of machinery and personnel.
x) On the right side, the rising water threatened the various spurs including spur no 5 upstream Taunsa, initially erected in 1958 at the time of constructing the barrage with a view to divert the natural river course.
y) While locals were strongly of the view that right bank escape could have prevented the LMB disaster, that recourse could not have given much relief due to modest capacity of 5-10,000 cusecs especially as peak discharge of 1.1 million cusecs had not reached Taunsa.
z) The change in river morphology had rendered the pre-designated breaching section, upstream Taunsa irrelevant and outdated, as even the unprecedented water levels stayed away from these sections of the bunds.
aa) Downstream Taunsa, Indus starts flowing on the ridge; water level had marginally declined, partly due to the breaches upstream and combined effects of widening of the flood plain in the river’s extended reach.
bb) That offered little solace to those who stood uprooted from their homes and hearths.
cc) Taunsa Barrage had been recently rehabilitated, by using the IBRD project loan of Rs.11 billion (2004-06).
dd) The breached LMB, its main stone pitched bund had been repaired during 2008 and 2009, as a part of that very project.
ee) Further downstream in Rajanpur district, Jampur Bund and Fakhhar Bund at Mithan-Kot, the latter constructed by district government in 80’s, without adhering to Federal Flood Commission’s specifications and handed over to Irrigation Department for maintenance, collapsed under water pressure.
ff) Mercifully at that stage, arrivals from Jhelum and Chenab rivers’ systems remained moderate, due to medium flood releases by India where surplus waters are usually diverted for productive irrigation in Rajasthan belt.
gg) Localized rains on Indus’s right bank in Rajanpur generated hill torrents that filled Wapda’s under construction Kachhi canal with debris, before adding additional flows to the Indus.
hh) As Indus entered Sindh province, on 7/8th August, under-construction Bhong Bund was damaged at 10 sites on the Punjab-Sindh boundary, though initial high on 5th August passed that point without any significant damage.
ii) Hill torrents between Taunsa-Guddu on the right bank combined with another 300,000 cusecs discharge from Punjnad Barrage fed by Rivers Chenab and Jhelum had raised the inflows at 1962 vintage Guddu Barrage to super flood level.
jj) While the season’s first highest at 920,948 cusecs, received at Guddu on 5th August, remained within regulation limits, apprehensions about the safety of the Tori Bund, between miles 12-13, on right bank between Guddu and Sukkur Barrages were widespread in the local community and media.
kk) On 6/7 August in the wee hours attempts were noted about some movement of machinery to effect cuts on already eroded Tori Bund but these were foiled by the locals who had taken shelter on the bund.
ll) Highest actual arrivals on 7/8th August of 1,148,700 cusecs at Guddu Barrage far exceeded the formulae-based departmental projections of 850, 000 cusecs, compared to design capacity of 1.2 million cusecs.
mm) Peak flows had taken 36 hours to reach from Taunsa to Guddu, against 24 hrs normal.
nn) The Tori Bund, downstream on the right bank of Guddu Barrage suffered extensive breaches of about 2.7 km; it released unprecedented estimated 1.47 MAF towards Kashmore, Shikarpur and Jacobabad enroute to Naseerabad Divisioin of Balochistan. On the way it damaged 70% of the 150 km of Beghari-Sindh Feeder and Kirther canals, and devastated life and property with direct brunt on Jaffarabad District.
oo) Raini canal received almost 100% extra water against design capacity to register 13 breaches between RD 35-234 with an average length of 200 ft; it was suspected that had this not happened, 193, 000 acre feet of water would have inundated Ghotki district.
pp) Within Sindh, its declining but sustained flows demolished nearby secondary Loop Bunds of old Ghauspur, Ghaurghat Bund and B.S. Feeder Canal Bunds too, to dislocate large populations besides inundation of the fertile farm-lands.
qq) These bunds had a history of frequent breaches, recorded in the Sindh Bund Manual but not always necessarily coinciding with Super floods: e.g. Tori Bund breached in 1904, 1930, 1932, 1942, 1975, 1976 and 1995; old Ghauspur Loop Bund in 1912, 1921, 1924, 1925, 1926, 1927, 1928, and 1929; whereas the GG Bund breached in 1929, 1935, 1955, 1956 and 1976.
rr) By 10th August, 1,131,000 cusecs reached Sukkur Barrage with reduced capacity of 1.1 million cusecs. This barrage was constructed in 1932 with a designed capacity of 1,500, 000 cusecs optimum, and at a time when up-country major water reservoirs under the 1960 Indus Water Treaty were not even in contemplation. It commands some 7.0 million acres of fertile farm lands including date-palm orchards in Khairpur through seven canals, three on right bank and four on left bank with scores of minors and subsidiary channels and is thus an important source of livelihood.
ss) Further downstream Sukkur Barrage, within Sindh, it took 17 days for the super floods to reach 1956 vintage Kotri Barrage with optimum design discharge of 1.0 million cusecs. In 2000, its gates were revamped and pond level was raised by 2 feet.
tt) On 27th August, 964, 897 cusecs passed Kotri against previous highest of 981,000 in 1956.
uu) Against expected travel time of 72-78 hours from Sukkar to Kotri, it took 336 extra hours.
vv) By that time, the water levels had substantially subsided, without threatening any of the main irrigation structures.
ww) Downstream Kotri, at Thatta-Sujawal two major Bunds, MS Bund on the left bank and PB Bund on right bank breached and flooded vast areas, almost four weeks after the beginning of flash floods in the KP.
xx) Breaches also took place in the Nara-Valley drain and bunds around Mancher Lake that threatened Sehwan Airport and PARCO’s refinery on 13 September.
yy) The induced breaches to the Lake’s bunds re-diverted the flood water to Indus after inundating 40 villages.
zz) Likewise, RBOD I, II and III that drains water from Balochistan suffered breaches and damages.
35. Extreme gaps were observed in the comparative flood forecasts from the PMD and actual discharges that passed through various controlled structures of Wapda and I and P departments. These were more pronounced during the critical phases of peak floods. The following tables will flag the point:-

TABLE: PMD FORECAST AND ACTUAL DISCHARGE OF WATER
(‘000’ CUSECS)
DATE TARBELA MANGLA TAUNSA GUDDU SUKKUR
FORECAST ACTUAL PEAK FORECAST ACTUAL PEAK FORECAST ACTUAL PEAK FORECAST ACTUAL PEAK FORECAST ACTUAL PEAK
25.07.2010 45-50 46
26.07.2010 200-220 221 45-60 50
27.07.2010 210-230 239 50-80 70
28.07.2010 250-290 280 100-200 170
29.07.2010 290-340 459.0 (+119) 130-250 221 230-245 300.0 (+55)
31.07.2010 500-620 835.0 (+215) 200-340 267 280-350 824.0 (+474)
30.07.2010 600-750 547.0
(-53) 90-130 155.0 (+25) 450-700 618
01.08.2010 400-500 447 90-170 113 650-850 799 250-300 293
02.08.2010 370-440 385 70-120 105 800-950 767.0 (-33) 300-470 355 250-300 216
03.08.2010 350-370 360 80-120 100 700-780 790.0 (+10) 370-550 463 220-300 252
04.08.2010 310-370 352 650-790 722 470-650 701.0(+51) 260-370 311
05.08.2010 600-740 693 750-1000 963 320-500 872.0 (+ 372)
06.08.2010 600-650 614 750-1000 963 600-800 1,049.0 (+249)
07.08.2010 500-600 568 900-1000 1,129.0 (129) 880-1000 1,130.0 (+130)
08.08.2010 1,100-1150 1,149.00 1,050-1150 1,131.00
08.08.2010 1,050-1150 1,088.00 1,130-1150 1,131.00
09.08.2010 900-1,080 1,037.00 1,130-1145 1,113.00
10.08.2010 950-1,030 997 1080-1.130 1,084.00
11.08.2010 1,000-1100 1,010.00
(Source: PMD and WAPDA REPORTS)

The above did not necessarily reflect on the professional competence or integrity of those deputed to measure flows of flood water; these certainly revealed inadequate technical capacity and absence of one-window war room.

36. It was generally believed, individually as well as collectively, that ‘the 2010 floods were unprecedented’. That perception was strongly and consistently reinforced by media though it highlighted cases of negligence and extensive ad-hocism triggered by the massive volumes of roaring waters. This was also the position taken by most of the official respondents who appeared before the Supreme Court, or later assisted the Commission. However, available reports from Federal and Provincial sources, including the FFC, WAPDA and I and P Departments, and frequency analysis of recorded peak flows at controlled structures establish a different picture. Perusal of official record, public testimonies and our field visits confirmed that the 2010 Flood flows were unprecedented at six major controlled irrigation structures in KP and the Punjab; on the other hand, lesser than historic highest passed at the three main barrages on Indus, in Sindh Province, as is self-evident from the following table:-
Irrigation Structure/ River Peak Discharge 2010 Cusecs) Historic Highest (Cusecs) Year
Highest Levels
Swat River
Kabul River at Nowshehra
Tarbela Dam
Jinnah Barrage
Chashma Barrage
Taunsa Barrage
220,000
400,000
835,000
936,000
1,037,000
959,000
97,500
223,000
800,000
917,000
781,000
788,600
1995
1965
1929
1942
1976
1958
Guddu Barrage
Sukkur Barrage
Kotri Barrage 1,148,000
1,131,000
965,000 1,176,000
1,161,000
981,000 1976
1976
1956
Source: Federal Flood Commission and WAPDA.

a. Out of the above, Chashma, Sukkur and Kotri Barrages received and passed higher peaks than their designed discharge capacity, assuming Sukkur’s reduced capacity, of 1.1 million cusecs.
b. Another unusual feature noted from the flood flows throughout the Indus route, from Besham in northern hills to Kotri plains in Sindh was the abnormal variation from the historical record as self evident from the following table:-

c. Most Dams/ Barrages including Sukkur sustained high and exceptionally high peaks upto 15 consecutive days was unprecedented.
` d. Kotri Barrage sustained high flows for more than 7 days. But the most significant reality was that despite 336 extra hours, for the waters to reach Kotri Barrage, Thatta-Sujjawal, downstream, was inundated after the breaches of MS and PB Bunds. Not only that bunds were not maintained, despite adequate warning and time-lag, efforts to fortify the eroded and known vulnerable sections of bunds at Thatta Sujawal were not made, and despite the local MNA chasing all concerned.
e. The disparity in the time-lag between projections and arrivals was directly co-related to the excessive diversions of flood flows that escaped through breaches. Thatta /Sujawal downstream Kotri had no reason to be exposed to tamed flows long after 4-weeks of the warning advisories commencing first torrential rain in KP on 27th July, if not earlier.
f. Assuming Sukkur’s present capacity at 1.1 million cusecs with 6 feet freeboard modified by the Indus River Commission from 900,000 cusecs premised on 4 feet freeboard (page 4 of 18 chapter V of Sindh Bund Manual) in pursuance of IRC meeting of 27th September, 1973 and later reviews after 1976 floods) the relevant hydrographs of the Indus established two back-to-back reduced peak flows that merged on arrival at Kotri.
g. The standard rule of the thumb after 1976 historic floods is that height of a bund/ embankments is required to be maintained at a level 6 ft above the last highest flood level. In Sindh, the highest floods were recorded in 1976 and in the Punjab in 1992. But the bunds were admittedly not maintained for decades, as per the prescribed specifications of the relevant O and M Manuals except the LMB of Taunsa Barrage in the Punjab. The last mentioned was refurbished in 2008-09 under a World Bank Project. It was noted that besides poor maintenance during low flood/ dry seasons 4-5 years prior to 2010, diversions/ unauthorized structures within the pond areas, illegal farming in the river beds and pond areas, encroachments and private zamindara bunds or combination thereof contributed to induced structural failures, before the arrival of peak waves. These were therefore, damaged as soon as water approached the toe of the bunds, suffering from inattention and years of neglect in dry seasons which exposed them to all potential risks enumerated in the respective Flood Manuals or the PWD Code. These SOPs dictated a certain degree of responsibility and extra attention during extraordinary seasonal forecasts. These safety guidelines were not followed in pre-flood phase; joint inspections by the local armed forces, invited in aid of civil power did not materially affect the change beyond routine visits. Everyone seemed contented with going through the paper certifications.
37. As soon as rains began to show on ground, the vibrant electronic Media that was vigorously preoccupied initially at not too distant Attabad Lake in Gilgit-Baltistan, and then the Air-Blue tragedy in Islamabad, switched its focus to cover the flood flows, wave- by-wave. It was the first ever major event of that magnitude anywhere, after 2005 earthquake. Leading anchors, men and women, rushed to the real stage, to witness live tragedies unfolding before their very eyes with drenched feet to transmit as their national duty; they not only expressed solidarity to the cause of the marooned, they created a niche as national institutions of credible standing by sharing real- time footage of various events.

38. In Balochistan, the shock was so sudden and severe that Mr. Zafarullah Khan Jamali, a former Prime Minister and resident of affected Jaffarabad District joined the angry protestors, alleging, on live media, malafide political manipulations by two Federal Ministers of Sindh and its local administration of having vested mundane motives. He repeatedly reiterated the allegations in his meeting with the incumbent Prime Minister in the presence of media personnel that breaches were caused to Tori bund, and not to breach Aliwahan were intended to save Jacobabad and the sugar godowns of politically influential persons. He also alleged that attempted breaches in the Jacobabad-Dera Allah Yar bye-pass in Balochistan was intended to save Jacobabad Airbase. Unfortunately, he could not make it convenient to depose before the Commission or file an affidavit to substantiate political motives or malafide despite two opportunities extended to him as per his request and to his convenience. His media claims with respect to lives lost were also highly exaggerated.

39. The historical evidence in Sindh Bund Manual shows that Guddu, Sukkur and Kotri Barrages had withstood higher flood water flows than the 2010 flows; the performance of these three Barrage structures and training works designed to sustain flood pressures and retain the bigger volumes may have also been beyond expectations of many. But what was lacking was thorough and regular inspections of the bunds, particularly the main bunds on which the allied and secondary loop Bunds and structures depend. A timely attention to the specified official duties and obligations after the 2009 flood season, and repairs in pre-flood season before 2010 monsoon could have prevented most, if not all the damages except the flash flood in the KP and northern belt and from right bank hill torrents in KP’s D.I. Khan, DG. Khan and Rajanpur in the Punjab.

40. The above has implications, regardless of the contributory sources and factors that threatened or induced various breaches. Like weather, mighty Indus took no criticism nor did it spare inefficiently supervised structures or years of official neglect; it accepted the challenge posed to its strength to confront incompatible/ low quality materials to sweep it in a flash, with its natural fury; it did not indemnify what supervisors were prepared and willing to condone. As its roaring water found new levels, it levelled away almost anything and everything before spreading its anchor sheet of water over millions of hectares of Kharif crops, both cash and food, farmed in relatively flatter plains for a good harvest.

SECTION-3

A SCENARIO AVERTED BY DESIGN

41. As noted above also, during first peak, on 30th July 2010, Tarbela reservoir received 835,000 cusecs, and its management decided to release only 603,000 cusecs after addition of 6.97 feet against 1 foot permissible SOP at that point in time. Likewise, Mangla reservoir on Jhelum River absorbed a peak of 344,000 cusecs. These two reservoirs, with a total storage capacity of 12.62 MAF, are normally augmented in stages as per precisely calibrated heights / volumes as a standard practice. However, the top management engaged itself to permit substantial deviations to curtail the exceptional build up downstream Khairabad. Likewise, at Chashma carefully crafted diversions eased the pressure on the main barrage and delayed the arrivals downstream to some extent. These eventually helped reduce significantly the combined flood peaks in Indus, particularly downstream Punjnad that could have been compounded by conditions unfolding in Indian regulated river catchments. Taking into account the capacity of existing canal network, it is estimated that in the absence of absorption at Tarbela reservoir, another 232, 000 cusecs would have joined 481,000 cusecs from Kabul River’s peak to swell the flows at Jinnah Barrage to a total of 1.3 million cusecs against its designed capacity of 950, 000 cusecs.

42. Similarly water at Chashma and Taunsa barages, even with no addition from hill torrents/ rains on the way, would have risen to 1.4-1.5 million cusecs whereas dispatch of 1.8 million cusecs would have reached Guddu, and marginally lower 1.6 million cusecs at Sukkur on way to Kotri.

43. In the light of what happened in the country during 29th July through 27th August 2010, it is not necessary to map the rest of the consequences for the entire Indus basin, its irrigated agriculture, the population settlements and rest of the transport and other physical infrastructure with which designers of the barrages were aware even in 1930s, when Indus Treaty replacement works like Tarbela and Mangla, were not even in contemplation. It was flagged in various studies that Pakistan receives more than 136 MAF of water annually; of which 80% comes in June to September during SW monsoon; remaining 2/3 of the year when the Rabi food / cash crops are sown and grown mostly face frequent shortages of irrigation supplies, even in normal years, not to speak of periodical drought cycles that create serious tensions amongst upper and lower riparians of the Federating units. Out of the total availability, Wapda noted that during 67 wet-days of 2010 Flood season, 55 MAF flowed into the Arabian sea; its previous records show even higher escapes of 92 MAF in 1995, 81 MAF in 1992 and 1978 and 69 MAF in 1976. With 15 % storage capacity, enough for 30 days of irrigation requirements, presently, Pakistan has the capacity to ensure food security for 172 million besides generating a modest export surplus, mainly rice. Growing needs of rising population indicate a need for political consensus to expand and optimise Mother Nature’s free gifts rather than living on international dole or inviting its wrath; two major disasters of 2005 and 2010, both in Ramadan must be heeded to. Delays are neither conducive for national objectives nor due recognition of nature’s free gift. A study has shown total annual availability of water in Pakistan as given in the table below:-

ANNUAL RIVER FLOWS
(MAF)

River Apr-Jun Jul-Sept Oct-Dec Jan-Mar Annual Flow
Indus 27.9 48.7 7.1 5.8 89.5
Jhelum 9.9 8.2 1.8 2.7 22.6
Chenab 6.7 13.1 1.7 2.0 23.5
Total 46.5 70.0 10.6 10.5 135.6
Source: Indus Waters Treaty in Retrospect by Mr. Bashir A. Malik, Chief Technical Advisor UNO (R)

CHAPTER-5

ANALYSIS OF THE OFFICIAL EVIDENCE

44. Divergent views have been expressed with respect to the causes of breaches: The Petitioners did not mince words in alleging politically motivated interventions that traded off water induced devastations, to save direct hit in one area to inflict loss on the other, more vulnerable. This was, however, vehemently contested by the incumbent and retired officials of Sindh and Balochistan, responsible for flood management. Before analysing the weight of public contentions, comprehension of following objectives, official instruments or SOPs developed with over 100 years of experience of construction, inspections and maintenance of flood protection works may be instructive:

a. Dams, barrages and canals maintained by Federal or Provincial Authorities: Elaborate SOPs including mathematical formulae-based tools have been specified to regulate water distribution, record the water intake and releases throughout the year and especially during SW monsoon seasons taking into account historical data of the controlled structures and major reservoirs in terms of low, medium, high, exceptionally high and Super Floods.
b. In the Punjab safety of the controlled irrigation structures is the top-most management objective.
c. The Sindh SOPs based in the Sindh Bund Manual are rooted in the concept of containing the Indus within its banks as it approaches any of the three barrages. For the purpose with effect from 1976 bunds/ embankments are required to be maintained at a height six feet above the historical highest flood level, called freeboard. Periodical inspections of bunds, immediately after the flood season, and initiating requisite repair and upgradation is expected. Indus River Commission has specified a set of forms required to be maintained and submitted about the status of the bunds/ river discharges and keeping in hand materials and labour required for repairing breaches. Maintenance of the bunds during dry seasons and wetting of the bunds to check rodent related holes, and other leaks of various types. In particular, these provide for:-
(i) Provision of stores, materials, equipment and accessories and labour for plugging any gap or breach.
(ii) Daily patrolling before and during flood season, and regular inspection of identified vulnerable points.
(iii) Pre-flood special inspections by designated inter-agency teams.
(iv) Monitoring of rain and water discharges in rivers and hill torrents, on regular basis and projections of expected flows at various barrages, keeping in view the travelling time specified.
(v) Mathematical formulae have been worked out for forecasting expected arrival at various points enroute.
(vi) Recording of computations in log books initially with pencils to be modified by ink as per actual flows.
(vii) Coordination with all horizontal and vertical stakeholders.

d. The management-structures created to attend various duties are: Three-tier organizational set ups to be created under the NDMA XXXx, PDMAs, DDMAs, Federal Flood Commission, Wapda, PMDs FFD, IRSA, Indus Water Commissioner for Indian controlled waters, Relief Commissioners, various emergency services, and Irrigation departments.
e. The tools to achieve above objectives are timely collection and collation of relevant data regarding winter snowfall, glacier melts and summer temperatures and monsoon rainfall in the catchments for a reasonable forecast, adjusted immediately for an abnormal change in natural elements.
f. Coordination with the managements of upstream controlled structures.
g. Pre-designated bund sections, upstream Jinnah Barrage in the Punjab, earmarked for dismantling by use of explosives, kept handy by Pakistan Army Engineers, should the inflow create an extraordinary situation beyond the optimum design discharge capacity.

45. Admittedly, the 2010 Flood was classified as super flood; the flows were unprecedented in the KP and had generated higher than the regulation-discharge or designed capacities, at Tarbela dam and Jinnah, Chashma & Taunsa barrages in the Punjab, but these were not higher than previously recorded flows in three barrages in Sindh, as reflected in the table in para 22 supra. The above has implications:

a. The KP administration had no time to respond to flash floods that swept away everything in Swat and Kabul rivers in a flash.
b. The three barrages in Sindh received below historic maximum inflows, though these lasted for longer durations.
c. Tarbela Dam and Chashma barrages regulated their intakes and outflows as per SOPs.
d. The RGB upstream Jinnah barrage was breached after interagency consultations on 30 July 2010, for safety of the barrage as breaches in LGB and LMB on 29th July, 2010 a day earlier did not warrant any risk.
e. Four major and scores of minor breaches in secondary bunds in the Punjab, including the LGB/LMB at Jinnah and LMB at Taunsa were not pre-designated. Inter-play of many factors contributed to these breaches: Non–observance of Regulations, misjudgements, delayed repairs of essential works, inefficiency of the Engineers in-charge of the bunds & poor supervision, inadequate maintenance, lack of stone stock on site and even design issues in case of LMB at Taunsa.
f. Since the bunds had been designed for height six feet above the HFL line of 1976 floods, the contention of overtopping of Tori and other bunds in Kot Almo, Thatta was irrelevant. It is not substantiated by any credible evidence or material; on the contrary, deliberate attempts were made to suppress evidence and mislead the Commission as was the case with other inquires.
46. The 2010 Flood was variously described and generally believed to be: ‘Super Flood’, ‘Unprecedented Flood’, ‘1 in 1,000-years’, ‘1 in 2,800 years floods’ and even, ‘1 in 8,000 years flood’. Almost 12% of nation, mostly in rural areas and farm sector were worst impacted, at a time when they were preparing for ‘Sehri’, in the holy month of Ramadan. The Federal Flood Commission, in its written statement in the Hon’ble Court stated that downstream Guddu, it was ‘below 1976 HFL’. While primary source of the catastrophe was undisputedly traced to mother nature, allegations of acts or omissions, and politically motivated decisions in all the three phases were voiced: Pre-flood, during the flood and post-flood including repair and maintenance of vulnerable structures, arrangements for establishment of well stocked relief camps, logistics for food, medicines, transport etc, issuance of early warnings for relocation of people most likely to be affected by impending disaster, observance of guidelines to minimize eventual exposure to an unforeseen contingency, orderly conduct of rescue & relief operations during the disaster and taking care without compromising their dignity and earliest rehabilitation.

47. Be that as it may, the individual functions assigned to relevant Ministries and their organizations and Provincial Governments and their entities together with respective roles played by their functionaries, high or low, during the 2010 Flood, as brought out in the oral and documentary evidentiary material produced before the Commission or secured by it from official sources with some effort and considerable persuasion, and other relevant or pertinent e-information in public domain are described and analysed below:-

SECTION-1
FEDERAL ORGANIZATIONS

48. Cabinet Secretariat operates directly under the Prime Minister and is responsible for handling disaster relief [Item 24, First Schedule, Federal Government Rules of Business 1973] through:-

a. Emergency Relief Cell established under Federal government to respond to any major disaster, at home or abroad. The ERC maintains contingency plans, appropriate reserves of essential supplies for basic necessities required by the affected populations, under any foreseen or unforeseen contingencies following a self-evident motto: ‘anywhere, anytime’. However, with the creation of National Disaster Management Authority in 2006, the ERC’s role came under review. In February 2009, the Cabinet Division’s proposal to streamline its role was referred by the Prime Minister to a two–member Cabinet sub-committee that advised its relocation and merger with the NDMA placed under Prime Minister’s Secretariat. That being a legal and constitutional issue, needs consideration to align with statutory obligations emanating from Ordinance LIII of 2007 since transformed into an Act of Parliament, in December 2010 read with Fourth Schedule of the Federal Government’s Rules of Business, 1973, yet to be operationalized.
b. National Disaster Management Authority in the Prime Minister’s Secretariat. Once the flood hit the country, the Federal and Provincial Relief and Disaster Management officials, with the NDMA at the apex, took steps and measures to respond to an extraordinary challenge as noted earlier as well. This has been summed up in the comprehensive overviews of the organizational response and logistic support coordinated during relief and rescue phase and the snapshot of the measures taken on graduation to next phase for release of first tranche of the grant, pooling of public and private resources on a massive scale, to minimize hardships that had taken most by surprise but could have been far greater. As regards structural side, initially notified by Cabinet Division under Ordinance XL of 2006, without derogation to pre-existing laws, issued in pursuance of Article 144 resolutions by Provincial Assemblies of Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the Punjab, later extended by re-promulgation as Ordinance XV of 7th April, 2007 expired on 6th August, 2007. On 03rd October, 2007, the NDMA was to be resurrected by Ordinance LIII of 2007, enforced w.e.f. 17th August, 2007 but the NDMA was never notified as such under the said law. The Ordinance was one of the temporary laws allowed transient extension by the Hon’ble Court on 30th July, 2009 in Sindh High Court Bar Association case. Another Ordinance was issued in 2009 before its eventual conversion into an Act of Parliament in December 2010, also enforced w.e.f. 17th August 2007, with one change from the Ordinance: Unlike the Ordinance notified without derogation of existing laws, this Act was given an overriding effect over other laws. The Ordinance contemplated a three-tier inter-Provincial hierarchical framework under a unified National Commission, headed by the Prime Minister, on which Provincial Chief Ministers and key Cabinet Ministers and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee were given berths. The NDMA at the apex was attached to Prime Minister’s Secretariat; its secretariat was to be headed by a whole time Chairman and ex-officio Secretary of the Commission. The law obligated Gazette Notifications for the establishment of National Disaster Management Commission under the Prime Minister (Section 3), and Provincial Commissions under respective Chief Ministers [ ( Section 13)]; designation of a Federal administrative Ministry/ Division for NDMA’s oversight and parliamentary business (Section 2(f)) and for framing of rules [Section 47]; to notify National Disaster Management Authority (Section 8), Provincial Management Authorities (Section 15) and District Disaster Management Authorities (Section 18); to draw up ‘The National Plan’ and the Guidelines by the NDMA and the action plans by Federal Ministries/ Departments and Provincial Authorities (Section 10), the ‘Provincial Plans’ had to be within the framework of guidelines by the National Authority (Section 17); and ultimately the ‘District Plans’ by the District Authorities within the overall framework of the National and Provincial Plan guidelines (Section 21), to prescribe minimum standards of relief by all PDMAs through their respective DDMAs, for the people in distress, and matters connected therewith in general (Section 11) including Flood; conduct Annual reviews of the plans (Sections 10 & 17) to organize training courses for capacity building through setting up of a National Institute of Disaster Management [(Section 26)]; to raise National Disaster Response Force [(Section 27)]; establish National Fund for Disaster Management [(Section 29)]; and submit its ‘Annual Reports’ to the two Houses of the Parliament [(Section 41)]. However, despite its over 4 years of existence except FATA and GB Governments, the mandated statutory notifications had not been issued for establishment of the Commission or its various organs, both by the Federal & Provincial Governments under Ordinance LIII of 2007, in 2009 or even the 2010 Act so far; the bodies created under Ordinance XL 2006 continue to function, without savings by Ordinance LIII of 2007, at least none was furnished to the Commission despite reference. It was also noted that the recommendations of the two members Cabinet Committee that met after 20 months of its constitution in February 2009 to reflect on Cabinet Division’s proposal about NDMA’s attachment with or without merger with the ERC and resolved to meet again after two weeks has yet to re-convene. The Provincial and District Disaster Management Authorities were also likewise notified in pursuance of 2006 Ordinance, though Provincial and District Disaster Management Plans were formulated, with minimal intellectual inputs sans a couple of exceptions. It was also noted that the defacto NDMC, thus constituted held three meetings on 5th March, 2007, 3rd January, 2009 and 19th August, 2010 but none of the Provincial Commissions met except the KP Commission on 5th May, 2009; the FATA and AJK Commissions also met once on 8th June, 2009 and 16th November 2009, respectively. The urgency or importance attached to a series of extraordinary legislative initiatives was missing in the entire executive branch! Further, it was noted that:-

i) In his depositions relating to formulations listed against serial number 1, 2 and 12 in Para 1 of this Report, the Chairman NDMA, who had vast and rich experience of conducting 2005 earthquake operations, confirmed holding of pre-monsoon inter-agency preparatory consultation session on 28th June, 2010, attended by 53 senior officials and key stakeholders from Provincial & Federal Governments (except the Punjab) besides USAID, JICA and OXFAM. After review of the IRSA’s report on water availability and the Monsoon forecast by Flood Forecasting Division of the Pakistan Meteorology Department, the NDMA Chief expressed his satisfaction about the state of preparedness of three PDMAs and other departmental arrangements in following words: ‘….overall objective of the conference was achieved and it will assist local authorities in terms of allocation of resources and disaster preparedness to deal with any emergency situation during the upcoming monsoon season’ though it urged improvement in the ‘less than satisfactory coordination between civil and military agencies’ ; the ‘quality of their presentations’ was also appreciated. It will be instructive to provide a bird’s eye review of some of the salient features that reveal the state of departmental preparedness:-

(1) PMD’s Flood Forecasting Division predicted ‘slightly higher than the previous year and expected to be normal’ Monsoon.
(2) WAPDA assuaged the dominant apprehensions on everyone’s focus to that assure that ‘there will be no threat to Tarbela Dam in case more water comes as a result of increased glacier melting as well as dam burst of the Hunza Lake’;[this was very significant in days to come]
(3) Sindh Irrigation Department confirmed that ‘147 critical points have been identified which will be improved before the onset of the next rainy season’ with a further assurance that ‘relevant staff of the Irrigation Department is well trained and capable of dealing with any flood like situation’.
(4) The KP representative confirmed ‘Establishment of Emergency Centre’ to ‘minimize the expected loss to human life and property’.
(5) Balochistan representative shared details about the ‘on-going and future plans/ schemes’ to seek help and appreciate the NDMA assistance, in the recent past.
49. Leaving aside the substance of the outcomes or individual perceptions of the lead managers of principal stakeholders of that conference were expected to team up for flood fighting, it took NDMA some three weeks for issuing the Minutes of the proceedings, on 19th July, 2010. By that time, weather forecasts had taken a new turn, necessitating fresh warnings/advisories, repeated with intervals on 20th, 26th, 27th and 29th July besides the two SOSs sent to the Chief Secretary, Sindh demi-officially, on 2nd August 2010 on the heels of PMD’s warning of 1st August and promptly acknowledged by the PDMA. As it happened, by then, the 28th June PMD forecast had been overtaken by nature, justifying intensified alerts about the impending disaster and triggering counter- measures to prevent or minimise the damage. While material has been placed on record in handling an extraordinary volume of work and commendable efforts mobilized after unfolding of the disaster, for 52 months after its establishment, the NDMA had not done its homework for pre-disaster phase, nor pursued the PDMAs and DDMAs to do theirs, either, or report its inability to do so to the National Commission or the Parliament: Annual reports submitted to the two Houses of the Parliament, as contemplated in extraordinary legislative initiative of surrendering provincial autonomy on this subject, required a more significant interest from that august body. The adhoc approach manifested absence of clearer contours of a National Strategic Plan that had to lay foundations for the Provincial level plans; that was not conducive for the size or type of the tragedy that unfolded untold miseries for 12 % of national population to erode its 5.8 % of the GDP in one big sweep. An institutional approach was not pursued; it was a pre-requisite for an orderly implementation of article 144 legal framework contemplated by the Federating units in 2006. The fact that the largest Province did not depute its representative to attend consultative session spoke volumes about the NDMA’s clout, in normal times, at least. That need had become more pronounced as Sindh, the second largest province was also not on board initially, though coalition partners in 2002 and 2010 at provincial and federal levels remained on board. This state of affairs did not inspire much confidence. If the pre-emptive plans and other attendant arrangements required careful planning, diligent focus to engage the entire chain of managers, amongst others, to identify department specific deficiencies for capacity building, to develop a framework and requisite personnel skills, had become a statutory obligation. The scale of disaster that preceded the creation of the NDMA or the one that visited the country four years later dictated organizational approach which was not visible.

50. The review highlighted critical gaps in the pre-disaster stage actions / initiatives despite passage of 44 months since the establishment of the NDMA in December 2006. Organizational capacity to plan and devise a framework for prediction, ability to forecast with reasonable degree of certitude, use of modern tools of early warning possibilities by a well developed scientific discipline that could reduce wide-band of south-Westerly monsoons predictions or potential hazards of rising global warming and consequential glacier melting with dependable precision, to minimize losses of life & property and prevent damage to fledgling infrastructure or even sensitize all concerned, in time. If the official minutes of 28th June were released after 3-weeks, on 19th July, 2010 that contain commitments to secure funds for some urgent works, what urgency could it instil in others down the line; no more needs to be said about the misplaced sense of pre-occupation of the apex NDMA. The people expected much more responsibility and commitment from the professionals of a nuclear Pakistan, especially after 2005 earthquake, to help save its hapless from vagaries of nature/weather, combined with laid back attitude of the supposedly ‘well trained’ irrigation professionals whose acts and omissions contributed considerably to a massive loss of Rs. 855 billion budgeted for national debt service liability in fiscal 2010-11. For a country already exposed to, and reeling under the twin man-made or self-inflicted disasters of war and terrorism, both ripping through the very national fabric, it was too much. That out of this, almost Rs. 560 billion (425+135) was suffered by the rural agricultural sector to virtually rob them off the recent gains from higher commodity prices is a cause of additional concern. If the public accuses various management tiers of complacency that, with a few exceptions, varied only in degree, they cannot be exclusively blamed.

51. Whether that was due to professional inadequacies, lack of awareness or commitment, no cogent explanation or material was produced on the subject. That was also valid with respect to various other institutional parameters and frameworks for developing / reviewing guidelines contemplated by the following extant laws, The Canal and Drainage Act 1873 as adopted by the Provinces, Minors Canals Act 1935, Punjab Soil Reclamation Act 1952, Balochistan Irrigation Ordinance 1980, Punjab Water User Associations Ordinance 1981, IRSA Act 1992, four Provincial Irrigation and Drainage Authority Acts of 1997 and Environment Protection Acts of 1997. At least, these were not shared with the Commission except KP, despite specific reference. The NDMA is not only legally under obligation to oversee pre-disaster phase preparations; it has yet to carve its niche for a systematic overview of the entire flood matrix to chalk out a disaster specific action plan, following the wisdom that ‘those who sweat more during peace bleed less during war’. The Commission noted with satisfaction that the NDMA has taken in hand formulation of a National Plan with JICA’s technical assistance.
52. The position in PDMAs and DDMAs was slightly different; while these bodies had sketched general outlines of their skeleton plans, with clearly demarcated roles and division of responsibilities for respective field outfits, including Civil Defence, their professional reviews and revisiting would enhance utility, and make these more meaningful and comprehensive management tools, worthy of responding to disasters situations including flood, road accidents, accidental fires, collapse of dilapidated buildings in urban areas or earthquakes or even a nuclear accident, etc God forbid. The deficiencies observed during 2010 flood offer a rich experience to realign the District Plans in the light of Provincial guidelines, under the national level umbrella of the NDMA framework. Much more is needed to be done.

53. Be that as it may, as relief activities progressed, the Federal Government also responded under general perceptions of mistrust, to plug communication gap with the affectees and their sympathisers, albeit belatedly, to set-up the NODMC, as an apolitical national level oversight body, with representatives from the Provincial Governments on board, to oversee transparency of post-flood financial disbursements for the people and Federating units. Under the conditions then obtaining on ground, that had become an international necessity. But even that platform was not instituted by invoking the window provided by Ordinance LIII of 2007! Under such state, adequacy or otherwise of the specified departmental ‘Standard Operational Procedures’ (SOPs), degree of compliance by official agencies / officials, acts of malfeasance, misfeasance and even nonfeasance before, during or after the 2010 Flood, including post-flood management for IDP’s orderly rehabilitation left many open and unanswered questions. If affectees’ expectations exceeded what reached them, the governments had to reprioritize commitments of already squeezed resources, diverted to decade old wars including the war on terror.

Ministry of Defence (MOD):

54. It assisted through weather forecasts, and by extending aid to civil power during the 2010 Flood disaster. The role of the concerned departments is discussed below:-

a) Flood Forecasting Division (FFD) of the Pakistan Meteorological Department ‘has a central role in the flood forecasting and warning’. It sources hydro-meteorological data from various national and international counterparts; actual rainfall during July-August 2010 at various locations is self-evident from the data cited in an earlier part. The FFD collates the rainfall data from various stations besides satellite data from the SUPARCO to prepare its flood forecasts disseminated to 350 addressees concerned with various aspects of flood management or relief organizations. But its current technical capacity is limited to 4-days advance warnings, against 10-days international best that was inadequate for the task in hand. Additionally, vast gaps were noted and observed in the range of flood volumes predicted by the FFD and actual flows at controlled irrigation structures due to partial coverage of tributaries of the Indus systems confirmed by comparison at selected locations as noted earlier in para 21 supra. The Commission also noted the spatial gaps in the coverage of many minor rivers and hill torrents that tend to generate flash floods that confirmed its findings on the substantive issues, for in the 2010 Flood, the inflows downstream Kashmore did not exceed projected peaks or previously noted HFLs in 1976 at any barrage. A more elaborate and safe network could have provided a more comprehensive estimation for all key stations and irrigation structures; the more so, as any slip in not correctly factoring in flash currents generated by hill torrents from D.I. Khan, D.G. Khan and Rajanpur, on the right bank of Indus, could lead to serious miscalculations and indeed the consequences as flagged in simulated scenario in an earlier section of this Report. Additionally, more coordination was required to take stock of the waters diverted from means other than the main barrage to give adequate warning for downstream managements from Tarbela to Kotri. In retrospect, the PMD’s decision not to share international projections of severe rains and consequential high floods proved ominous and not well conceived.
b) SUPARCO is equipped to undertake satellite imagery from the upper space with a well developed state of the art GIS system but statedly it produces images in daylight only and during absence of cloud cover. It assisted the Commission to have a useful overview of the topography of the entire flow of Indus river; sizes of the Bund breaches at Jinnah, Taunsa, Kot-Mithan, Bhong, Tori triangle alongside vanishing of old Ghauspur and MS and PB Bunds in Thatta besides Naseerabad Division in Balochistan. The SUPARCO work contributed useful inputs towards a credible review of pre and post flood claims about damages; these were reconfirmed by Commission’s visit to the four Provinces.
c) Armed Forces responded in aid to civil power, to carry out annual pre-flood reconnaissance. During 2010 floods, the three armed forces responded to government calls, as always, to launch its biggest ever peace-time logistic operations to render extraordinary services: it undertook rescue missions during the flood for which need-based resources were mobilized. Machinery and manpower was provided to effect or fill breaches where needed. Arranged and used explosives as per the Flood Protection Plans. Thousands of marooned people trapped in flood were saved, including those unwilling to heed to initial official warnings. Tens of hundred tons of essential foods, medicines, tents, dewatering devices, water cleaning equipments/ chemicals and clothing were delivered to those in need, by multi-modal transport to deliver relief items, received from home and abroad; mismatch was not ruled out but that was inherent in the very nature of undocumented donations. The Armed Forces are also engaged in reconstruction and restoration works including social and physical infrastructure from resources generated by it. Its role during pre-flood phase regarding inspection of bunds and other protective works needed more transparency and objectivity by making these inspections a thoroughly professional exercise, rather than a routine annual ritual. The Commission noted the assurance that steps are being taken by Pakistan Army to harmonise its security consideration in the use of bunds with safety of protective bunds. The PAF Shahbaz Air Base at Jacobabad handled 869 flights of various types during 30th July to 30th October, 2010; mostly these carried relief goods and that dispels perceptions that the facility was blocked for relief supplies. Costs of its reconnaissance functions, including allowances to personnel deployed are reimbursed by Provincial Governments in terms of MoD’s Joint Services Instructions on the subject.

Ministry of Interior,

55. Through its National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) brought in the loop to devise a transparent system for expeditious disbursements of first tranche of the house-building grants to over 1.5 million family heads in affected areas. For the purpose, a variable eligibility criterion was devised by the Provincial Governments, and the NADRA was expected to undertake verifications of antecedents of the eligibility of affectees’ families to help avoid duplication or fictitious payments. Despite observed hiccups in view of the innovative use of national data-base, keeping the magnitude of the work and the environment of general perceptions of mistrust of official machinery, despite random complaints, the NADRA acquitted itself of its assigned task with professional excellence, leaving minimum room for extraneous manipulations. The Commission noted that the outstanding claims of 400,000 generated due to phased notifications in the KP were primarily by that Government’s own policy on eligibility criteria. During the Commission’s visit to the KP, it was confirmed that 300,000 cases had already been resolved. The NADRA had the capacity to assist that government by advising or devising methodology to address cases of marginal deviations with a more pro-active approach. It discharged its task expeditiously and indeed efficiently; it used its in-house technical & professional capacity to render a national public duty, free of cost and transparent disbursements of ex-gratia payments. The designated Banks did not impose any banking charges during disbursements in the first phase, is also commendable. This was an impressive case of organizational flexibility realigned to use its resources and facilities during national emergency, despite many individual complaints, mostly due to inter-provincial variations in the specified criteria for eligibility made stringent for the second tranche. Out of the cases brought before the Commission during its field visits and sent to NADRA for verifications, on 27th April, 2011 reports in respect of 2,012 cases relating to Kot Addu were received: The reports show that 876 complainants have since received Watan Cards, Out of these 860 received Watan Cards after re-notification of concerned village by the Punjab Government. Eligibility of another 558 complainants was confirmed whereas 211 were found ineligible for various reasons. Cases of multiple addresses and change of address were also reported; 101 presented CNICs which had not been issued by the NADRA. The cases relating to KP, and brought to the notice of the Commission during its field visit were still under process at the time of finalizing this Report.
MINISTRY OF WATER & POWER

56. Federal Government Rules of Business 1973 assigned ‘matters relating to development of water and power resources of the country’ besides ‘international cooperation’ in the sector, to this Ministry. Since dissolution of erstwhile West Pakistan in July 1970, a fragmented approach has been pursued in this sector, and to date no national water policy has been shared in public domain. Maintenance of irrigation works, except Mangla, Tarbela and Chashma are under Provincial I & P’s departmental responsibility. The Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper shared with DFI’s a few years back did not contain any contours of land policy earlier. The Commission noted with dismay the NDMA’s report that high level “Vigilance Committee”, constituted in the Ministry every year to ‘function on daily basis to monitor and manage effective flood flows downstream to avoid flood peak synchronization does not appear to have been notified ‘ for the 2010 flood season. The Commission finds no justification to institute or continue disbursement of discretionary funds for flood protection works to the Minister incharge. Be that as it may, as most major and minor rivers defy present Provincial boundaries, the Ministry, as the national focal point for water policy, acting through four of its outfits had greater responsibilities, as will presently follow:-

a) Federal Flood Commission (FFC) is an attached department of the Ministry [Sr. 93 Schedule III RoB 1973], and is the lead agency in the institutional framework designed ‘to support the provincial flood management plans’. Besides ‘National Water Policy’, it is responsible for periodical review of the flood management framework, technical soundness of flood protection schemes and plans, securing of federal funding and post-completion review of the schemes, including construction of embankments and spurs along major rivers/ canals systems, or works executed by the provinces. Provincial Irrigation Secretaries and a few federal technical agencies are duly represented on it. The Planning Commission informed that post-completion evaluation of the flood sector PSDP schemes was also the responsibility of the Commission, a role that was not flagged by the FFC itself before this Commission. With respect to the claims of unprecedented flood it reported to the Supreme Court that super-flood flows in Sindh were below 1976, to dispel the assertions that high flood overtopped the bunds constructed with 6 feet freeboard above the 1976 HFL. But being the lead inter-provincial forum, the FFC had to render a more pro-active role in overseeing optimal use of allocated resources, beyond its projected limited role claimed before the Commission. In-house staff constraints could be supplemented by other innovative resource persons. It was noted that the FFC had not been able to optimise its role beyond associating itself with the foreign funded project assistance or even utilize modest funds allocated for post-evaluation of projects. It also did not take any initiative to seek annual ritualistic activation of ‘Flood Overview Committee’ for the 2010 Floods season. It was disappointing to note that the Universities of Engineering & Technology did not respond to its communication regarding academic studies on 2010 flood though some of their senior academia appeared before the Punjab Judicial Commission. This Commission expects the FFC to revisit its mandate in close coordination with NDMA.
b) Indus River System Authority (IRSA) created under a 1992 Act of Parliament to regulate and oversee normal irrigation supplies as custodian of the 1991 Inter-Provincial distribution accord. All releases from various dams and reservoirs require its indents. Its role to the extent of purposes directly relevant for the Commission’s mandate came under review in WAPDA’s presentation as well. The Commission confirmed inadequate water supplies for Kharif crop 2010-11 in Kirther canal though overall water supply for Balochistan, through pat-feeder system, had been enhanced by 11%. On macro level, this intra-Provincial seasonal disequilibrium could mislead the political leadership as if Balochistan got extra water in 2010-11 crop seasons as 2/3rd of a million population was close to another economic disaster in the making; the Hon’ble Court intervened on the interim recommendations of this Commission and issued directions to complete the rehabilitation of the damaged Kirthar Canal, in time for Kharif 2011 and for IRSA to restore normal vital supplies.
c) Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) is a statutory organisation created as erstwhile West-Pakistan entity through an Act in 1958 to undertake development works in water and power sectors, including the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 underwritten by the World Bank as its Guarantor. In July 1970, Wapda was placed under Federal control and through the 5th Amendment in the Constitution, the pre-fix ‘West’ was deleted from its nomenclature in the Fourth Schedule (Act LXII of 1976). The WAPDA is currently responsible for orderly development and maintenance of mega water reservoirs only, power sector has been assigned to PEPCO by a statute. Major dams under WAPDA’s responsibilities include Mangla dam on river Jhelum and Tarbela Dam, besides Chashma Barrage on Indus River; these have a limited capacity to store water [10-15 % of annual water availability] for twin purposes: Irrigation and power generation. While day to day regulation of irrigation supplies are made as per IRSA indents, releases needed for safety of the structures are not subjected to IRSA mechanism. The WAPDA also assists FFD with rainfall data from its telemetric gauge stations and flood data from various locations of the Indus River system. While tracing out the sources of extraordinary floods, in its submissions Wapda provided a holistic perspective in the context of regional climatic shift that generated unusual patterns during the 2010 Flood with potential threats that loom in future. Besides professionally managing the three main structures of Mangla, Tarbela and Chashma with constant vigil from the top, Wapda rendered advisory services for safety of various barrages to synchronise optimum retention of flood water and attenuate releases. That helped minimise pressure downstream at critical hours/days of rising floods without compromising dam safety of Mangla and Tarbela Dams and Chashma Barrage on the Indus. The nature & causes of breaches of main embankments were analysed by it besides suggesting remedial measures for short, medium and long term. Timely rehabilitation of Mangla raising project in AJK will provide additional relief to reduce adverse impacts of the floods besides adding considerable revenue from additional power generation: The table below highlights recurrent losses and potential for growth:-

The Commission also noted simulated numbers of worst case scenario; e. g. as noted earlier also, during first peak, Tarbela reservoir received 835,000 cusecs, but only 603,000 cusec controlled flows were released downstream Indus at that point in time, after retaining 6.97 feet, against 1 foot permissible under normal SOP. Likewise, Mangla reservoir on Jhelum River absorbed a peak of 344,000 cusecs to release attenuated supplies. These two reservoirs, with total storage capacity of 12.62 MAF, are augmented in stages as per precisely calibrated heights/volumes as a standard practice. However, the top management engaged itself to permit substantial deviations to contain the exceptional build up downstream Khairabad as noted in an earlier part of this Report. One of the lessons learnt is that delayed creation of new water reservoirs is neither conducive for national objectives nor symbolize much needed gratitude for nature’s free gift.
d) Indus Water Commission (IWC) constituted under the Indus Water Treaty for overseeing treaty obligations in liaison with Indian counterparts; the Commission did not examine any of its officials for no suggestion or complaint was made with respect to lack of timely warnings about the flood flows from Indian managed rivers. However, the Commission would like to flag that IWC is an important player in the context of information exchange during critical phases of flood forecast and management. This Commission noted some recent reports in public domain wherein grave concerns have been expressed about the unequal nature of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT), in the context of Indo-Pakistan conflict, impinging on Pakistan’s very existence. In this regard, the Commission would like to make a passing reference to the disagreement between two south Asian neighbours with respect to “the water issue” as also reported in Indian media: The Times of India, The Hindustan Times, The Hindu, The Indian Express and The Economic Times. The upshots of these reports, taken together with the background analysis by Mr. B.A. Malik, in his ‘Indus Treaty in Retrospect’, raised fundamental questions regarding need for early expansion in the reservoir capacities with a sense of urgency. If raising of loans was justified for any project, the on-going brown ages dictate investment in this multidimensional sector may be inferred from the scenario rather than peeling of the onions. The unilateral propagation made a USA writer to observe that ‘not only the message is the same in each case, ‘the arguments were the same, the numbers were the same, and the phrases were the same’ i.e. “no real issue, just Pakistani shenanigans”, needs attention.

Pakistan Red Cross (PRC)

57. A government supported national level NGO that undertook relief operations including medical cover during disaster situations especially for people in distress. The PRC also supplemented health services in the public sector. As no adverse view was noted about its operations, it was not called for review of its operations.

SECTION-2

PROVINCIAL / TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATIONS

58. Provincial Irrigation Departments / Drainage Authorities responsible, firstly and mostly, for canal management and distribution of irrigation waters, and for the maintenance and upkeep of flood embankments designed and erected to ensure safe living and productive agriculture besides safety of barrages. For the purpose these are required to undertake through timely planning, design, construction and maintenance of extensive canal network and flood protection works taking into account guidelines in the relevant “Flood Fighting Plans” and the Bund Manual developed in the light of local and foreign experiences regarding: A-Z of the entire networks. For the proper discharge of their professional functions, the provincial staffs monitor and record provisional / projected and actual flows at various barrages and specific sites along controlled irrigation structures to analyse and use during pre-flood [pre-Abkalani period in Sindh] to ensure review of ground conditions after every flood and then undertake urgent works and keep prepared for remedial measures in contingency, expected and unforeseen, during and after the flood seasons. The Irrigation Secretaries/ officials who had dilated upon existence or otherwise and observance of the SOPs where applicable, the level of pre-flood action plans under which joint civil-military surveys are conducted to assess the state of the bunds, and departmental preparedness in responding to the impending challenges to their respective structures including stocking of necessary materials and equipments, actions taken before, during and after the floods and on-ground work of six-tiers of provincial Irrigation officials in close coordination with the armed forces and civil armed-force contingents in their respective jurisdictions, both with reference to specific formulations and generally, as well. However, it was noted that:-
a) The KP floods were admittedly caused by flash floods generated by unusually heavy precipitations. Further, KP Government affirmed that it did not have/ need any flood related SOPs for its irrigation structures as none was designed for the purpose. True, that no one accused that government of negligence at pre-flood stage or any manipulation of irrigation facilities, yet the extent of loss justified revisiting the existing arrangements for benefit, say for removal of encroachments from river beds and areas around, for creating escape channels and mega storage facilities as noted in the D.I. Khan areas. The conditions in KP, did not indicate even remotely that until major reservoirs like Munda were constructed, any official or department could have prevented the 2010 type damage. The Commission learnt the benefits of Irrigation Minister’s initiative to personally steer the entire Rescue and Relief operations as also measures for time-bound restoration of irrigation supplies for 2010-11 Rabi crop, by setting up a camp-office at Nowshehra. On the one hand, it provided free access to affectees to voice their grievances, it also provided much needed impetus for staff to work 24/7 for relief and restoration, as also to plan medium to long term measures without waiting for Federal funds. The prompt restoration of irrigation facilities for 2010-11 Rabi within three weeks had reinvented the mutual trust of the people and departmental staff.
b) The Punjab confirmed existence of region–specific “Flood Protection Plans” / SOPs and submitted these too. Their perusal shows that these provide for engineered breaches of RGB, the only one designated site, if necessitated, for safety of Jinnah Barrage but as a last resort. This is so recorded in their annual Flood fighting Plan 2010 for Kalabagh Irrigation Division and Taunsa Division, as well. The breach effected upstream Jinnah Barrage at the last minute was procedurally in accord with the SOP/ plan, intended to avert a disaster to the 1947-vintage barrage, earmarked for rehabilitation. To do so, the inter-agency group was duly motivated by the 29th July breach in LGB/LMB that had failed to take water pressure of that intensity for various reasons, especially the blunder in not observing the regulation with respect to filling of the pond and opening of the gates in time, not to speak of attempted forgery in record to rest the plea of promptitude, on fake record. However, the resolve to protect the 2008-09 renovated LMB ‘at all costs’ and other secondary bunds in Taunsa region failed, as the newest on the block breached for various reasons: Whether that was triggered by failure of the Project Management Office (PMO) located at distant Lahore, unable to effectively guide or supervise his inefficient maintenance staff, indifferent attention to pre-flood mandatory but routine inspections by civil-military teams, some not even deemed worthy of recording, inattention to plugging of leaks and rat holes, or usual charges of rampant corrupt practices, were as relevant, as was the fact that, with a critical but controversial change in design, the LMB had been armoured by ‘stone-pitching’ under multi-billion rupee WB project executed in 2004-06 and 2008-09, disregarding professional reservations about structural innovations thus enforced at a cost to public and the nation. Additionally, construction of a weir had also reportedly contributed to intensified pressure on the LMB, though overall flood flows were otherwise still much below the revised peak capacity of the renovated barrage. True that the breach had cascading effect on secondary Bunds that extensively devastated Kot Addu and Muzaffargarh but then many people did not believe that to happen, despite advance warnings by local officials. It is a pointer to the need to revisit the role of the WB team that designed and supervised Taunsa rehabilitation project during 2004-09. The Commission took note of the exhaustive evidence produced before the Punjab Judicial Commission that pointed out gross negligence in delayed filling of pond area, failure in timely activation of the gates of the Jinnah & Taunsa Barrages that may have relieved the pressure on the two LGB and LMB breached by the force of rising waters, before approaching dangerous levels, not to speak of accusations of attempted pilferage of tens of millions of rupees under the cover of bogus repair to flood damages by daring officials, identified during preliminary departmental inquiries, as well lower staff will need attention. It may not be advisable for this Commission to dilate further on the outcomes and consequences of the evidence led before the Punjab Commission in view of section 6 of Ordinance II of 1969, but it has no hesitation in flagging that the World Bank must be sensitized to bear its part of the responsibility for what was done by its experts for which eventually residents of Kot Addu and Muzaffargarh were required to pay. It is also a lesson that professional credentials and advices by DFI experts must be subjected to local scrutiny by best minds; taking their expert prescriptions as gospel truth is hazardous. This was also seen in case of Tarbela Dam saved after remodelling by Pakistani engineers, way back in 1976.
c) There is also a need to assess adequacy or otherwise of the transfer of technology under foreign funded projects other than addition to the transport fleet. This Commission also feels that observance of official tenures and periodical training for upgrading the skills of the para-technical and supervisory staff must be taken as integral part of personnel management and promotions/ demotions. This would help ward off the unintended consequences of the practice of reshuffling officials in pre-flood season, close to floods or inviting allegations of motives etc.
d) The effort to plug LGB breach in Jinnah Barrage, immediately with the efforts of Maple Leaf Cement Factory that responded to the Punjab Government’s call was commendable example of public-private cooperation.
e) As regards Sindh, it needs to be noted that unlike the rivers in KP and the Indus in northern reaches of the Punjab where it passes through deep banks and gorges, as it enters D.G Khan downstream Taunsa on the right bank, it flows on the ridge and adjoining towns and areas are vulnerable to rise in its levels, except for a few stretches near white desert in Sindh. Hundreds of kilometres of protective bunds have been designed and constructed to regulate and contain the river flows to the three main barrages at Guddu (1.2 million cusecs), Sukkur (1.1 million cusecs) and Kotri (1.0 million cusecs) besides Jinnah and Taunsa in the Punjab and Bhong Bund on the boundary of the two provinces, near Kashmore. The Sindh officials consistently denied any SOPs that authorize breaches for any reason and so inscribed in the 2008 edition of Sindh Bund Manual as well. The Manual contains A-Z of theory and history with data on rains/floods since early 1900, policy options, approved practices and technical instructions to manage the Indus and its flows. While listing various options to control floods, the Manual strongly rejects the option of constructing any major reservoirs as a remedy to contain or store the surplus water-flows. But then that paradigm was predicated on maintenance of bunds for meeting the purpose for which these were erected. It was recently updated, formally in January 2008 at the initiative of Mr. Shuja Junejo, the then Irrigation Secretary, a senior Irrigation engineer with vast experience and at the helm during 2010 Flood. In his last official capacity, he was the Vice-Chairman of the Indus River Commission that approved the revised edition of the Bund Manual, as the sole departmental guide for policy levels for execution by the field staff. Its preface gives most lucid and self-contained summation of the concept and policy for bund safety in Sindh keeping in view the spread of Indus, in high seasons. The Manual was originally developed by a British engineer in 1930’s, and updated from time to time. The last 2008 edition took note of the ‘Super Floods’ of 1942 and 1976. It was after this flood that the decision was taken to raise the freeboard height from four to six feet from HFL of 1976, a fact not highlighted before the Sindh Cabinet or the Commission. This edition also incorporated the experiences from USAID sponsored visit to Mississippi River by Sindh irrigation officials for studying flood management practices deemed relevant for the Indus plain. Mr. Junejo was part of US study group as well as the official group that supervised revision of the Manual. The Manual provides a most comprehensive overview of Indus River System and its reaches and nature, to specify self-contained prescriptions of ‘Do’s’ and Don’ts’ for every conceivable contingency that the eight tiers irrigation staff hierarchy was/is expected to learn and master after on-ground practice, despite some redundancies. It establishes in no unambiguous terms that no irrigation professional could afford to skip awareness of detailed guidelines contained therein, except at a grave risk, to their respective charge and trust, as indeed was the case during the 2010 Flood season. Examination of the Bund Manual shows that it is a virtual ‘Constitution’ or ‘Bible’ for all irrigation professionals and staff, except perhaps those assigned to administer it by way of supervision, guidance and monitoring, as they failed to maintain the bunds at specified levels. Such omissions to keep the bunds in proper state defied justification as well as logic of having to maintain or publish it at tax –payers cost! Chapters II, V, IX X, XI, XII & Appendix IV and its Annexes of the Manual also cited in Para 43 of the SJC report [page 69-164] reproduced verbatim details from it. Just to capture the broad headings of the Manual [the figures in parenthesis denote para nos of the Manual] will help understand the framework under which bunds are to be maintained and repaired before flood season:-
i) Chapter I contains definitions of various terms employed in the Manual.
ii) Its Chapter II contains purpose and objects for creations of Indus River Commission in 1901: As the apex policy & oversight body while remaining Chapters deal with specific technical details, guidelines and operational instructions for the eight tiers of irrigation hierarchy with Chief Engineers at the top and Beldar/ Muqadam at the bottom.
iii) Chapter V contains technical information on the Design relevant of New Bunds and Loop Bunds at construction stage: Free Board (33) and Leaks for Free passage of Water (36).
iv) Chapter IX prescribes Pre-Abkalani Maintenance instructions covering: Levelling of Bund Tops and slopes (92),Items of earth work in Annual repair (93), Specifications for Earthwork for annual Repairs (94), Opening up and Refilling of Leaks ( 95), Annual Repairs to Masonry Works on the Bunds ( 96), Plantation on Bunds (97), Inspections of river courses and Proposals for Measures (98), Proposals for wetting during Ensuing Abkalani (99), Filling up of old burrow pits on Land side (100), Miscellaneous Items for Pre-Abkalani Maintenance (101) and Non-Abkalani establishment ( 102).
v) Chapter X contains details re ordinary maintenance requirements during Abkalani under the sub-heads viz details Re: Presence of Maintenance establishment Required on the Bund(103), When the Executive Engineer are required to be on the Bund (104), Unremitting Patrolling During High Abkalani Essential (105), Shifting System in Patrol establishment (106), Organization of Patrolling and duties of Members of Staff [from SDO to Beldar: 5-tiers](107), Strength of annual and Abkalani Establishment normally Necessary [4-men per-mile](108), Abkalani Materials (109), Wetting of Front Bunds and Loop Bunds with wetting Channels (110), Wetting Loops and Filling Compartments (111), Filling Bunds where Front Bund is Likely to be eroded(112), Cutting of Front Bund in the Event of Breach(113), Other cases of relieving Picketing ( 114), Miscellaneous Items of Maintenance during the Abkalani ( 115), Opening up and refilling the Leaks ( 116) and Employment of Zamindari Labour in Connection with Bund work ( 117).
vi) Chapter XI deal with Emergent Measures or Causes of Failure of Bunds and Methods Used to combat them under various sub-heads: Common Causes of failure of Bunds (118), River Erosion (119), Failure of Bund Sluices (120), Inadequate Freeboard (121), Overtopping (122), Wave-wash (123), Failure Due to Inadequate Cover(124), Slips and Their Treatment ( 125), Unequal Settlement (126), Leaks( 127), Under-Ground Leaks or ‘Blow out’( 128), How to Close an Underground leak (129) and Prevention is Better than Cure ( 130).
vii) Chapter XII deals with Breaches in River Bunds and How to close them: Causes of Breaches (131) and immediate action in the event of Breach (132).
viii) The above extracts were further supplemented by one of the Petitioners who filed additional details from Chapter XII of the Manual that did not fully conform to the position taken by the department before the SJC and containing: Preliminary Measures Necessary for Successful Closing of Breaches (133), Improvements in Communications Required (134),Earth required(135), Definite plan of Action required(136) One Method of Closing Large River Breaches(137),Closing of 1942 Breach in Sukkur Begari Bund( 138), Establishment required(139), Material required(140),Plant required( 141) and Labour required(142).
ix) Chapter XIII Periodical Reports and Returns under the heads: Erosion Statement (143: IRC Form no.1), Abkalani Report (144: IRC Form no. 2), Reports on the State of Bund Sluices and Regulators (145), Wetting of New Bunds (146), Statement of specific Levels at Each Mile of Bund (147: IRC Form no.3), Statement of H.F.L. on Bund Mile Gauges and Free Board Available Each year (148: IRC Form no. 4), Bund Register for Consolidated Statement for Embodying Data for River Bunds (149: IRC form no. 5), Register Showing Incidence of Leaks( 150: IRC Form no. 6), Report of Levelling on Bunds (151) and Other IRC Forms (152: Indus Bulletin and IRC Form no 7).
x) Chapter XIV provides a synoptic overview of the ‘Flood Management Practices on Mississippi River USA’ including the lessons learnt by four senior Irrigation officials during USAID sponsored visits to Lower Mississippi river during 10-29 May 1993 whereafter the Bund Manual was reviewed and updated under various assumptions of flood projections in the Indus river system. The incumbent Secretary Irrigation, during the 2010 Flood then SE Rohri Canal Circle, Sindh was part of that study Mission.
xi) Appendix I & II of the Bund Manual constitute historical record of the floods since 1901; the former contains anticipated / projected flood levels simulated on the basis of previous highs, with due consideration for accumulated silts.
xii) Annex–I to the Appendix I contains further and specific details of 148 ‘Vulnerable Points’ in the bunds constructed on the right and left banks of Indus River’s Guddu, Sukkur and Kotri Barrages and the possible causes/source of the threats. These include Tori bund and MC Bunds at serial no 10, 12 and 13 flagged in view of repeated breaches of various sections, upto 27 in case of Tori ‘Open to wave-wash’; it had remained safe in 1976 when water level was close to 1.2 million cusecs but it breached in 1995 at 500,000 cusecs and then was subjected to repairs; that reinforces the public view that it did not overtop in 2010, but contradicted the after thought of CE Guddu that it had not been attended since 1976.
xiii) Appendix II specifies formulae based measurement of the speed of water arrival, time lag from various locations, flood prediction techniques. Para 4 in this part deals with flood warning regarding flood peaks, to assess the downstream discharges to be communicated to Provincial Irrigation Secretary. The anticipated discharge for downstream Guddu is estimated at 600 000-1,200,000 cusecs in the Manual, the ceilings for downstream Sukkur and Kotri are reduced by 100,000 cusec each, at 600,000-1,100,000 cusecs, and 400,000-1,000,000 cusecs, respectively. The Manual specifies that as soon as the discharges at the three barrages cross the minimum threshold levels, the Secretary Irrigation shall be informed for further directions. In our view, this part of the Manual, read with chapter XIII obligations, was most crucial at critical stages of decision making during the 2010 Flood.
xiv) Appendix IV provides history of breaches in two major bunds subject matter of inquiry, Tori Bund breached for 19 times during 1904 up to 1996 and their causes: 16 cuts in MS Bunder Bund during 1919-1988 and 5 cuts in Aliwahan (1976).The breaches after independence are well documented. It also shows the bunds that received prioritized attention and funds.
xv) Appendix V of the Manual deals with miscellaneous but specific river works relevant for Sindh Province, including: Feasibility of Flood control measures; Revetments, Cement stabilized soil revetments and Use of tree groynes. And
xvi) Finally Appendix VI is a critique on relevance of the American experience of flood levels by cut off and sand fills and how much of it could be used by Sindh, in Pakistan.
Unfortunately, from the depositions and other material on record, it was established that this Manual was treated more like a Holy Book, respected & worshipped in name, without being practiced; that was most disappointing especially as its newest editor was at the helm during the 2010 Flood and could have used that to revise his paradigm. What use was it if its SOPs were neither followed, nor steps taken even to familiarize the concerned officials with this immensely educative material, preferably in their native language or what they could comprehend. To use it as a mandatory part of training pre-condition to qualify for promotions, through departmental examinations or application of mind to spring-clean its irrelevant components; e.g. the obligation to search for a ‘Pathan’s donkey’ [no offence meant to our proud Pashtoon brothers], as a means of transporting essential materials to site; surely a situation like the 2010 Flood justified more speedier modes of transport to plug the breaches. Additionally, it was noted that the material aspects of instructions were not highlighted before this Commission, as was the case with the other official forums and that confirmed:-

1) That the field staff was or had been made aware that the Guddu, Sukkur and Kotri Barrages had a capacity to discharge1.2 million, 1.1 million and 1.0 million cusecs, respectively; the written briefs presented before the Sindh Cabinet and by the Provincial irrigation Minister on 18th April before this Commission on the other hand claimed that the peak discharge capacity at Sukkar and Kotri Barrages is 900,000 and 875,000 cusecs, respectively.
2) That history of breaches did not rule out possibility of relief cuts, should the need arise, as was the case with Aliwahan Bund breached in 1976 when approximately 67,000 cusecs were diverted from five regulated locations to minimise exposure of the affected areas and peoples, even if irrelevant as that option has now been recorded in history including the Bund Manual.
3) At least in one case, a District Disaster Plan verified that very often zamindars divert floods to other’s farms and lands by unauthorized cuts in bunds or erect private [Zamindara] bunds.
4) The Manual as well as pre-flood identification of 148 bunds in Sindh are vulnerable on many locations, including the Tori Bund and its secondary loops of old Ghauspur and Gaurghat, due to various reasons including wave-wash effect warranted serious preventive measures but these were not taken before the flood season.
5) In case of Tori Bund that was more critical in view of the known departmental disposition of 4th February 2010 in the IRC meeting that unless the Bund was strengthened well before 2010 flood season, likelihood of colossal losses could not be ruled out. This very fact had also been highlighted in an earlier meeting of the IRC immediately preceding the meeting on 4th February 2010.
6) As regards the presentation by the Sindh representatives, its record and oral evidence had been thoroughly examined by the Commission. It also took note of depositions of 82 witnesses examined by the Sindh Commission, consisting of two former Hon’able Judges of the Sindh High Court that undertook areal & on-site inspections of the breached bunds. While the SJC exclusively focussed on the impact of flood devastations within the Sindh Province only, it discarded oral testimonies of key officials and public witnesses on account of certain material events of actual breach of Tori Bund. These were attributed to twin causes of ‘heavy rain’ which was not there and high-flood waters, after cross verification by official weather data regarding downpour, cited in an earlier part of this Report, invoked as an alibi for insufficient response, absence from the breach site at critical hour and returning of the CE Guddu without getting down from his Jeep. The SJC had also noted adequate material to conclude years of individual and collective lethargy, negligence, or both since 1995 as also during the pre-flood phase of 2010. Under the PPC ‘an act includes omission, where there is duty to act’. The bunds generally and Tori, MS and PB Bunds, in particular had not been maintained upto requisite state or height, is also established by pre and post-flood official proceedings of the IRC’s meetings wherein against schemes [no 2.a, of the meeting 4th February for Rs.81.572 million and item 85 for Rs.103.727 million, dated 14th October, 2010] worth over Rs.61 billion were considered. That if compared with DNA verified losses of Rs.11 billion in Sindh’s Irrigation infrastructure leaves many open questions?
7) Irrigation department’s second major claim about absence of SOPs for breaching of any bund was also weak and contradicted by historical record, in Sindh Bund Manual. Relief cuts in the past, including cuts given to Aliwahan Bund are listed threadbare, e.g. in 1976, at least five cuts were given to release some 67,000 cusecs of water without much loss to life and property. In this case, the Commission noted that unlike the 1976, the decision not to breach Aliwahan Bund was taken after on spot consultations of likely implications. That this decision was taken at a high level meeting at Sukkur, attended by the Provincial and Federal dignitaries, including Chief Minister Sindh, Irrigation Minister Mr. Saif Ullah Dharejo, Federal Minister Syed Khurshid Ahmed Shah, senior officials including Secretary Irrigation, Chairman WAPDA, private retired irrigation officials/Consultants and Commander 5 Corps, after review of implications and consequences for inter-Provincial communication routes, with due regard to expert consultations rules out any motivated restraints.
8) While it was rightly contended that one or more breaches in Aliwahan would not have affected the upstream Tori Bund discharge, no cogent explanation was given as to why steps were not taken to minimise, if not avert, losses allowed to be inflicted on Thatta-Sujawal poor, two weeks later. If emergence of newer population settlements during last three decades prevented the 1976 repeat options at Aliwahan, similar consideration could have prevailed and demonstrated for the farmers and inhabitants in Thatta-Sajawal, to prevent havoc that unfolded twenty days later, on 27th August, 2010.
9) The Commission noted that one ’District Contingency Plan’ formulated by a DDMA in Sindh verified that local influentials frequently resort to unauthorized cuts, to divert floods away from their lands to harm others.
10) The Commission took note of extensive encroachments of acquired lands in Katcha and around river beds, farming in the prohibited zones, construction of private bunds in river beds and abuse of the crest surfaces for various unauthorized purposes, including transportations, to which staff’s insecurity from lawless elements was added as avoidable hazards to justify lowering of guard by concerned O & M staff of the Irrigation department; these had no bearing on the responsibilities that had to be discharged by Provincial machinery, through timely actions. During visit to Tori, a local official boasted of his tribal affiliation to claim that he could take any member of the Commission anywhere, at any hour of the day/ night without any risk!

59. As regards plea on non-availability of funds, it was pointed out by MD SIDA that Rs. 200 million were outstanding for works already executed by the field staff which could only act within certain limits. The Commission noted that if SIDA could undertake essential works without funds, what prevented the CE Guddu or his immediate superior in the Department to carry out undertake minimal works at Tori after approval in principle of a scheme worth Rs.82 millions on 4th February 2010. The departmental contention that the Tori rehabilitation scheme was not approved by the competent forum or Federal funds were not provided was a crude attempt to cover up gross negligence after failure to suppress that evidence; being an after thought, that alibi did not deserve any credence, whatsoever.

60. Be that as it may, in the case of Sindh, the most important issues were breach of Tori Bund in Guddu Barrage area and two other bunds built back-to-back, namely secondary bunds of old Ghauspur and Gaurghat that together form a triangular, virtually a semi-circular loop that had breached, with cascading effect within 30 minutes of the breach of the main bund, and MS Bund and PB Bunds near Thatta, all exacerbated by incompatible use of the lands nearby for agriculture, fish farm and cattle use. The consistent positions taken by the Irrigation officials, including the Provincial irrigation Minister that the main Tori Bund, as also MS bund and PB bunds in Thatta-Sujawal, breached by overtopping by exceptionally unprecedented flood levels for extended durations, was contradicted both by public complaints that viewed Tori Bund breach as deliberate, as also pre-flood and post-flood proceedings of the IRC, amongst others about which the Hon’ble Minister may not have been briefed at the relevant time in 2010. The position was inherently unsustainable, nay grossly misleading attempt, inter-alia, on following counts:-

a. Firstly, the record of self-evident proceedings [Items no 2.a, of the IRC meeting of 4th February 2010 for Tori Rs.81.572 million [Appendix-K] wherein approval was sought for certain works on river side of the bund and other necessary repair to strengthen and armour the Tori Bund, some six months before the floods. This contains graphic details about the deteriorated condition of the Bund; that status had been assessed after 2009 nominal floods and the then Secretary Irrigation, Mr. Junejo who was Vice Chairman of the IRC was fully aware and foretold that delay in repairs before the 2010 Flood season would ‘inflict colossal damage to life & property’; to put it in most mild terms, the contention that the PC-I was approved in principle but not funded, confirms additional gross negligence to take timely corrective measures; nothing could lead this Commission to conclude otherwise.
b. Secondly, the admission by the C. E. Guddu Barrage that almost 70 inches of the Bund height, almost entire six feet prescribed freeboard above 1976 HFL, had eroded due to non-maintenance, is materially relevant though he used that plea only as a last resort to blame history.
c. Thirdly, the record of the post-Flood IRC meeting [Item 85 of the meeting dated 14th October 2010 for Rs. 103.727 Million] that narrates scraping of earth from Tori crest on 6/7th August to fill the Garrahs on the river side; this impugned departmental action explains the big ditch on the CD captured by media as also the evidence of the brave men who witnessed on midnight of 6/7th August presence of an ‘Excavator’, captured live shots of the ditch stealthily after removing the earth from the crest of worn out bund, and what they considered as an attempt to breach the Tori Bund.
d. Fourthly, from the evidence that 2010 Flood in Sindh was below the1976 Flood levels that reached Guddu on 6/7th August. On 14th March, 2011 the Commission noted the HFL mark of August 2010 floods at some lengths of the dilapidated houses on Tori Bund, below the designed crest level.
e. Fifthly, the number of schemes and estimated costs of rehabilitation amounting to over 61.0 billion mooted in the 2-3 meetings of the IRC, in October 2010 and later, established beyond doubt about the poor state of maintenance of the bunds, including Tori and its secondary loop bunds or those in Thatta required a professional indepth probe.
f. Sixthly, the statement of Mr. Rajput former Secretary Irrigation Sindh, and present Consultant of that department, that Tori bund was breached even in 1995 medium floods as well. It was a clear indicator of the state of maintenance by the professional staff. If seen in the context of narratives in Appendix I & II of Chapter I of Bund Manual, it raises many more questions about the recourse to deliberate attempts to mislead, whether it was the Commission constituted by the provincial government or the apex Court or briefing to the political leadership did not deter the Irrigation officials?
g. Last but not the least, the Flood Rehabilitation Plan 2010 compiled by the Planning Commission after inter-Provincial consensus consultations in December 2010 that categorically stated s that ‘no bund was overtopped’.

These leads were identified by the Commission and substantiated the general and specific public complaints.

61. While Sindh’s Provincial Minister Irrigation reappointed to the same portfolio on 24th July 2010, clarified a part of his public statement, made in the presence of acting Chief Secretary, Sindh, about the breach in old Ghauspur Bund as part of strategically agreed departmental plan, it was at best treated as an ill-advised departmental briefing. He repeatedly and bravely denied that he had been misled by the departmental staff to lend political ownership to many things done before he was brought to the helm, surprised the Commission.

62 The position regarding MS Bund and PB Bund in Thatta District was no different; the public testimonies and visual examination of the HFL mark, noted on the bund sites during the Commission’s visit on 16th March 2011, established that breaches had been triggered by poor maintenance, unauthorized uses, pipes to lift irrigation waters for planting and irrigation across main bund, and further compounded by neglect in a succession of dry years. These had contributed to the breaches in one way or the other. The Commission has, therefore, no doubt that the Irrigation department had adequate time to mend its historical apathy to strengthen the weaker components of those bunds before arrival of high water mark on 27th August 2010 that could not have been wished away; their timely response, to an impending disaster foretold, could have spared them the allegations of holding late night entertainments sessions, near the fateful sites, unmindful of the tragic happenings; what more damning evidence could be brought when ruling party’s own MNA alleged inaction, despite his efforts to run from pillar to post to wake up all concerned in time; the lady Provincial Minister from Sindh was shown by media to be at pains too; she had minced no words about the state of apathy shown vividly on the public screens! That was most disappointing, indeed.

63 Provincial Relief Commissionerates headed by Senior Members in Boards of Revenue, notified under respective 1958 Calamities Acts to coordinate relief/rehabilitation efforts during, and after the calamities. These include taking into account duty to oversee preparatory actions, such as inspections and protection measures for warning and identification of sites for establishment of suitably equipped relief centres by the territorial revenue administrations at Division, District and sub-Divisions, down to the village level. This Provincial responsibility was not devolved after introduction of District Governments in 2001. However, with promulgation of the NDMA Ordinances since December 2006, the statutory functions under the 1958 Act, adapted by Provinces in 1975 in pursuance of article 268 imperatives, remained in tact. After conversion of the Ordinance into an Act of Parliament in December 2010, many substantive functions under the 1958 Act stood subsumed in the NDMA’s extended charter. In other words, while the statutory powers to declare calamity affected areas remains with the Relief Commissioners, many other functions regarding integrated planning for disaster management stood allocated to the NDMA based network of organisations. Balochistan, the Punjab and Sindh notified calamity affected villages to create non-discriminatory eligibility on territorial basis, as revised from time to time, after surveys; the KP pursued a different verification based policy approach with all the attendant implications. While doing so, possibility of non-affectees getting benefits was not ruled out but that is a real possibility in any operation of that magnitude and may be subjected to additional screening and verifications. The more so, when the grants were contingent to availability of foreign funds: By 27th April, 2011 total bilateral and multilateral commitments of US$ 2,670 million had been received; these included US$ 1,359 billion in the committed pipeline out of which US$ 534 million had been disbursed. Out of in kind commitments of US$ 480 million, US$ 226 million had been delivered. The Economic Affairs Division also confirmed projectized assistance of US$ 2,066 million including those from DFI’s. Out of these US$ 390 million was earmarked on account of “Citizen Damage Compensation Programme”. Of these the latest were two loans; One on 30th March 2011, IDA/World Bank approved a soft loan of US$ 115 million and second on 31st March, 2011 by ADB’s approval of a loan of US$ 650 million, including a US$ 50 million equivalent of soft ADF component, for Sindh flood restoration works. The details of Foreign Assistance at various stages of the Flood 2010 are given in a consolidated form at Annex-IV: A-C. The Commission noted the divergent courses of action by three Provinces: e.g. To declare general areas as calamity affected was non-discriminatory, as against more cumbersome but logical approach in the KP option to verify individual claims that tends to equip the field staff with discretion of potential abuse. The two have their respective merits. Even though some 400,000 complaints about Watan cards were filed as many as 300,000 were stated to be settled. The nature of relationships in KP did not pose any major problem. But being an executive policy domain, the Commission is unable to suggest preferences except to sound a caution that whatever be their policy choices, respective governments must ensure that grievances were addressed promptly, justly and through a transparent mechanism; exceptional cases and observed anomalies be resolved at responsible levels, by discretion tempered with mercy. Particularly, the case of affectees whose lands were lost to rivers that changed their course or the old and ladies separated without legal divorces, required policy level attention for relief as was done for a special person without hands.
Having noted that, the Commission feels that the factum that almost 27, 000 Watan cards had not been en-cashed has not been duly publicised to let people know that very many considered eligible were reluctant to receive state dispensation; many complaints of extending benefits to unaffected may have been addressed in that process!

64. Provincial Disaster Management Authorities created in 2007 or thereafter, to act through District Disaster Management Authorities, to partially repair post-2001 fragmented local management structures on two counts: Non-devolution of all service delivery functions and exclusion of many provincial and federal areas from the purview of the electoral process, despite two Federal laws promulgated for the purpose in 2002 and the 2005 earthquake. Since elected District Governments did not cover the entire space in revenue districts due to exclusion of cantonments from the new local government laws, an integrated set up was conceived as a part of a unified command and control system, to deal with the disasters through effective vertical and horizontal integration of territorial and functional coordination through management structures. Provincial Governments amended the respective Rules of Business to create PDM Departments and to specify their policy and oversight functions. Most powers and functions of the PDMA were/are at par with the erstwhile Relief Commissioners but no evidence was led to substantiate if the inter-Provincial NDMA provided any guidelines, as intended by the extraordinary law on the subject, primarily due to political crisis generated by extra-constitutional dispensation enforced on 3rd November 2007, a month after promulgation of the 2007 Ordinance for establishment of the NDMA in October 2007.

65. Civil Defence Organizations (CDO) mostly composed of volunteers, to assist local administration / Army in rescue, evacuation and relief measures and mobilize local personnel for disaster management, rescue and relief. The CDO is the lead agency that steers disaster management at District & Tehsil levels under respective DCOs who have designated DROs as focal persons designated under District Disaster Management Plans; these played their respective roles, where necessary. The Commission did not invite the CDO for any evidence. To use it for any productive benefit, this set up has undergone major revamping since establishment of state of the art, 1122 services to respond to all types of emergencies from accidents, to medical-calls in main towns and for big fire managements besides flood relief. These rendered useful contributions.

66. In addition to the above, sectoral departments of Agriculture, Communication and Works, Food, Heath and Livestock and Planning and Development have important roles impinging on overall crisis management scenarios were associated with the Relief and rehabilitation work but were not invited in view of the TORs. The NDMA network will have to integrate these departments with its overall plans.

CHAPTER-6

CONCLUDING REMARKS

67. The adumbration of the above evidence, the information and the Commission’s field visits when related to the relevant official instructions and observed practices established that:-

a. The NDMA’s lead role in coordination of rescue and relief phases during and after the floods to save life, if not the property, was outstanding, by any standard. But it did not put in position pre-disaster structural framework or administrative network mandated in 2006 or contemplated by the NDMA Ordinance 2007 (LIII of 2007) or 2009 Ordinance, despite passage of over 42 months till June 2010 or later to-date.
b. The PMD’s rain forecasts were timely but its estimations regarding flood discharges were not as accurate as it was generally perceived; the FFD needed to factor in the flows from hill torrents and along other rivers where no gauges are installed; the need to boost its capacity to forecast beyond 4-days advance warning as compared to 10-days international best was also established; during flood season 2010, its 28th June assessment was off the mark within 3-weeks. More than that, scientific simulations and weather modelling approach by highly qualified mathematical models could also generate better outcomes. The PMD should not have ignored international assessments except at a great peril, even if these did not conform to its wildest estimations, knowing in-house technical capacity constraints.
c. The KP did not have the occasion or adequate time to plan or act against flash floods, but in terms of response time and actions, it acted fast to restore the damaged irrigation supplies through make-shift arrangements that enabled most farmers to plant a bumper Rabi crop for 2010-11 to help revive life and living of most affected people as many lost their lands to the river action.
d. The Punjab had limited but reasonable notice for preventive measures and for issuing warnings to people. While threat to Jinnah Barrage was averted, other breaches including the breaches to LGB/LMB of Jinnah Barrage and those induced by human intervention could have been checked, partly or wholly, to minimize loss of life and property, though these had indirectly but considerably benefited by easing out the pressure on controlled irrigation structures in Sindh.
e. Like KP, the Punjab administration in coordination with Armed Forces also led the operations from the front, for rescue and relief inter-alia to restore/ replace two most damaged LMBs within record time and speed, by associating private sector and by invoking emergency codes, designed for such eventualities; that prevented damages from 2nd peak of flood flows. The Provincial administrations led by example. This Commission would not like to make any further observation on that account in view of inherent limitations of subjecting executive judgements in crisis to retroactive wisdom except to ward off future pitfalls. But projects executed under emergency provisions be subjected to special audit, as a policy.
f. In view of sharp political divide in the Muzaffargarh and DG Khan, possibility of mischief in inflicting cuts or politically motivated charges could not be conclusively ruled out as besides FIRs, almost 100 writs were filed in LHC from hese Districts.
g. The officials in-charge of irrigation structures responsible for inefficiency, negligence or corrupt practices identified in departmental inquiries are expected to be proceeded against under due process. This Commission would not like to make any further observations with respect to officials’ subject matter of inquiry of Punjab Judicial Commission.
h. The then Secretary Irrigation, Sindh and the then Chief Engineer Guddu were well aware of the poor state of Tori Bund long before the 2010 Flood; they had adequate time and to attend to that work but failed to move in time.
i. The then Chief Engineer Guddu, by his own admission, and his immediate superior, the Secretary Irrigation, had failed to anticipate the expected level of flood waters at Guddu Barrage that inundated Sindh’s three major districts besides Balochistan’s Jaffarabad district.
j. Both Chief Engineer Guddu and the then Secretary Irrigation consciously and deliberately, tried to attribute disaster due to inadequate maintenance and funding constraints during yester-years, besides justifying former’s absence from the Tori Bund breach site at the critical time for reasons of heavy rainfall that never was, and the claim that that made vehicular tour of the bund impossible. Especially in view of his own PC-I of 4th February 2010 and Planning Commission’s consensus document that rebut the factum of over-topping.
k. The SEs and XENs incharge of the breached bunds in Guddu and Kortri command areas are likewise responsible.
l. The 2010 Flood in Sindh was unprecedented to the extent of duration of the peak flows though the discharges were lower than the 1976 Flood.
m. The pre and post Flood 2010 IRC proceedings contradicted in material terms Mr. Junejo’s contention, that most bunds other than those directly raised in the subject matter of petitions were maintained at reasonable level of repair.
n. The possibility that certain elements within the Irrigation hierarchies mislead its political leadership regarding benefits of creation of additional water storage cannot be ruled out.
o. The World Bank programme on drainage in last three decades and Taunsa Rehabilitation project may be reviewed to ensure transparency especially in the context of technology transfer and training of local professionals and Para-technical staff.
p. The packages prepared for the restoration of irrigation works and embankments had a cost factor of Rs.61 billion in Sindh alone, and the consensus DNA of Rs.11 billion raises legitimate and serious concerns in respect of departmental practices.
q. AGP may also undertake special audit of funds expended in last 10-years for irrigation sector including review of its own reports.

68. It was stated that in many areas people ignored warnings about impending disasters for various reasons. Manifest disconnect at local levels may have made them brush aside implicit or explicit dangers for public infrastructure, large and small, standing agricultural crops by unsuspecting / ill-prepared people, limited access to TV network further impeded by uneven load-shedding in rural areas, pre-occupation with fasting and worship.

69. Given the imperfect nature of observed communication with the affectees and their sympathisers, as water flows increased, perceptions mixed with reality compounded the confusion. Parliamentary debates did not dispel adverse public perceptions, both woven by design or with effort. Meantime, the official credibility touched a new low; numbers were no longer relevant; even one complainant was too many to generate media blitz. The local and national media chased the waters, as brave men and women anchors and public representatives repeatedly flagged to the authorities about areas of default, real or potential, suggesting absence of coordinated response. The HR Petitions filed by two Parliamentarians, one each from both sides of the divide, including the Deputy Chairman, Senate of Pakistan who sent a letter to Hon’ble Court through a leading Jurist, and an energetic lady Member of the National Assembly, amongst others, who chose to travel extensively on the water trail and documented the media coverage, members of the Bar and general public, all opted to invoke Article 184 (3) Jurisdiction of the apex Court.

70. In areas with sharp political divisions, intense public debates focussed on malicious breaches, to allegations of favours to local influentials who manage to secure appointments for their loyal supporters, inadequacy of assistance rendered alongside questions impinging on fairness in distribution and disbursements, both in the context of Federating units and marooned people who awaited rescue operations through transport planes and Heli-lifting relief supplies in many inaccessible areas were voiced by media. Not to be left alone, international communities also voiced their concerns, some indirectly, others were not so subtle. Though it realized the dimension of the fast unfolding disaster a bit late, to offer support, on 18th August 2010, the UN Secretary General convened a special Session in which Foreign Governments, DFIs, UN Specialized Agencies and other International Organizations to made generous pledges for donations and/or loans for the people whose blood and resources had been overstretched by the war imposed on them; rhetoric dominated disbursements. The reports that international community had honoured only 50% of the pledged contributions in the UN sponsored Funding appeal finally led to composition of the NODMC, created with Provincial representation to oversee and guide fairly and justly the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation plans.

71. The processing of loans by DFI’s also took its time and payment of 2nd tranche of Rs.80,000/ household was delayed, leading to frustrated expectations; these multiplied complaints of inaction or negligence. From the material brought on record, it was established that Federal & Provincial Governments and local administrations, supported by general public, political workers, local and international NGOs, all joined hands to launch the humanitarian assistance on unprecedented dimensions, unfamiliar for its management structures eroded systematically and subcutaneously, since 1969. Men & women, civil and military personnel deployed for the purpose rushed with dedication whatever, from wherever and in whatever mode was possible under those conditions. At the initial stages, saving lives of the marooned, provision of essential food, safe drinking water were the obvious priorities; utensils and other voluntary services were trucked and airlifted as Medical professionals including the internees joined. Most people had no idea that weather takes no note of their belief systems. Disaster not only evoked and channelized public sympathy, at home & abroad, some major channels actively conducted awareness programs for private charity, collected and disbursed relief assistance, at times by enlisting feme-fatale celebrities of all hue and shade. Besides saving many precious lives, these agencies had done what was humanly possible, in view of the organizational & logistic constraints. That was, however, not so with respect to many in the Provincial Irrigation hierarchies.

72. Only WAPDA had had the opportunity to review its SOPs in the wake of Ataabad Lake syndrome to alert its senior professional team to explore and examine all options to meet any contingency, in the context of threats to Tarbela and downstream Chashma, should the Attabad Lake burst by any chance. Like NDMA, the KP and the Punjab also acted with utmost dedication in conjunction with armed forces to minimize impact of the disaster, at times beyond the call of duty. These efforts need institutional back up.

73. As public perceptions, at home and abroad, compounded, including those from within the coalition partners, the Provincial Governments of Sindh and the Punjab constituted Judicial Commissions to probe into alleged acts of malfeasance or nonfeasance by the respective administrations. For obvious reasons, their ToRs were focussed to the specific complaints, rather than functionally and spatially integrated dimensions commensurate with scale of the national catastrophe, or redressal of publicly voiced complaints, in their entirety. This Commission benefitted from the evidentiary material collected by the two Commissions with due regard to Ordinance II of 1969.
74. A comprehensive Disaster Risk Management plan is required to be developed by the NDMA. To do so it has to take an overview of many factors that impinges on this function under stressful conditions. According to an ADB paper ‘a disaster plan must incorporate measures to reduce exposure. A reliable system must contemplate reducing exposure, early warning and strengthen resilience of the affectees before, during the onset of the calamity, and later in restoration stages. It also identified various elements including but not limited to: a) Acceleration of programs for infrastructure improvements to keep up with ballooning urban population; to develop alternatives to those living in high-risk areas, protection and restoration of ecosystems that buffer the impact of natural hazards; b) ensuring timely warnings to reach individuals, to develop flexible systems ranging from global monitoring, regional, and national preparation to local emergency action; customize wording of warnings and methods used for local communities; to expand income options in rural areas, reducing reliance on a single crop; and c) encouraging regional cooperation that helps stricken economies to recover, protection and restoration of ecosystems that provide and enhance the livelihood of rural populations’
75. On behalf of civil society, a case was made out for early restoration of LG systems; that was a legitimate suggestion but needs democratic realignment of its design to strengthen management structures for good governance; it is not to be a mutually exclusive system at the cost of good administration by colour blind rule. The 2001 LG system, put on hold in all the Provinces, and not practiced in 44 cantonments administered under a 1924 Act and Islamabad managed under 1960 MA Ordinance, despite two elections in 2001 and 2005 and removal of reasons for not enforcing two Ordinances of 2002 need serious consideration too.

76. Before concluding, the Commission will like to flag its concerns about frequent efforts and attempts to tamper and meddle with tried and tested management and administrative structures of the country, and without any plans for up gradation of essential skills except investing in foreign demand-led areas. Controversial reform packages, at the behest of usurpers who engage ‘fly by night’ consultants with sole and premeditated task of perpetuation of their regimes and wrapped up with their exit from the scene need no more comments. There is no caveat that while changes in all man-made systems are necessary and must be subjected to periodical review, to do so without creating a viable alternate is most unwise. The moreso, as half baked attempts demoralized the key service institutions; e.g. those established by inter-provincial consensus of the founding fathers in December 1949 and sustained by successive constitutions, including 1973 decimated within a few days of commencement of the constitution and despite political accord of October 1972 on which it was founded. Disruption of appropriate training to align the service memberships with growing challenges of the time has taken its own toll. Like the bunds, not kept up as per the Bund Manual, these validly made constitutional institutions suffered erosion from the corroding influences of last 42 years of practices violative of basic law, and without remorse.

77. Last but not the least, extensive encroachments in the flood plain was flagged by most as one of the key factors responsible for obstructing the natural river flows, especially during the flood seasons. The Commission noted enormity of the dimensions of this practice during aerial view along the Indus River in two provinces in the form of vast lush green farms planted and interspersed throughout the reach of the Indus River bed where it flows on the ridge. During its hearings, two more issues were highlighted: Allotments of lands to Sindh “haris” in Katcha area by a previous administration and growth of housing settlements to meet one of the most basic needs of shelter for growing population. (This is not unique to the River plains; mushroom growth of ‘Katchi abadis’ in Islamabad’s most developed urban centre and seat of Federal Government is not free from that malady.) In the Commission’s view this is a symptom of policy failure, not a disease: successive governments have failed to develop and execute town planning as an integral and unavoidable instrument of state policy under which need oriented provision had to be made for meeting the residential requirements of the growing population rather than growth of affordability driven expansions. As a direct result thereof, leaving aside a few developers, this vital state function has been abdicated to real estate agents; the more organised and fortunate amongst the society resorted to housing cooperatives with DHAs in the lead; many proved inadequate in view of the sharp mismatch in supply of and demand for developed housing sites as well as emergence of opportunists and ‘qabza’ groups patronised under local influentials with all the attendant consequences. As ‘Kacthi abadi’ culture flourished as a ‘benign dispensation’ for most vulnerable exposed under the paradigm of ‘affordability’ and allowed to live under ‘hewers of wood and drawers of water’, as a shortcut having no other viable option; be it ad-hoc appointees in education and health sectors, frequently regularized sans due process mandated by articles 4 and 25; in irrigation sector, posting of personnel rendered surplus after abolition of posts/ departments, by absorbing against jobs inconsistent with their professional credentials did not raise any eyebrows. As enforcement lagged in every field, rule of law suffered and corruption multiplied by the hour as an end product to haunt many, so much so that even laws protected under First schedule of the constitution for removal of illegal possessions of state properties and host of other laws listed earlier could not be invoked: routine conversion of plots / estates in residential localities into commercial centres continue to compound the traffic congestion in urban centres besides creating extreme pressure on essential civic infrastructure of schools and hospitals. Recently the CDA has managed to secure thousands of Kanals of its land, worth tens of billions, from unauthorized occupants after the apex Court issued orders under Suo moto jurisdiction. The state needs to revisit its basic responsibilities too.

78. The largest damage to public sector infrastructure was suffered by the Transport and Communication sector. Complaints of human interventions has also been voiced and the NHA was directed to apprise the Commission about such breaches in road network in various provinces and the estimated losses; including the reasons for overtopping of M-I motorway.

So, the fact is that along with every hardship there is also ease. Indeed, with every hardship there is also ease!

CHAPTER-7

RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction

79. As a result of its interaction with the representatives of various federal & provincial governments, ministries and institutions as well as the media, civil society organizations of the general public, the Commission considers it appropriate to include a member of important recommendations in the Report.

80. Although the following recommendations are not directly in response to the formulations contained in the 15th December, 2010 Order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, these are nevertheless highly relevant to flood control measures for preventing possible damage and devastation in the future. The Hon’ble Supreme Court may like to consider these submissions, for whatever action it deems necessary.

I. Expansion of Flood Early Warning Systems (FEWS)

81. The current early warning facilities in the country are of a limited nature. According to Meteorology Department, the range of forecast is barely 3-4 days. Due to limited technical capacity, we are lagging far behind the developed countries. There are only 07 Radars in the whole country. There is no coverage in the northwest of the country and Balochistan, including the coastal belt of 960 km.

82. Although Pakistan is a member of the Word Meteorology Organization (WMO), it is not accessing information from it. Nor is it taking full advantage of information available with it. The Hon’ble Supreme Court may wish to advise the Government of Pakistan for taking the following measures at the earliest:

a. Expansion of radar coverage to the whole country.
b. Establishing a coordinating mechanism with WMO and the SAARC countries for accessing / sharing information on early weather warning.

II. FLOOD MITIGATION

83. During the devastating floods of 2010 which not only caused damage of life and property in the private sector but huge damage also occurred to the public sector infrastructure such as sweeping away of roads, bridges and a large number of schools, colleges and BHU’s etc.

84. In its interaction with public and private sector institutions, the Commission noted with concern that major damage occurred due to lack of maintenance and repair of river embankments, canals, and obstruction by major highways/motorways constructed by the Irrigation department and the National Highway Authority (NHA) and others across the country.

A. Barrages and Bunds

85. Several bunds, canals and barrages experienced breaches as a result. In the case of Jinnah Barrage, the breaching sections were identified before and were breached after proper consultative progress. The water discharged from such pre-designated breaches was channelized and it re-entered the Indus downstream. This was not so in the case of other bunds where no such provision existed and yet these bunds were allowed to be breached. This caused huge damage to life or property besides rendering thousands unemployed and homeless.

86. During its deliberations, the Commission observed that most damages could have been prevented if strategically located escape points, like the Raini Canal, were available at barrages, bunds and motorways/highways. Adequate systems could be put in place providing for a consultative plan for maintenance of bunds through assured funding, if necessary, by generating funds from water users as was offered by formers in KP. Provision for pre-designated breaches at barrages, bunds and motorways/highways could be provided after conducting a detail survey and preparing feasibility reports.

B. Motorways/Highways

87. It was brought to the notice of the Commission by representatives of KP that the major reason for inundation of agricultural lands and abadis on the northern side of Peshawar-Islamabad Motorway (M1) was the inadequate capacity of crossing bridges meant for the drainage of flood flows in rivers located between Peshawar and Mardan. The motorway virtually acted like a “bund” obstructing the natural course of water flows in the area. The bed of river Kabul, upstream and downstream of the main Kabul river bridge, has silted up to an alarming level which has decreased the waterway and poses a serious threat of out-flanking and over-topping of this vitally important structure during floods. In fact, this happened during the flood of 2010 near the Jindi River which damaged the M1 resulting in closure of the motorway for several days. Similar concerns were voiced by representatives of civil society organizations and provinces.

88. It is imperative for the NHA and the FFC to carry out a joint survey and study of all its road network in the country to identify areas of possible flooding as a result of obstruction caused by these roads and take remedial measures for provision of designated escape channels to ease the pressure of flood at various potential locations. The provincial highways and irrigation departments may also be associated. The Hon’ble Supreme Court may wish to advise the government to initiate actions, accordingly.

III. Encroachments

89. The 2010 Flood has fully exposed the illegal encroachments which have been allowed to go unchecked by the concerned authorities due to negligence, corruption and poor managements resulting in massive losses to life and property.

90. Thousands of acres of “Katcha” lands have been illegally encroached upon by local influentials or have been leased out on nominal charges resulting in erection of private bunds. Construction of houses and other built up properties have been allowed along river banks and canals etc. Similarly, there has been a surge of encroachments on acquired lands in pond areas of barrages which has aggravated the flood hazards. The natural flow of water has been blocked as a result of numerous encroachments in most waterways due to unplanned and illegal constructions.

91. Unfortunately, the local and provincial governments have themselves indulged in encouraging illegal acts promoting encroachments. Unauthorized and technically unsound public works have been executed by local authorities. Construction of roads and gas pipelines have been allowed to pass through bunds in contravention of legal provisions. All such encroachments have contributed to obstructions in the flow of water resulting in flooding of many areas. A matter of grave concern which came to the notice of the Commission was that some of the governments are selling acquired lands in pond areas to raise revenues. Under the law, no construction of any infrastructure is allowed to be erected within a distance of 200 feet from banks of the rivers/streams. It should be a matter of serious concern if the government itself indulges in unlawful acts of selling those very lands which it had acquired to protect irrigation infrastructure and property of the citizens.

92. The governments must correct that and ensure that no encroachments are permitted and no acquired lands are sold or leased out. Actions should be initiated by governments to remove all encroachments with a firm hand. It should also ensure that all such illegally constructed structures on government lands which had been destroyed by the recent floods are not allowed to be re-erected.

93. The Hon’ble Supreme Court may wish to consider appropriate directions to the government in this regard.
IV. Munda Dam

94. The proposed Munda Dam project, 6 km upstream of Munda Headworks, is in an advanced technical engineering stage. When constructed it would provide water storage of 1.3 MAF and produce 740 megawatts of power. More importantly, it would completely control the flows of water in Swat River and its tributaries which eventually flow into the Indus at Khairabad, Attock district. Had Munda Dam been constructed, there would have been minimal damage downstream in Charsadda, Peshawar and Nowshera districts and Munda Headworks. The example of Gomal Zam Dam can be quoted here which is under construction and was responsible for preventing flooding of Dera Ismail Khan district even though it is partially complete. Keeping in view the great benefits of this Dam, the Hon’ble Supreme Court may consider advising the Federal Government to expedite execution of Munda Dam and prioritize work on other potential sites to optimize gains from natural endowments.

ANNEX-I
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN
(Original Jurisdiction)

PRESENT
MR. JUSTICE IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, C.J.
MR. JUSTICE GHULAM RABBANI
MR. JUSTICE KHALIL UR REHMAN RAMDAY

CONSTITUTION PETITION NO. 62 OF 2010
(Marvi Memon Versus Federation of Pakistan, etc.)

AND
SUO MOTO CASE NO. 17 OF 2010
(Action taken on letter sent by Mr. Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim and Mr. Jan Muhammad Khan Jamali regarding Unauthorized Diversion of Flood Water)

AND
HUMAN RIGHTS CASE NO. 46315-B OF 2010
Application by Muhammad Rahim Baloch
AND
HUMAN RIGHTS CASE NO. 44668-S OF 2010
Application by Dr. Asad Leghari
AND
CIVIL MISC. APPLICATION NO. 2998 OF 2010
Application by Ms. Zahida Thebo, Advocate
AND
HUMAN RIGHTS CASE NO. 50451-P OF 2010
(Anonymous Application)
AND
HUMAN RIGHTS CASE NO. 52220-P OF 2010
(Application by Ghazazfar Ali Khan)

Petitioners/ Applicants Mr. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, Sr. ASC
With Ms. Marvi Memon (in person)

For Govt. of Balochistan Dr. Salahussin Mengal, A.G

For Govt. of KPK DrSyed Arshad Hussain Shah,Addl.A.G

For Govt. of Punjab Ch. Kadim Hussain Qaiser, Addl. A.G.
Mr. Ghulam Rasool, Deputy Director

For Govt. of Sindh Mr. Abdul Fateh Malik, Addl. A.G.
Raja Abdul Ghafoor, AOR

For M/o Water & Power Qazi Talat Mehmood, S.E., FFC
Mr. Allah Din Mahar, S.O.

For M/o Finance Nemo

Const. P. 62/2010, etc.

Date of hearing 15.12.2010

ORDER

In the listed petitions important questions of facts have been raised by the petitioners particularly, in Const. Petition NO. 62 of 2010 instituted by Ms. Marvi Memon, who is a parliamentarian being member of the National assembly. The said petition along with other cases was taken up on 25th October, 2010, when following order was passed:

“Ms. Marvi Memon (petitioner), who is a Parliamentarian being a Member of the National Assembly, has approached this Court through listed petition under Article 184 (3) of the Constitution for the relief claimed therein. It is alleged by her that due to recent disaster by floods a large number of inhabitants of Sindh have suffered enormous losses both of life and property against their fundamental rights guaranteed to them under the Constitutions, and administration miserably failed to manage their affairs which, otherwise, was quite possible. She has asserted that it is not only that respondents were responsible for mal-administration on their part but on account of lack of accountability of influential persons are also responsible for adding/increasing the miseries of the citizens who have been left scot free pursing their influences. The prayer made in the petitioner is reproduced herein below:-

“(i) Order that the Respondents pay full and complete compensation for losses and damages incurred to all affected persons;
(ii) Give full, complete and accurate statement of accounts for monies which were allocated for maintenance, monitoring of the irrigation system in Sindh and Balochsitan as well as those which have been earmarked for all relief, rescue and early recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation activities.
(iii) Direct the concerned Respondent’s to show cause as to whey the needed irrigation maintenance, monitoring and upgrades were not performed/ undertaken.
(iv) Order concerned agencies to commence investigation into the conduct of all responsible persons with a view to seeing if any criminal charges or civil penalties may be appropriate in each individual case.
(v) Order that the Respondent set up an independent and autonomous commission/ body to investigate the events surrounding the floods and its aftermath.
(vi) That the Respondent’s be directed to provide detailed reasons and justifications for making every cut/ breach made at all time. This should include but not be limited to information relating as to who gave the order to make each cut/ breach and the precautions taken if any to protect life and property from the consequences each cut/ breach. This should cover every cut/ breach make in every canal, dyke, bund and other irrigation infrastructure in the province of Sindh and Balochistan as well as those in other provinces which directly affected the citizens of the afore-mentioned provinces especially with respect to Southern Punjab.
(vii) That the Respondents be made to pay damages to the person who were either forcibly moved from their homes or prevented from entering other areas and reports should be obtained from the Respondents regarding the same.
(viii) That the respondents should be ordered to provide reasons as to the insufficiency of the number of relief camps in all affected localities. Moreover the Respondents be directed to given detailed reason as to why the existing relief camps were not able to accommodate all affected persons. Furthermore the Respondents should be directed to ensure that all relief camps work at optimum levels and that sufficient resources be allocated/ employed at the camps and that steps are taken to arrest the spread of diseases especially amongst women, children and the elderly.
(ix) That furthermore the Respondents should be directed to given a report on the desirability of the location of each relief camp.
(x) Any other remedy that the Hon’ble Court deems fit.”

2. Similarly, Mr. Fakruddin G. Ibrahim, senior ASC, an eminent jurist, has addressed letter to the Registrar of this court relying upon a T.V. programme dated 13.09.2010 hosted by Kashif Abbasi and Talat Hussain on ARY Digital and other press reports as regards damages caused by un-precedent flood which they themselves have seen as a result of unauthorized diversions of flood waters by influential land owners in Sindh causing heavy losses to persons and property in parts of rural Sindh.

3. Likewise, Mr. Jan Muhammad Khan Jamali, Deputy Chairman, Senate, in his letter dated 18-08-2010, inter-alia, has alleged that due to breaches caused in flood laden Indus river at Thori Bund near Guddue Barrage by some influential the persons the standing crops have been damaged causing heavy losses to residents in the District of Jaffarabad. Further that on account of this all the four tehsils of Jaffarabad were inundated and water rose to a level of 7ft destroying every single building, household of the rural communities and 85% of the inhabitants of Jaffarabad became Internally Displaced Persons etc.

4. Identical situation has been pointed out by one Ms. Zahida Thebo, Advocate who is resident of village Ghari Mehar. She has alleged that in the current devastating floods the whole agriculture belt contiguous to Indus river has largely been affected for which the administration including Chief Minister Sindh, Mr. Qaim Ali shah, Home Miniser Dr. Zulfiqar Mirza and Dr. Talat Mahasser, MNA PPP and Provincial Minister, Sindh Qadir Magsi and Provincial Minister for Irrigation and Power (Sindh) Murad Ali shah, state Minister Rafiq Jamali are directly responsible having caused illegal and willful diversion of flood waters with braches near Sultan Goth Bund (small dam) formed by the local haris etc.

5. In addition to above, there are few other applications, by such as, the one of Dr. Asad Ali Leghari wherein he has prayed for action against criminal involvement of politicians and D.C.O. Dadu in taking delayed decision inundating Taluka K.N. Shah, District Dadu and also for creating hurdles to give the safe passage to flood water.

6. Some other applications on the same subject have been placed wherein irregularities and violation of fundamental rights of the persons who have suffered on account of the recent flood have been pointed out.

7. Because prima facie in these matters violation of fundamental rights of flood effectees, whose number runs into thousand have been pointed out, therefore, to examine whether, listed cases except Const. Petition NO. 62/2010 can be dealt with under Article 184(3) of the Constitutions preliminary exercise was undertaken during course whereof the Director General, Survey of Pakistan was directed to submit pre and post satellite images of the flow of Indus river to show the braches of bunds at different places in the provinces of Sindh and Balochistan during the flood. In response to the directions of the Court, the Deputy Surveyor General, Pakistan produced satellite images which were displayed in the Court room on the electronic screen. Having seen the same prima facie it is observed that at different places of Indus river (Tori Band) breaches have taken place, which resulted into inundation, due to which possibility of causing loss to the person and the property of the flood effectees cannot be ruled out and allegations so put forward in the applications for causing loss to the persons and property of the flood effectees is not without substance.

8. The administration of both the provinces i.e. Sindh and Balochistan allegedly have failed to mange/ control timely the flow of the water as well as law and order situation in respective areas due to which the effectees have suffered badly. There is also allegation against respondent in Const. Petition No. 62/2010 about non-supply of the aid/food etc. in a transparent manner to the flood effectees. Undoubtedly recent flood in the country was he biggest disaster in the history of the nation and the organizations like Defence and Media played commendable role and at the same time the Administration was also expected to prove their worth upto the mark but there are serious allegations against them as has been narrated hereinabove.

9. Accordingly relying upon the material available at this stage notices are issued to the respondents in Constitution Petition No. 62 of 2010 with direction to them to file their para-wise comments as during further hearing of the petition, the question for determination shall be based on the pleading of the parties.

10. In the meanwhile, the Chief Secretaries of all the Provinces shall compile separate reports in response to Suo Moto Case No. 17/10, H.R. Cases No. 44668-S, 46315-B/2010 and Civil Misc. Applications No. 2998/2010 with the assistance of their experts on the subject of control of flood, disaster etc. with complete material and data indicating that what necessary steps were taken for the management of the flood water, its losses sustained by the flood effectees both for their persons and properties, reasons for the same and also to state as to whether there was possibility to control huge loss by adopting precautionary measures. The report must be based on the recommendations of technical experts, who are capable to furnish transparent account of state of the affairs without concealing the facts or creating unnecessary confusion.

11. We may also ask the T.V channels both official and private to transmit DVDs, CDs with transcripts of the programme relating to flood disaster shown on the Channels. The Anchor persons and representatives of T.V. channels who visited the flood effected areas n the provinces of Balochistan, KPK, Punjab and Sindh may submit their view points as well. Notices to the channels be served through Chairman PEMRA on the basis of the list furnished by it.

In response to directions contained in above order following have submitted their concise statements/replies/comments. etc:

1. Ministry of Defence, Islamabad
2. Ministry of Finance, Islamabad
3. Ministry of Water & Power & Federal Flood Commission
4. Chief Secretary, Govt. of Punjab
5. Chief Secretary, Govt. of Balochistan (Interim Report)
6. Chief Secretary, govt. of KPK
7. Home Secretary, Govt. of Sindh
8. Secretary Irrigation, Govt. of Sindh
9. Deputy Director, National Management Authority

2. In this matter following formulations/questions for consideration, inter-alia, are required to be answered in view of the pleadings of the parties:

1. Whether embankment breaches during the period of high floods in Indus River are subject to any procedure to be followed by the authorities at the relevant time, if so, what is the manner of exercising of such powers and by whom and under what circumstances?
2. Whether in the floods in River Indus in the months of July and August, 2010, procedure for embankment breaches was followed judiciously?
3. Whether before ordering embankment breaches at different places, particularly at Aliwan and Tori Bund, no procedure was followed, if so, who is responsible for the same?
4. Whether before embankment breaches at different places, precautionary measures were adopted, particularly in view of warnings issued form time to time by the metrerological department of Pakistan?
5. Whether the beneficiaries, if any, responsible for embankment breaches to save their properties/ crops etc, are also responsible for the losses sustained by the affectees?
6. What is the approximate volume of losses sustained by the affectees and Government during the floods?
7. Whether relief was extended to the flood affectees on war footings or not?
8. Jacobabad Airport was available for flood relief operations, if so then whey the relief goods were not sent to affectees on urgent basis?
9. What is the pace of rehabilitation in the flood devastated areas?
10. Whether flood affectees are entitled for damages and compensation from the Government of Pakistan or from the persons who were benefited from the embankment breaches.
11. Whether administrations of the Provincial Government in private and official capacity are responsible for failing to manage affairs of flood affectees justly or properly, if so, what action is suggested against them?
12. Whether embankment of River Indus was being maintained annually, if not so, who is responsible for the same?
13. Who was responsible for breaches that took place at Tori Bund and Aliwan Bund?

3. Essentially above factual controversies / questions need to be answered by a fact finding body who shall be authorized to exercise all those powers which are available to a Commission constituted by the Court. The skill and experience on administration and revenues side for appointment as Members of fact finding body would be one of the consideration because the constitutional and legal questions raised in instant proceedings have to be answered by this Court. There is no cavil with it that such questions would be properly considered when factual aspects of the case are highlighted sufficiently and in a proper manner. Therefore, instead of constituting a commission comprising Judicial Officers, it is considered appropriate to appoint Commision of following prominent and senior retired officers with requisite skills and experience at their credit to deal with matters relating to the factual controversy highlighted hereinabove:

1. Mr. A.K.Lodhi, Former Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh.
2. Mr. Fateh Khan Khajak, Former Chief Secretary, Government of Balochistan.
3. Mr. Azam Khan, Former Chief Secretary Government of KPK
4. Khawaja Zaheer Ahmed, Former Federal Secretary Government of Pakistan.

The above respectable members of the Commission shall, from amongst themselves, select a Senior Member to act as a Convenor of the Commission. We are of the opinion that as the controversy relates to some technical aspects as well, the Commission shall be authorized to co-opt, for its assistance, any number of the members having experience and expertise in the matters like Irrigation, flow of water, constructions of dams, bridges, etc. Such members shall also be considered to be the component of the commission with the same authority / jurisdiction, which has been conferred upon other members.

4. As the task being assigned to the Commission, undoubtedly, is enormously laborious one, the Commission shall, amongst many, require logistic aid and support involving financial aspects as well; therefore, we direct:

i. That all the Chief Secretaries of the Provinces shall constitute a pool for the purpose of meeting Commission’s requirements, logistic and finances to be left at its disposal and whenever there is necessity to enhance the logistic support or to increase the finances, etc. required by the Commission, the same shall be updated by the Chief Secretaries of all the provinces after consultation with each other through Facilitator who is being appointed herein below.
ii. The Surveyor General of Pakistan shall also ensure that full assistance is provided to the Commission so that it may examine the satellite images of the embankment, etc, if it is considered by the Commission.
iii. The Secretary Irrigation of the Provinces responsibility with all the relevant staff, particularly, those posted at the relevant time in the areas where breaches took place, shall coordinate with the Commission during their meetings when and wherever the same are convened by providing all facilities necessary for the purpose of understandings the issues which are required to be answered.
iv. Similarly, the Relief Commissioners of the Provinces shall also provide assistance whenever it is required in this behalf by the Commission.
v. The Secretary Information, Government of Pakistan as well as Secretaries of the Provinces and the Chairman PEMRA shall also provide full assistance for the purpose of collecting print and electronic reports and material if need be. The Secretary Information shall also be responsible to make any advertisement / publication of notice, etc. if required to be issued by the Commission for the purpose of inviting objections, claims, etc. from the public of all the four Provinces.
vi. Mr. Sajid Mehmood Qazi, Additional Registrar of this Court is appointed as Facilitator for the Commission. He would be coordinating amongst the Members of the Commission and shall provide the necessary assistance required by the Commission for the purpose of achieving the objects.
vii. Office is directed to prepare the paper books of the material so far collected including the reports (report of Commission) submitted by the Additional Advocate General Sindh, and shall dispatch the same to the Members of the Commission and if need be extra copies shall also be provided to them.

5. In view of lengthy question, which are of factual controversies, it is considered appropriate to allow two months time to the Commission for submitting its report before the Court. Matter is adjourned to a date in office.

Islamabad
15.12.2010

ANNEX I-A

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN
(ORIGINAL JURISDICTION)

PRESENT
Mr. JUSTICE IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, HCJ
Mr. JUSTICE GHULAM RABBANI
Mr. JUSTICE KHALIL-UR-REHMAN RAMDAY

CONST. PETITION NO.62 OF 2010
(Marvi Memon vs. Federation of Pakistan, etc.)

AND
SUO MOTO CASE NO. 17 OF 2010
(Action taken on letters sent by Mr. Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim and Mr. Jan
Muhammad Khan Jamali regarding Unauthorized Diversion of flood Water)

AND
HUMAN RIGHTS CASE NO. 46315-B OF 2010
(Application by Muhammad Rehim Baloch)

AND
HUMAN RIGHTS CASE NO. 44668-S OF 2010
(Application by Dr. Asad Leghari)

AND
CIVIL MISC. APPLICATION NO. 2998 OF 2010
(Application by Ms. Zahida Thebo, Advocate)
AND
HUMAN RIGHTS CASE NO. 50451-P OF 2010
(Anonymous application)
AND
HUMAN RIGHTS CASE NO. 52220-P OF 2010
(Application by Ghazanfar Ali Khan)

Petitioners/Application Ms. Marvi Memon (in person).
For the Federation Mr. Khalid Ismail Abbasi, DAG.
For Govt. of Balochistan Mr. Abdul Aziz Khilji, Addl.A.G.
For Govt. of KPK Syed Arshad Hussain Shah, Addl.A.G.
For Govt. of Punjab Mr. Saeed Yousaf, Addl.A.G.
For Govt. of Sindh Raja Abdul Ghafoor, AOR.
For M / o Water & Power Nemo.
For M / o Finance Nemo.
Date of hearing 04.01.2011.

*-*-*-*-*-*-*

ORDER

Vide order dated 15.12.2010, we had appointed Mr. A.K.Lodhi (former Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh) as one of the members of the Commission. However, he has approached the office showing his disability to act as a member on account of health problems, therefore, after deliberation, we have agreed to appoint Mr. A.W.Qazi, Former Federal Secretary, Government of Pakistan as the member of the Commission. He has also agreed to be the member of the commission as reported to us by registrar, therefore, the name of Mr. A. K. Lodhi as per the reasons disclosed hereinbefore is substituted with the name of Mr. A. W. Qazi as the Member of the Commission. As far as rest of the contents of the noted above order, they shall remain the same. Meanwhile, we have succeeded in laying our hands on a book “INDUS WATERS TREATY IN RETROSPECT”, compiled by Malik Bashir Ahmed. As per the contents of the same, this fellow seems to be a highly qualified person. He had been representing Pakistan in UNO and so many other countries after receiving education on the subjects of Dam, Water power etc. in and outside the country. It is directed to transmit a copy of this book to the commission for their perusal alongwith other material and if the commission so desire they may seek his further expert opinion in respect of the matter for which commission has been constituted. Adjourned to a date in office.

Islamabad, the
4th January, 2011.
Waqas Naseer*

ANNEX-I-B
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN
(ORIGINAL JURISDICTION)

PRESENT
Mr. JUSTICE IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, C.J
Mr. JUSTICE GHULAM RABBANI

C.M.A. NO. 890 OF 2011
(For extension of time)
IN
CONST. PETITION NO. 62 OF 2010, etc

Marvi Memon …. Petitioner

Versus

Federation of Pakistan and others … Respondent

For the petitioner Petitioner in person
For the Province of Punjab Ch. Khadim Hussain Qaiser, Addl. AG
Date of Hearing 09.3.2011

ORDER

A request has been received from the Commission constituted vide order dated 15.12.2010 to extend the period for the completion of the task assigned to it. Petitioner has appeared in person and expresses her satisfaction about the pace of progress being made by the Commission and states that time may be extended as has been prayed. Request is allowed. The Commission may complete its report within a period of six weeks from the date when earlier time of two months has expired.

Islamabad
09.03.2011
Zulfiqar

ANNEX-I-C

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN
(Original Jurisdiction)

PRESENT:
MR.JUSTICE IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, C.J
MR.JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI
MR. JUSTICE GHULAM RABBANI

CONSTITUTION PETITION NO.62 OF 2010
(Marvi Memon Versus Federation of Pakistan etc.)
AND
SUO MOTO CASE NO.17 OF 2010
(Action taken on letters sent by Mr.Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim and Mr.
Jan Muhammad Khan Jamali regarding Unauthorized Diversion of Flood Water)
AND
HUMAN RIGHTS CASE NO.52220-P OF 2010
(Application by Ghazanfar Ali Khan)
AND
HUMAN RIGHTS CASE NO.57247-A OF 2010
(Application by Malik Kausar Abbas Advocate)
AND
HUMAN RIGHTS CASE NO.59622-S OF 2010
(Application by Dr. Abdul Ghaffar Rind)

Petitioners/ Applicants Mr. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, Sr. ASC
With Ms. Marvi Memon (in person)
On Court Notice:
For the Federation Mr. Khalid Ismail Abbasi, D.A.G.
Mr. M.S. Khattak, AOR
Qazi Talat Mehmood Siddiqui, S.E. FLC
Mr.Allah Dino Mahar, S.O.
M/o Water & Power

For Govt. of Balochistan Mr. Azam Khattak, Addl. A.G.
For Govt. of KPK Syed Arshad Hussain Shah, Addl. A.G.
For Govt. of Punjab Ch. Kadim Hussain Qaiser, Addl. A.G.
For Govt. of Sindh Mr. Miran Muhammad Shah, Addl. A.G.
Raja Abdul Ghafoor, AOR
Mr.Ahmed Junaid, C.E. Irrigation Deptt.
On behalf of Secretary Irrigation Sindh
Voluntary appeared Mr.Sajid Mehmood Qazi, Addl. Registrar/
Facilitator of Flood Commission

Date of hearing 28.3.2011

O R D E R

The Flood Commission has submitted following interim report:

“On 15 March 2011, during the course of its interaction with affectees of Jafferabad District that suffered most due to 2010 floods, in Balochistan, concerns were expressed about the economic hardships unfolded by loss of two crops of Kharif and Rabi 2010 due to breach of Tori Bund in Sindh. The affectees urged timely measures to enable the farmers to plant the next Kharif crop, being the third consecutive crop and any let up will surely unfold untold miseries for the people most directly affected by the floods in the Naseerabad Division in general, and the District, in particular. Apprehensions were also voiced that slow pace of rebuilding of the damaged embankments in Sindh may generate a fresh round of devastation in the next season.

2. These representations substantiated Commission’s observations of the state of Rabi plantings during over flighty from Sukkur to Jafferabad on that morning, and on way back to Sukker. Most farm lands had not been planted or lacked vegetative cover for various reasons including the 2010 flood water, present in many stretches, despite lapse of 6-7 months, reduced irrigation & safe drinking water supplies on account of damages to irrigation infrastructures, as well as lesser number of IDP’s returning back to resume farming for obvious exposure to stressful living conditions for men and cattle. The situation needed urgent attention of all concerned, including the Federal and Provincial Governments, as the potential unrest was not deemed conducive for the Federation.

The Commission, therefore, resolved to make following interim recommendations, to The Hon’able Court, for issuance of appropriate directions to the concerned authorities for restoration of life and living:
a) To remove critical constraints including provision of adequate inputs and water supplies for men & cattle, if necessary by one time special dispensation, to facilitate timely plantation of the 2011 Kharif crops.
b) To urgently respond to the legitimate expectations for addressing their most immediate concerns having direct bearing on human and cattle life.
c) To confirm a firm time line for restoration of damaged infrastructure and rebuilding of Kirther Canal both in the province of Sindh and Balochistan, and repair of Tori Bund in Sindh having direct bearing on rehabilitation of agriculture, most affected in Naseerabad Division, with special attention to Jafferabad District, And
d) Such other directions ancillary and incidental to the above objectives.
3. It was resolved that the Facilitator will take measures to submit the above Resolution to the Hon’able Court for its gracious considerations in the context of formulations no.7,9 and 10 in Court’s orders dated 15.12.2010, without prejudice to Commission’s final findings.”

2. Mr. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, learned Senior ASC, who appears along with the petitioner Ms. Marvi Memon, explains that on account of flood devastation the farmers/haris having their agricultural landed property falling within the command of the Kirther Canal passing through the area of Dera Allah Yar entering into province of Sindh are suffering on account of rise in the prices of the fertilizers, seeds, etc, and the Government is required to assist them to save their lives and properties. However, we have pointed out to him that as final report has not yet been received, therefore, we have to confine ourselves for the time being to the extent of the recommendations placed before us for the purpose of passing appropriate orders to the concerned authorities. It is noted that the Flood Commission in its interim report has sufficiently explained difficulties and miseries including non receipt of regular supply of the water for the purpose of irrigation. There cannot be two opinions that protection to life and property is the fundamental right of the citizens. Equally, it is the obligation of Government to protect their lives and property and to see that the citizens particularly those who are subject matter of the petition and have suffered on account of flood devastation, to enjoy better living.

3. Mr. Ahmed Junaid, Chief Engineer of Irrigation Department, has appeared on behalf of Secretary Irrigation, Government of Sindh whereas no one has appeared from Balochistan except the Additional Advocate General. The Chief Engineer of Irrigation Department, Govt. of Sindh, has pointed out that work has already commenced on Kirther Canal to ensure supply of water to irrigate the lands during the forthcoming season of kharif crop. The supply for irrigation purposes in the area noted by the commission both in the Balochistan and Sindh Provinces falling within the command of the Kirther canal are necessarily required to be completed expeditiously enabling the farmers to sow their crops.

4. It is to be noted that season of Kharif normally commences from the first week of month of April, therefore, the Chief Secretaries of both the provinces i.e. Balochistan and Sindh are hereby directed to pool their all resources and ensure without fail to complete the task of supply of water to the farmers in the area of Dera Allah Yar and adjacent areas of the province of Sindh not later than 15th April, 2011. However, both the functionaries shall be submitting weekly report to the Registrar for our perusal in Chambers.

5. Before parting with this order we would like to clarify that in the interim report reproduced hereinabove the Commission has not mentioned that the Tori Band was not deliberately breached, therefore, reports which have been published in some of the sections of media perhaps are not based on the correct facts.

Islamabad
28-3-2011
Zulfiqar*

ANNEX-I-D

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN
(Original Jurisdiction)

PRESENT
MR. JUSTICE IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, C.J.
MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI
MR. JUSTICE GHULAM RABBANI

C.M.A. No. 1326 OF 2011
In
CONSTITUTION PETITION NO. 62 OF 2010
(Marvi Memon Versus Federation of Pakistan, etc.)
AND

SUO MOTO CASE NO. 17 OF 2010
(Action taken on letters sent by Mr. Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim and Mr. Jan
Muhammad Khan Jamali regarding Unauthorized Diversion of Flood Water)
AND
HUMAN RIGHTS CASE NO. 52220-P OF 2010
(Application by Ghazanfar Ali Khan)

AND

HUMAN RIGHTS CASE NO. 57247-A OF 2010
Application by Malik Kausar Abbas Advocate
AND
HUMAN RIGHTS CASE NO. 59622-S OF 2010
Application by Dr. Abdul Ghaffar Rind

Petitioners/Applicants Ms. Marvi Memon (in person)

On Court Notice:

For the Federation Mr. Khalid Ismail Abbasi, D.A.G.
Mr. M. S. Khattak, AOR
Qazi Talat Mehmood Siddiqui, S.E., FLC

For Govt. of Balochistan Mr. Azam Khattak, Addl. A.G.
Mr. Arshad Hussain, ADC.

For Govt. of KPK Syed Arshad Hussain Shah, Addl. A.G.

For Govt. of Punjab Ch. Kadim Hussain Qaiser, Addl. A.G.

For Govt. of Sindh Mr. Abdul Fateh Malik, A.G.

Date of hearing 14.04.2011

ORDER

The Members of the Commission have sought permission to submit the report on or before 30th April, 2011. Order accordingly.

2. No report has been received from the Chief Secretaries of Balochistan and Sindh about the completion of the work on the embankment of the Saifullah Canal in District Naseer Abad, etc. Office is directed to issue reminder and report received thereon be submitted in chambers for our perusal. Cases are adjourned to a date in the 2nd week of May, 2011.

ISLAMABAD.
14.04.2011.
MAZ/*

ANNEX-II-A

LIST OF WITNESSES/OFFICIALS RESPONDENTS WHO APPEARED BEFORE IT OR WERE EXAMINED BY THE COMMISSION AT ISLAMABAD

SR. NO.
NAME & DESIGNATION
1. Mr. Rab Nawaz,
Secretary Irrigation & Power Department,
Government of Punjab, Lahore.
2. Mr. Ghulam Ali Baloch, Secretary,
Agriculture & Cooperatives Balochistan.
3. Mr. Sohail Rajput, Special Finance Secretary,
Sindh, Karachi.
4. Mr. Masood Ahmad, Special Secretary Finance,
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
5. Mr. Javed Siddiqi, AD PDMA,
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
6. Mr. Izzat Khan, Assistant Director Planning,
Irrigation Department, KPK.
7. Lt. Gen (Retd) Nadeem Ahmed,
Chairman, The NDMA, Islamabad.
8. Mr. Ahmed Kamal
Member DRR, The NDMA, Islamabad.
9. Mr. Asjad Imtiaz, Acting Chairman,
Federal Flood Commission (FFC),
Ministry of Water & Power, Islamabad.
10. Mr. Mumtaz Khan, Secretary,
Irrigation & Power, Government of Balochistan, Quetta.
11. Mr. Muhammad Ishfaq Khan, Secretary,
Irrigation, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar.
12. Mr. Rab Nawaz, Secretary,
Irrigation & Power, Government of Punjab, Lahore.
13. Mr. Rafiq Ali Memon, Secretary,
Irrigation & Power, Government of Sindh, Karachi.
14. Mr. Zafarullah Mehr,
Chief Engineer, Irrigation Department, Karachi.
15. Ms. Marvi Memon,
Member National Assembly (Petitioner Re HR 62/2010).
16. Mr. Jan Muhammad Khan Jamali,
Deputy Chairman Senate.
17. Ms. Zahida Thebo,
Advocate.

18. Mr. Hamid Mir,
Columnist/Anchor, GEO TV.
19. Mr. Javed Ahmed Soomro, Reporter,
Sindh TV News, Islamabad.
20. Mr. Aamir Ilyas Rana, Bureau Chief
Express News, Islamabad.
21. Mr. Ali Sher, Chief Reporter,
Waqat News, Islamabad.
22. Mr. M. B. Soomro,
Reporter, Daily Kawish.
23. Sh. Nisar Hussain,
Bureau Chief, Apna TV Channel.
24. Mr. Muhammad Yaqoob Ch.
Joint Secretary, M/o Defence.
25. Brig. Muhammad Ajmal Khan,
Director (Engineer) Pak. Army.
26. Air Commodore Ashfaque Arain,
Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Plans), PAF
27. Mr. Arif Mahmood, Acting Director General
Meteorological Department.
28. Mr. Javede Ali Qureshi, (assistant by Mr. Shafiq Ahmed)
Directors SUPARCO.
29. Mr. Mohammad Ehsanul Haq, MD (SIDA).

30. Mr. Shuja Ahmed Junejo, former Secretary (I&P),
Government of Sindh.
30. Mr. Idrees Rajput, Columnist/Consultant/former Secretary
(I&P), Government of Sindh.
31. Mr. Ibrahim Rind, former Chief Engineer (Irrigation),
Government of Balochistan.
32. Mr. Muhammad Shakil Durrani,
Chairman, WAPDA (assisted by senior officials).
33. Mr. Ali Arshad Hakeem,
Chairman, NADRA (assisted by senior officials).
34. Mr. Tahir Munir,
Director General PDMA, Balochistan, Quetta.
35. Mr. Khalid Sherdil,
Director General PDMA, Punjab, Lahore.
36. Mr. Asif Ali Farrukh,
Director (Operations), PDMA, KP Peshawar.
37. Ms. Iffat Malik,
Acting Director General PDMA, Sindh, Karachi.
38. Mr. Sarwar Bari,
Social Activist & Political Columnist,
(along with associates/workers) Islamabad.

39. Mr. Sahibzada Mahmood Faizi,
Joint Secretary, Ministry of Food & Agriculture.
40. Mr. Inyatullah Khan,
Agriculture Development Commissioner.
41. Mr. Ghulam Aziz Khan,
Director, Pakistan Oil Seed Development Board.
42. Dr. Shakeel Ahmed,
Wheat commissioner, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.
43. Mr. Muhammad Junaid,
Acting Chairman, National Highway Authority, Ministry of Communication, Government of Pakistan.
44. Mr. Asim Amin,
General Manager, (Design) National Highway Authority, Ministry of Communication, Government of Pakistan.
45. Mr. Attique Ahmed,
General Manager (Operation) National Highway Authority, Ministry of Communication, Government of Pakistan.
46. Mr. Shahabuddin Channa,
Secretary Rehabilitation, Government of Sindh, Karachi.
47. Mr. Muhammad Akram Sohail,
Secretary/DG AJK State Disaster Management Authority,
AJK Government, Muzaffarabad.
48. Mr. Abdul Qayyum,
Director General, G-B Disaster Management Authority.
49. Mr. Matloob Hussain Shah,
Chief Planning, Gilgit/Baltistan.
50. Mr. Arshad Khan,
FATA Disaster Management Authority, Peshawar.
51. Mr. Mohsan Chandna, Secretary,
Planning & Development Department, Government of Sindh.
52. Mr. Shahabuddin Channa,
Secretary Rehabilitation Department, Government of Sindh.
53. Mr. Sualeh Ahmed Faroqui
Former D.G. PDMA, Karachi.
54. Khanzada Ameer Masood,
Affectee from Dera Ismail Khan.
55. Raja Raza Arshad, National Project Coordinator, Flood Reconstruction Unit, Planning Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad.
56. Mr. Naseer Gillani, Chief,
Planning Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad.
57. Mr. Shahid Humayun,
Consultant, Flood Reconstruction Unit, Planning Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad.
58. Mr. Jawaid Akhtar Sheikh,
Flood Reconstruction Unit, Planning Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad.
59. Mr. Zia-ul-Islam, Statistic Officer, Statistic Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.
60. Syed Khursid Ahmed Shah, Federal Minister of Religious Affairs & Labour & Manpower, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.
61. Jam Saif Ullah Dharejo, Minister for Irrigation & Power Department, Government of Sindh.
62. Mir Aijaz Hussain Jakharni, M.N.A. Former Federal Minister.
63. Sardar Mohammad Saif-ud-Din Khan Khosa, M.N.A.
64. Malik Ahmed Yar Hunjra, M.P.A. (Punjab).

ANNEX-II-B

LIST OF PUBLIC WITNESS & THOSE WHO MET THE COMMISSION AT BREACHED BUND SITES

SR # NAME PAGE
1. Nadar Ali S/o Abdul Majeed 1-2
2. Bahram S/o Abdul Khaliq
3. Mumtaz Ali S/o Ali Balawal
4. Zakir Hussain S/o Kozo Khan
5. Javed Ahmed S/o Muhammad Azeem
6. Sabir Ali S/o Naik Muhammad
7. Lal Muhammad S/o Rahim Bukhsh
8. Khadim Hussain S/o Naik Muhammad
9. Liaqait Ali S/o Sher Muhammad
10. Azad Ali S/o Abdul Sattar
11. Wahid Bakhsh S/o Sabloo Khan
12. Esoo S/o Mehboob Sidhi
13. Abid Hussain S/o Guroo
14. Wazir Ali S/o Abdul Khaliq
15. Babil Khan S/o Balawal Khan
16. Araz Muhammad S/o Allah Aziao
17. Manzoor Ali S/o Naik Muhammad
18. Rahib Ali S/o Ali Gohar
19. Shah Murad S/o Allah Ameelo
20. Jaffar S/o Bilal
21. Naseer Muhammad S/o Abdul Khaliq
22. Farooq S/o Abdul Sattar
23. Haji Bandi S/o Peer Bukhsh 3-8
24. Munoo S/o Khaman Nonari 9-12
25. Saleem
25. Nisar Ahmed S/o Ameer Bukhsh 13-17
26. Peer Bukhsh S/o Nabi Bukhsh 18-31
27. Muhammad Tariq S/o Abdul Qadir
28. Muhammad S/o Muhammad Naeem
29. Jalal-ud-Din S/o Muhammad Murid
30. Sair Ali S/o Moman
31. Baqa Muhmmad S/o Allah Bukhsh
32. Kabal S/o Muhammad Ramzan
33. Muhammad Amin S/o Muhammad Khan
34. Muhammad Salah S/o Alhtano
35. Jani S/o Haider Bukhsh
36. Haiz Muhammad S/o Khoso
37. Khadim Hussain S/o Khawaja Dino
38. Ghulam Yasin S/o Dher Khan
39. Liaqat Ali S/o Naeem Khan
40. Haji Azhar Ali S/o Marhoom Nawab 32-35
41. Abdul Khdique S/o Ismail Memon 36-47
42. Saifullah S/o Muhammad Hashim Junejo
43. Syed Mir Muhammad Shah S/o Amir Muhammad Khan
44. Mono S/o Khaman Noorani
45. Abdul Aziz S/o Adam Memon
46. Essa S/o Pir Dino Soorjo
47. Gulzar Ahmed S/o Muhammad Yousaf
48. Zerano W/o Punhoon
49. Ajiz Khawaja
50. Ayaz Sheearni, M.N.A.
51. Hanif S/o Muhammad Ismail
52. Ali Ahmed Hani 48
53. Mst. Amina
54. Merban Ali
55. Ghulam Muhammad
56. Aslam
57. Muhammad Ali
58. Nalo Shamee
59. Dost Ali
60. Ali Bukhsh
61. Muhammad Rafique
62. Wali Muhammad
63. Habib Bukhsh
64. Ali Nawaz S/o Ismail Malah 49
65. Ali Raza S/o Ismail Malah
66. Khan S/o Ali Muhammad
67. Al-Hajrio S/o Khamisoo Mir
68. Muhammad S/o Ismail
69. Ismail S/o Ali Muhammad
70. Rahmat S/o Ismail
71. Peerion S/o Yalghoon Jakhro
72. Ahmed S/o Yanio Sorjo
73. Nooral S/o Mamoo Jakhro
74. Abur Razzaq S/o Muhammad Janori
75. Mst. Sharifan Wd/o Lal Khan
76. Mohib Ali Shah S/o Muhammad Hamin Shah
77. Muhammad Hussain S/o Muhammad Ali Shah
78. Muhammad Ismail S/o Muhammad Juman Shah
79. Ghulam Rasool S/o Muhammad Hussain Shah
80. Muhammad S/o Abdo
81. Abdul Khaliq Malah S/o Muhammad Ismail Malah
82. Abdur Rehman S/o Muhammad Moosa
83. Achar S/o Edoo Mallah
84. Haji S/o Hussain Malah
85. Halima W/o Kangoo
86. Haji S/o Karim Bux
87. Ghulam Hussain S/o Whato Khan
88. Ali Nawaz S/o Ghulam Hussain
89. Ashike Ali S/o Yar Muhammad Janwali
90. Ali Ahmed S/o Rahim Bukhsh Bikak
91. Amoo S/o Junaid Palari
92. Safeel S/o Amoo Palari
93. Muhammad S/o Zakir Soorjo
94. Sadique S/o Ahmed Nodrus 51-52
95. Muhammad Ahmed Nodrus
96. Akbar S/o Menon Wasio
97. Ijaz Ali S/o Faqir Muhammad
98. Ali Nawaz S/o Arab Sarjo
99. Muhammad Arib S/o Ramzan Sarjo
100. Ahmed S/o Achar Soorojo
101. Muhammad Ramza S/o Ismail Soorjo
102. Abdul Ghafoor S/o Miheno
103. Muhammad Hassan S/o Muhammad Yousaf
104. Baboo S/o Achar Saroojo
105. Muhammad Rahim S/o Karab
106. Muhammad Hussain S/o Ali Muhammad Saroojo
107. Ali Muhammad S/o Usman Saroojo
108. Ibrahim S/o Achar Soorojo
109. Bichal S/o Late Muhammad Hasan Lashari
110. Sanot S/o Usman Lashari
111. Iqbal Ahmed S/o Aljabio Lashari
112. Muhammad Sadique S/o Ibrahim Saroojo
113. Faiz Muhammad S/o Ayub Lashari
114. Haji S/o Waro Saroojo
115. Jamoon S/o Haji Saroojo
116. Abdur Rahim S/o Ahmed Saroojo
117. Ahmed S/o Pino Saroojo
118. Daud S/o Pino Saroojo
119. Ali Nawaz S/o Arab Saroojo
120. Aslam S/o Salah Muhammad Saroojo
121. Yousaf S/o Peeno Saroojo
122. Adan Zal S/o Late Peeno Saroojo
123. Habib Zal S/o Late Peeno Saroojo
124. Suleman S/o Haroon Nahio
125. Usman S/o Muhammad Yaqoob
126. Zakir Hussain S/o Adam Khan
127. Muhammad Umar S/o Haroon Nahieo
128. Hussain S/o Abdo Khokhar 53-54
129. Muhammad Ibrahim S/o Munir Muhammad
130. Sajin S/o Procha
131. Ganoor S/o Abdul Awal
132. Khan Muhammad S/o Ghulam
133. Haji S/o Muhammad Jumman Khokhar
134. Ghulam Qadir S/o Hameed
135. Wahid Bukhsh S/o Allah Nawati
136. Muhammad S/o Muhammad Ismail
137. Barkat Yar Muhammad
138. Muhammad Umar S/o Muhammad Malah
139. Ellahi Bukhsh S/o Janghli
140. Muhammad Urs Salah Jakhro
141. Rangash Ali S/o Gaito Jakhro
142. Qasim Muhammad Mazin
143. Kahmiso Shafi S/o Muhammad Jakroo
144. Qabool Khan S/o Mubarik Jakhroo
145. Ali Abid S/o Haji Khan Jakhroo
146. Yousaf Ellahli
147. Ratho Muhammad Yousaf
148. Adam Ellahi
149. Shad Muhammad Siad Jakhroo
150. Majnoon Ibrahim
151. Ellahi Yousaf
152. Mst. Zinat
153. Sahrin Bano
154. Abdullah Ibrahim
155. Bakhsh Ali
156. Ahmed Ibrahim
157. Ali Abid Noor Muhammad
158. Ghulam Mustafa S/o Darwa Khan
159. Jamil Ahmed S/o Mehmood
160. Gul Muhammad S/o Umar Soorojo
161. Amoo S/o Ali Muhammad
162. Muhammad Jumman
163. Mr. Muhammad Ashraf Khan Rind
Ex-Nazim, UC-5, Taunsa Barrage, Kot Addu. 55-84
164. Ijaz Hussain S/o Ghulam Hassan 85-118
165. Aijaz Ali Khowaja S/o Haji Imam Bux 119-130
166. Nazir Ahmed S/o Muhammad Suleman
167. Muhammad Hussain S/o Muhammad Suleman
168. Abdullah S/o Nazir Ahmed
169. Abdul Jabbar S/o Muhammad Moosa
170. Fahmeeda w/o Shahbaz Ali
171. Shoukat Ali S/o Ghulam Hussain
172. Abdul Haye S/o Gahi Khan

ANNEX-III-B

NDMA Report available separately on excel sheet

ANNEX-III-B-I

Cash Assistance
Table-1
Watan Cards- Summarized Status
Province Releases (In billion) Cards issued Disbursement
Federal Provincial Total Total (in billion) % of releases
Punjab 6.796 6.092 12.888 608,943 12.161 94.359
Sindh 5.350 5.870 11.220 591,016 11.217 99.973
KPK 2.500 2.500 5.000 206,029 4.121 82.420
Balochistan 1.250 1.250 2.500 116,639 2.165 86.600
AJ&K 0.500 0.000 0.500 10,617 0.212 42.400
GB 0.130 0.000 0.130 7,939 0.117 90.000
Total: 16.526 15.712 32.238 1,541,183 29.993 93.036

Table-2
Releases for Watan Cards – Bankwise Status.
(Rs. in billion)
UBL (Opened; 07.09.2010)
Province Releases Disbursement
Federal Province Total Watan cards issued Amount Amount w.drawn % of releases
Punjab 5.700 5.000 10.700 512,957 10.259 10.103 95.879
Sindh 3.500 3.670 7.170 358,455 7.169 7.232 99.986
KPK 2.500 2.500 5.000 206,029 4.121 4.090 82.420
AJ&K 0.500 0.000 0.500 10,617 0.212 0.210 42.400
Total: 12.200 11.170 23.370 1,088,058 21.761 21.635 93.115
Alfalah (Opened; 29.09.2010)
Province Releases Disbursement
Federal Province Total Watan cards issued Amount Amount w.drawn % of releases
Punjab 1.096 1.092 2.188 95,986 1.902 - 86.929
GB 0.130 0.000 0.130 7,939 0.117 - 90.000
Total: 1.226 1.092 2.318 103,925 2.019 87.101
HBL (Opened; 06.10.2010)
Province Releases Disbursement
Federal Province Total Watan cards issued Amount Amount w.drawn % of releases
Sindh 1.850 2.200 4.050 232,561 4.048 4.020 99.951
Balochistan 1.250 1.250 2.500 116,639 2.165 2.125 86.600
Total: 3.100 3.450 6.550 349,200 6.213 6.145 94.855
G. Total:- 16.526 15.712 32.238 1,541,183 29.993 27.780 93.036

C. Contribution in Prime Minister’s Relief Fund 2010

As on 30 April 2011
Source; State Bank

ANNEX-III-B-II

WATAN-CARDS (2ND INSTALLMENT DUE FOR DISBURSEMENT)

S.No COUNTRY / IFI CDCP* REMARKS Disbursed so far
1. China 10 Only US $ 10 Million disbursed so far 10
2. USA 190 These allocations have been proposed to be readjusted from the existing portfolio of KLB for the year 2010. EAD is engaged with USAID for the mechanism of utilization of these allocations. This amount will be expected to be utilized for second tranch of Rs. 40,000 to be paid to flood affected families per house hold. Nil
3. World Bank 125
(IDA soft terms) Loan has been approved by the World Bank but not disbursed so far. Nil
4. Italy 65 Confirmation from Italy is awaited Nil
TOTAL 390 10

ANNEX-III-B-III

Status of Prime Minister’s Relief Fund – 2010
As on 30 April, 2011

S.No Offices Opening Balance Day Receipts (Amount in Rs.)
Progressive balance
1. Lahore 1,511,277 1,511,277
2. Faisalabad 1,657,012 1,657,012
3. Multan 454,623 157 54,780
4. Sialkot 412,870 412,870
5. Bahawalpur 41,0,727 410,727
6. Gujranwala 228,128 228,128
7. Rawalpindi 2,975,060 2,975,060
8. Islamabad 6,781,067,387 6,781,067,387
9. Karachi 1,017,109,522 1,017,109,522
10. N. Nazimabad Kar 100,579 100,579
11. Hyderabad 938,298 938,298
12. Sukkur 293,046 293,046
13. Peshawar 1,626,416 1,626,715
14. D.I.Khan 36,790 36,790
15. Muzaffarabad 2,125,716 2,126,715
16. Muzaffarabad 2,125,716 2,126,715
Sub-Total; (A) 7,812,442,387 157 7,812,442,544
Foreign Currency Account 1,088,807,205 1,038,807,205
NBP B&C Branches (B) 2,924,833 2,924,833
Total: (A+B) 7,815,367,220 157 7,815,367,220
Grand Total 7,815,367,220 157 7,815,367,220
Adjusted Amount Total 7,811,861,577

ANNEX-III-B-IV

RELIEF IN KIND BY PDMA’S

Distribution of Relief Goods amongst Flood Affectees

items Area Total
Punjab Sindh Khyber Pakhtun Khwa Balochistan AJK Gilgit
1st Aid Box 150 80 230
Basins 7,658 16,768 24,426
Blankets 369,734 669,303 779,385 57,580 21,237 21,244 1,918,483
Buckets 39,929 56,644 128,987 13,173 46 512 239,291
Candles 5,760 10,000 10 15,770
Clothes 8,020 108,757 8,731 35,589 5,672 27,422 194,191
Dates(Tons) 217 210 172 70 58 50 777
De-Watering Pumps 4 25 11 2 42
Emergency Drinking Water Kits 770 814 1,584
Generator Sets 227 9 304 9 549
Hygiene Kits 27,641 44,083 75,427 12,264 691 364 160,470
Jackets 780 770 6,009 2,070 500 10,129
Jerry Canes 119,419 129,095 205,350 25,871 2,805 613 483,153
Kerosene Stoves 1,068 8,607 193 9,868
Kitchen Sets 98,642 136,081 165,286 8,920 2,611 861 412,401
Medicines (Tons) 131 169 50 45 10 23 428
Misc Food Items(Packets & Bags) 117,693 127,793 127,744 18,927 8,550 7,971 408,678
Mosquito Nets 39,532 118,588 59,918 72,224 290,262
MREs/ Cooked Food 3,329,748 6,577,034 822,991 13,036 6,924 6,924 10,756,657

Plastic Mats/Sheets 22,172 66,046 13,667 25,053 2,200 399 129,537
Shetters/Over-Night Kits 7,746 1,950 9,696
Soaps 77,946 54,936 331,460 45,075 2,184 511,601
Tents 163,422 150,654 137,020 30,929 2,686 4,466 489,177
Torch Lightes 1,500 1,600 1,739 4,839
Towels 790 1,010 100 40 300 80 2,320
Trapulines 232,860 347,158 334,208 13,058 2,836 585 930,705
Water Bottles 24,744 89,196 11,292 17,310 4,667 288 147,497
Water Purificaion Kits/Units 3,943 5,965 5,254 5 15,167
Water Purificaion Tables 250 250
Water Purification Plants 3 53 14 70
Water Tanks 80 76 14 35 10 215
Source: National Disaster Management Authority, Prime Minister’s Secretariat, Islamabad

DISTRIBUTION OF RELIEF GOODS AMONGST FLOOD AFFECTEES

Items Area
Punjab Sindh Khyber Pakhtun Khwa Balochistan Gilgit/ Baltistan AJK Total
Food Items
Baby Milk (cartons) 40 70 110
Beans (pieces) 221,087 221,087
Biscuit (1 shopper) 108 108
Biscuits (cartons) 2,100 740 134 22 2,996
Biscuits (packets) 8 8
Black channa (packets) 374 374
Boiled Rice (cartons) 50 50
Bread (cartons) 5,674 5,674
Cake Cartons 1,021 50 1,071
Cooking 1 1
Cooking oil 1,345 1,345
Cooking oil (bottles) 1,880 1,880
Cooking oil 4.5 ltr 173 173
Crispo Rus/Biscuits 168 168
Dates 140 1,130 1,270
Dates (20 kg crtn) 1,275 271 1,546
Dates 10 kg cartons 65 65
Dates 15 kg bag 1 1
Dates 5 kg cartons 1,572 1,572
Dates cartons 264 264
Drinking water 293,715 293,715
Dry Food (bags) 1,311 1,311
Family Bags (Dry Ration)cartons 23,679 23,679
Fish tin (pieces) 25,128 25,128
Flour (1 kg shopper) 711 711
Flour (bags) 120 120
Flour 10 Kg bag 2,507 2,993 5,500
Flour 20 Kg bag 14,060 8,578 22,638
Flour 40 kg 443 521 964
Flour 5 kg bag 263 263
Flour 85 kg bag 117 117
Food Carton 12 12
Food Items 130 130
Food package 4,654 4,654
Food packets 40,361 40,361
Fried Rice 45 13 58
Fry chana 20 kg 1 1
Ghee (10 kg cartons) 30 30
Ghee (900 gram packt crtn) 28 28
Ghee 1kg packet 130 2,212 2,342
Ghee 2.5 kg 121 1,000 1,121
Ghee 5 Kg 210 241 451
Gheee 16 kg tin 7 7
Honey + Jam 100 100
Jelly (cartons) 1,711 1,711
Juice (Crtn) 26 328 354
Lobia (50 kg) 185 185
Medicine ctn 615 615
Milk pack (Crtn) 6 534 540
Milk powder 105 105
Milk powder (25 kg tin) 537 40 577
Milk powder (6 kg crn) 40 40
Milk powder (9.6 kg crtn) 51 51
Milk powder (cartons) 214 214
Mineral Water (bottle) 5,712 5,712
Mineral water (Carons) 24,235 24,235
Mix Ration (Cart bag) 11,172 11,172
Noodles (bags) 98 98
Preserved Food (catons) 150 150
Pulses 234 234
Pulses (50 kg bag) 501 24 525
Pulses 40kg 361 361
Pulses mix (tin) 1,046 1,046
Red Chillies (cartons) 2 2
Rice 5,855 5,855
Rice (40 kg bag) -
Rice (50 kg bag) 1,384 90 1,474
Rice 5 kg 108 108
Salt (Cartons) 54 53 107
Sugar (50 Kg) 900 900
Sugar (bags) 55 55
Sugar 40 kg bag 18 18
Tea (12 kg cartons) 19 19
Tea (20 kg) 1 1
Tea (25 kg bag) 20 20
Tea (400 gm) 52 52
Tea (cartons) 25 25
veramcelli (cartons) 109 109
Water flitter bottles (cartons) 266 266
Water purifiers 480 480
Wheat (50 Kg) 106 106
Non-Food Items
Baking soap (cartons) 20 20
Baskets 7,240 7,240
Bath soap 28 15 8 51
Bed Sheets 16,931 16,931
Blanket 55,234 986,119 10,560 406 11,700 1,064,019
Bucket Plastic 319,768 41,200 5 360,973
Candles 500 447 947
Carpet rolls 82 82
Carpets 83 83
CGI sheet 218 218
Cloth (new) 100 100
Cloth Cotton 39 6 45
Cloth mix 3 3
Clothes (cartns) 7,066 7,066
Cloths (pair) 1,670 1,670
Fiber slabs 4,604 4,604
Fire Extinguisher 6 6
First Aid Kit 34 34
Foil mats (cartons) 123 123
Gateries (mix cloth) 131 131
Generators 6 3 20 29
Hand lotion (cartons) 1,798 1,798
Hurry can lamps 200 200
Hygiene Kit 892 111,150 5 112,047
Hygiene Kit Modul 1 1
Jacket 7,231 100 212 24 7,567
Jerry Cane 133 363,567 5,995 2,978 372,673
Jug (Cartons) 4 4
Kitchen set 1,289 198,223 4,050 40 203,602
Kudal 72 72
Lantrn 3 3
Latreen Slab 2 2
LPG Cylinder 4 4
Match box (ctn) 1 1
Matress Foam 50 50
Mats 136,142 1,384 137,526
Mattresses 607 369,068 369,675
Medicines (cartns) 4,421 2,955 1,104 8,480
Medicines Lanoxin (amp) 30 30
Microne (packets) 50 50
Mix Climate 1 1
Mosquito nets 560 126,046 1,500 128,106
Nail Kg 400 400
New born kit 1 1
Overnight kits (cartons) 143 143
Pajama/Shirt Hosiery 6,072 6,072
Pampers (cartons) 490 490
PGI Sheet 14 14
Plastic Gallon 85 85
Plastic mats 10,165 10,165
Plastic Mats 22,811 22,811
Plastic sheet 280,789 5,600 93 286,482
P-Mate 57 57
Quilts Bedding 247,988 322,075 430 179 12 570,684
Readymade garments Crtn 7 7
Rock balt (30 kg bag) 6 6
School Kit 7 7
Shawl/chadar/dupatta 73 168 241
Shelter Box/kit 400 7,628 8,028
Shelters 374 374
Shoes (crtns) 24 24
Shoes pair 4,504 4,818 3 9,325
Sleeping bag 79 79
Sleeping beds 580 580
Soap (cartons) 746 10 756
Socks (pair) 3,500 5,203 8,703
Spade 72 72
Spade Handle 72 72
Stove 246 7,000 1,410 8,656
Surf (cartons) 432 432
Surf (packet) 50 50
Sweaters 15,309 200 6,072 21,581
Tarpal 12 12
Tarpauline 72 72
Tarpau-line 63,557 63,557
Tents 61,321 36,832 178,379 14,179 935 698 292,344
Tool Kit 4,138 4,138
Towles/bed sheets 3,800 3,800
Uniform Cloth Caton 1,140 1,140
Used Cloth 18 18
Washing soap (cartons) 148 148
Water containers 1,373 1,373
Water coolers 818 100 918
Wood 150 150
Others 58,434 58,434
Sources: 1. Relief & Crisis Management Department, Board of Revenue, Government of Punjab
2. Provincial Disaster Management Authority, Rehabilitation Department, Government Sindh
3. Provincial Disaster Management Authority / Provincial Reconstruction Rehabilitation & Sattlement Authority, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
4. Provincial Disaster Management Authority, Balochistan
5. GB Disaster Management Authority, Government of Gilgit-Baltistan
6. State Disaster Management Authority, Azad Governmnet of the State of Jammu & Kashmir

ANNEX-IV-A
ANNEX-IV-B

INDICATIVE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE BUT NOT FIRMED UP EXCEPT WHERE INDICATED OTHERWISE FOR POST FLOODS RECONSTRUCTION
AMOUNT (US$ M)
COUNTRY / IFI PROJECTIZED ASSISTANCE REMARKS Disbursed so far
1 China 590

• NHA Projects: 190
• Concessional Loan: 100
• Preferential Buyer’s Credit: 300
Nil
2 USA 155 These allocations have been proposed to be readjusted from the existing portfolio of KLB for the year 2010. EAD is engaged with USAID for the mechanism of utilization of these allocations. This amount will be expected to be utilized for second tranch of Rs. 40,000 to be paid to flood affected families per house hold. Nil
4 Italy 28.56 Confirmation from Italy is awaited Nil
5 IDB 10 For agriculture sector (seeds, earth moving machinery) and reconstruction of social services (education and health) projects Nil
6 Japan 173 For rural roads rehabilitation in KPK. The loan has been signed as of 22-02-2011at the rate of 0.01% with 40 years repayment period. Released US $ 25 Million to KPK 25
7 Saudi Arabia 300 It is a soft loan facility and Planning & Development Division has been requested to furnish reconstruction projects. Reply is awaited. Nil
8 Oman 19.1 Oman has offered US $ 19.1 M as grant. Planning Division has been requested to identify projects for Omani grant. Nil
9 Korea 5 Korea is interested in financing water and sanitation, education and health projects from KOICA grant. Nil
10 Turkey 70 Turkey has signed MOUs with three Provinces Punjab Sindh and Balochistan for construction of the following:
1. 8 schools (Punjab 4, Sindh and Boluchistan two each)
2. Construction of 4620 shelter houses (Punjab: 2120, Sindh: 2000 and Balochistan: 500)
3. 12 commercial centres (Punjab 5 Sindh 5 Boluchistan 2)
4. 2 village clinics one each in Punjab and Boluchistan)
5. 6 Mosques (Punjab 3, Sindh 2 and Boluchistan 1)
6. 6 social facilities (Punjab 4, Sindh and Baluchistan one each)
Turkish International Agency is spending this money itself. Nil
11 ADB
650
(OCR=$600 million & ADF=$50 million The loan has been signed on 14.04.2011 and the legal opinion is awaited from the Law Division.
The amount is apportioned as under:-
(i) Reconstruction of National Highway’s (693km) through NHA. The loan amount for NHA in $ 285 million.
(ii) Reconstruction/Rehabilitation of Provincial Roads including Bridges in Sindh (800km) . The loan amount for this component is US$ 131 million
(iii) Reconstruction/Rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure is Sindh. The amount for this component is US$ 184 million.
(iv) The ADF amounting to US$ 50 million is only for irrigation sector, Government of Sindh. Nil